A Palestinian woman gazes out at Israeli soldiers outside her house in Hebron.

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Nordic Ecolabel
Armed conflict destroys societies, hampers development and makes it difficult for local populations to shape their own future. The population suffers, both while the conflict is raging and, often, for generations thereafter. People fleeing, an infrastructure in ruins and a collapsing economy can create a breeding ground for terrorism and international crime. There is often a risk that the conflict will spread to neighbouring countries.

The main topic of this year’s Results Report is aid to countries in conflict and fragile states. No fragile state is on track to achieve a single UN Millennium Development Goal by 2015. We need more knowledge and debate about what works and what doesn’t. We must do more of what works well. We must change or stop doing what doesn’t work.

This year’s topic is important, but challenging. Countries in conflict are the hardest countries in which to achieve results. The political situation can change quickly. In societies where lawlessness and corruption are rife, aid activities must be monitored particularly closely. There is also a risk that the assistance will become part of the conflict. The chance of failure is ever-present. Nevertheless, the risk attached to not doing anything can be greater than the chance of failing in the attempt.

Many factors determine whether societies can progress from war to peace. Development or humanitarian assistance is one small factor, and the results must be considered in the light of that fact. The Results Report contains examples of Norwegian assistance that has helped to save lives and reduce the suffering caused by war and conflict. People displaced by conflict have been given shelter, food and water, and the wounded have received medical attention. The report also contains examples of assistance that has contributed to stabilisation and peacebuilding with the help of civilian observers, through reconciliation measures, or by giving previously marginalised groups a chance to participate in political processes. It also describes initiatives that have contributed to the reconstruction and development of government institutions and a dynamic civil society. In addition to the direct effect of these activities, an international presence can be instrumental in protecting the civilian population.

Norad’s Results Report is one of several contributions to greater transparency with regard to results and challenges in Norwegian development and humanitarian assistance. The report is neither a research report nor an overall evaluation of all Norwegian aid for countries in conflict, but the analyses and examples are based on evaluations, research and international experience.

Oslo, 12 December 2011

Villa Kulild
Director-General
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Seledonia Vicente from Guatemala at a workshop on raising awareness regarding the rights of Maya women in society.

Photo: Ken Opprann
Mines and other explosive devices continue to cause injuries long after a conflict has ended. In this workshop, prostheses are made for victims.
The Results Report consists of three independent parts:

**Aid and conflict**
This part presents examples of results and lessons learned from Norwegian and, to some extent, international aid during and after conflict. This is the main topic of this year’s report.

**Results – current issues**
This part gives a brief presentation of some of the political initiatives and studies that are influencing the debate on the results of Norwegian and international aid. It also contains some examples of the results of development and humanitarian assistance provided by Norway through multilateral organisations. This part is unrelated to the main topic.

**Narrative in Numbers**
This part contains statistics that show how Norwegian development assistance is used, and compare Norway with other donor countries. The statistics also show development trends in Norway’s main partner countries. This part is unrelated to the main topic.
PART 1 – AID AND CONFLICT

Armed conflict creates deprivation, suffering and destruction. It impedes development, creates a breeding ground for international crime, and creates insecurity that spills across the borders of the countries in which the conflict is taking place. Providing support for countries during and after conflict has become a key element of Norwegian foreign and development policy, both because the need to achieve development is so great and because unstable states can pose a threat to global security. In several places, due to the network of contacts to which Norway has access through its diplomatic presence and the local presence of Norwegian nongovernmental organisations, Norway has been able to play a facilitating role in peace processes. Aid provided to countries during and after conflict can be divided into three main categories, based on the general purpose of the assistance. Individual projects must primarily be assessed in the light of their direct objective, such as the reintegration of refugees, distribution of food, or the development of a national statistics agency.

Three main categories of aid for countries during and after conflict

- Conflict resolution and peacebuilding
- Humanitarian action
- Long-term development and statebuilding

Development policy is increasingly becoming an integral part of foreign policy. Development policy and foreign policy goals can seldom be separated from one another in a globalised world. Based on the premise that conflict hampers development and that the absence of development hampers peace, Norway employs a combination of diplomatic instruments and aid to promote peace and economic and social development. Since the terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001, there has also been greater focus on international security in the development assistance context. By providing assistance for statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile states, efforts are being made to eliminate safe havens for international terrorism and organised crime. There is a growing understanding that aid must be coordinated with other areas of government policy. At the same time, it is Norway’s policy to keep humanitarian assistance separate from military measures.

In 2010, six fragile states or countries in conflict were among the 10 largest recipients of Norwegian aid, and almost 35 per cent of the assistance allocated to countries went to countries in conflict. This accounted for 15 per cent of all Norwegian aid in 2010. Most of the support for these countries is ordinary development assistance and emergency relief, while a relatively minor portion goes to projects aimed specifically at resolving conflict and building peace (see the example in Figure 4 on page 25). The share of development and humanitarian assistance that is channelled through multilateral or nongovernmental organisations is high in conflict settings (see the example in Figure 6 on page 26). In more stable countries, development assistance can to a greater degree be provided through the country’s own institutions. Which channel will produce the best results is not a foregone conclusion, and must be determined on the basis of need and the capacity of the various actors in each individual case. Regardless of which channel is chosen, aid initiatives must be well grounded locally.

It is particularly difficult to provide aid to countries during and after conflict. The risk of not achieving targeted objectives is higher than in more stable situations because conditions can change rapidly. Knowledge of the interests of different groups, how they are affected by the conflict, and which factors in society have an exacerbating or mitigating effect on conflict is crucial if the assistance is to achieve positive results and avoid having a negative impact on the conflict situation. In addition, the actual job of carrying out aid projects can be dangerous. Despite these additional challenges, results monitoring must be carried out. It is important to understand what worked or did not work, and why.

Many factors determine whether a country succeeds in creating peace and ensuring stable social development. Aid can help to move matters in the right direction. Creating peace is primarily the task of the parties concerned. There must be a political will to make peace. In many contexts, regional or global political relations determine how the conflict develops. Using the degree of armed conflict as the only measure of whether aid has been successful is not very meaningful. It is more relevant to assess whether the assistance has strengthened elements upon which peace can be built.

The results on pages 37–63 show that while individual measures to promote reconciliation or disarmament can prove effective, peace is first and foremost a question of finding durable political solutions that have the support of the population. Once a solution has been found, development assistance can be instrumental in stabilising the situation and securing peace. The results of the humanitarian assistance provided (pages 64–70), show that it can be effective in terms of relieving suffering, while at the same time fostering long-term development. Assistance for statebuilding and development (pages 72–80), show good results in both the Palestinian Territory and Afghanistan, even if Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest and least safe countries to live in. In both situations, political development will be decisive for ensuring lasting peace.

Some examples of results

This year’s report illustrates the broad range of aid activities carried out in countries during and after conflict. The following is a summary of some examples of results that illustrate the results achieved by development and humanitarian assistance, but also the limitations of aid:

In Guatemala, Norway played a facilitator role in the peace process. Since the civil war was brought to an end by a peace agreement in 1996, Norway has focused all assistance on implementing the peace accords. This has helped to bring about electoral reforms and promote greater political participation among the Mayan Indians, who have also been given better educational programmes and better access to the judicial system. The end of the civil war has not resulted in a more peaceful
but has done little to reduce the conflict for the local population, and to reducing conflict in the early post-independence stage. In this respect, the goal for Norway’s development assistance has been reached, even though the realisation of the vision of a Palestinian state and a peaceful solution will be dependent on the political will of the parties concerned and the international community.

A project designed to resolve water resource conflicts between countries in the Middle East was largely unsuccessful. This was due to weak political support for the project in the various countries, and to the fact that the larger political conflicts between the countries overrode any progress made within the framework of the project.

When East Timor gained its independence from Indonesia, a large percentage of the new country’s youth was unemployed. A Norwegian-funded project, carried out by the International Labour Organization in cooperation with the East Timor government, helped to build 300 kilometres of road and to provide temporary employment for 23,500 people. For many, this was their first experience of engaging in paid labour. A review notes that this project contributed both to alleviating poverty and to reducing conflict in the early post-independence stage.

In South Sudan, the fight for access to arable land, grazing land and water sources continues to give rise to local armed conflicts. Norwegian People’s Aid has financed a survey of natural resources of this type in order to ensure better management and reduce conflict. This initiative has led to increased production and higher incomes for the local population, but has done little to reduce the conflict over natural resources.

Somalia is one of the most eloquent examples of the challenges encountered by aid actors in fragile states. As drought and famine take their toll, aid workers risk being kidnapped or murdered while attempting to bring help to a needy population. Armed groups demand fees to allow convoys carrying assistance to pass. By building up good relations with local communities, the Norwegian Refugee Council has succeeded in gaining acceptance for the organisation’s efforts to deliver emergency relief. They have been able to provide food and shelter, improved sanitation and has provided basic schooling for many thousands of people. In August 2011 alone, 70,000 Somalis received food aid from the Norwegian Refugee Council.

During the civil war in Sri Lanka, Norway acted as a facilitator for the peace process, in which the parties entered into a ceasefire agreement in 2002 and held peace negotiations from 2002 to 2003, as well as post-tsunami negotiations on a mechanism for aid delivery. Norway helped to establish and lead a civilian observer mission which monitored the parties’ implementation of the agreement. Among other things, the observers helped to ensure that local conflicts did not escalate, and that children recruited by force were released. When the parties chose to follow the path of war, there was nothing the observer mission could do. This is an example of a situation where the larger political situation determined the course of events.

In North Uganda, a partial peace agreement was signed with the rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 2006. This enabled internally displaced Ugandans to return to their homes, while the LRA established permanent bases in South Sudan, DR Congo and gradually also in the Central African Republic. Military operations and civilian campaigns in these countries have led LRA rebels to desert and return to Uganda under a promise of amnesty for former rebels. In many cases, the result has been that both victims and those responsible for abuses return to the same village, without the perpetrator of the abuse having received any form of punishment. A local organisation provides assistance for traumatised victims and promotes reconciliation, with support from Norway. This has helped survivors and perpetrators alike to reconcile themselves with the past and with one another. The project has given priority to support for women, not only as victims of abuse, but also as a driving force in the reconciliation process.

The peace agreement between the Maoist rebels and the government of Nepal in 2006 paved the way for the drafting of a new constitution and the development of a functioning democracy. Although the process has come to a standstill due to the significant differences dividing the parties, formerly marginalised groups have been given an opportunity to participate in the process. Norway has supported local organisations that work to promote the rights of ethnic minorities and women. As a result, ethnic minorities in remote areas have been able to influence proposals for the new constitution.

The eastern parts of DR Congo are the areas of the world where the use of sexualised violence as a weapon of war is most widespread. The response of the international aid community has primarily been concentrated on providing medical and psychosocial assistance for survivors. Since the UN Security Council recognised sexualised violence as a threat to international peace and security, there has been greater focus on the need for a more coherent approach. In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a project that focused on prevention, legal aid and prosecution, in addition to healthcare. Funding was channelled through Norwegian and international organisations. The project has helped survivors to bring their cases before a court, and to raise awareness of women’s rights in the communities in which the sexualised violence occurs.

The multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was established in 2002, and comprises 17 different programmes in such sectors as education, infrastructure, hydropower and health. Along with other education initiatives, the education programme has helped to increase the number of children who attend school from around one million in 2001.
to around eight million in 2010. In 2001, almost no girls attended school. There were no women teachers in public schools. Now one third of all schoolchildren are girls, and almost one third of all teachers are women. More than 10,000 km of road have been improved, and Afghanistan is experiencing strong economic growth.

This growth cannot be ascribed solely to the ARTF, and the economic starting point was so low that Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most impoverished countries. An evaluation of the ARTF has concluded that good results are being achieved in the light of the security situation and the poor state of the country’s economy at the outset. Afghanistan is an example of the need for donors to monitor the use of aid to ensure results and reduce the risk of corruption. A 2008 evaluation pointed out that the monitoring of results on the ground was inadequate. When acts of corruption were revealed in connection with Kabul Bank, where for example ARTF funds intended for the payment of wages to public employees were deposited, Norway and other donors stopped substantial payouts. Before any new payouts were made, the Afghan authorities had to satisfy a long list of requirements in order to obtain an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

These results and experiences are consistent with the knowledge that has been acquired internationally concerning international engagement in conflict settings, fragile states and in countries emerging from conflict.

All in all, they offer grounds for reflection on some lessons learned. The most important of these are:

- Aid can contribute to creating and maintaining peace if the projects are well grounded in the local community and can be adapted to changing circumstances. This calls for good risk assessment and management both prior to and during project implementation.

- On the whole, the principle of avoiding unintended effects that exacerbate the conflict situation, and of making active use of aid to promote peace, is not sufficiently observed. It seems that the need to act quickly often conflicts with the need to carry out in-depth analyses of the situation in the recipient country. It is also important that the international donor community and recipient countries reach agreement on a system of task-sharing that does not create long-term parallel structures, as this undermines the development of national institutions.

### PART 2 – RESULTS – CURRENT ISSUES

Part 2 presents some of the initiatives and studies that influence the focus on results in Norwegian and international development assistance. For instance, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and results-based financing are topics to which considerable attention is currently being devoted. Results-based financing is being used in several projects and programmes supported by Norway, such as the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative and the International Energy and Climate Initiative – Energy +.

Part 2 also contains a discussion of the calculation of Norway’s share of results in cases where numerous stakeholders and factors are involved. In simple terms, Norway’s share of the results achieved by multilateral organisations can be said to be equivalent to Norway’s share of the budget. At the level of an entire sector, where different national and international actors have contributed, it is more difficult to determine what Norway’s share of the results amounts to. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has influenced much of the debate on results in the past year through the comprehensive review of multilateral organisations it conducted to decide where the UK gets the best value for its money.

### PART 3 – NARRATIVE IN NUMBERS

Part 3 examines selected statistics with a view to highlight developments and trends in Norwegian development assistance, and trends in Norway’s main partner countries. It begins with an overview of Norwegian development assistance in 2010 and how it has developed in the past decade. In 2010, development assistance totalled NOK 27.7 billion. The Government achieved its target of providing one per cent of GNI in development assistance in 2009 and 2010, allocating 1.06 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively in those years. The last time that this objective was reached was in the period from 1982 to 1992. A major share of development assistance goes to earmarked projects and programmes administered by multilateral organisations. The most noticeable change in Norwegian development assistance in recent years is the increase in support for measures relating to climate, the environment and energy. The International Climate and Forest Initiative made Brazil, which previously received little aid from Norway, the largest recipient of Norwegian development assistance in 2010.

Norway is the country that provides the most development assistance in relation to GNI. Norwegian assistance accounts for around four per cent of all development assistance from OECD countries. Norway scores high on the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) due to its investments in developing countries, a development-friendly migration policy and the fact that it allocates a great deal of development assistance relative to GNI. Norway scores poorly in the trade-related section of the CDI on account of its high customs barriers and high agricultural subsidies.

Finally, a look is taken at development trends in the 10 countries that received the most Norwegian development assistance in 2010. The statistics show that it is the countries in sub-Saharan Africa which have the highest percentage of poor people, while Haiti and Brazil have the greatest inequality between rich and poor. Afghanistan is the country in the sample that is most dependent on development assistance. Most of the countries in the sample are making progress towards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals, but none of them appears able to achieve all the goals by 2015. Except for Haiti, which suffered a setback due to the earthquake in 2010, all the countries are experiencing economic growth.

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Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest and least safe countries. A poster of Dostum tops a gate in Maymane.
Part 1
Aid and conflict
The main topic of this year’s Results Report is the results of Norwegian aid to countries where conflict has had a significant impact on development. Armed conflict hampers development, and has a destructive impact on societies, both while it is ongoing and often for generations thereafter. Moreover, lawlessness in a country can create a fertile environment for terrorism and international crime, and there can be a risk of a conflict spreading to neighbouring countries. All of this makes it important for Norway to be actively engaged, for humanitarian, development and security reasons. The next five chapters consider aid in conflict settings from a variety of angles.

Chapter 1 provides brief background information on current thinking with regard to aid in conflict settings. Chapter 2 contains an overview of Norway’s engagement in countries in or emerging from conflict, with a few concrete examples of how this engagement manifests itself in different places. Chapter 2 also shows how Norwegian aid in conflict settings is distributed between countries and thematic sectors. Chapter 3 explains how aid policy and approaches have evolved with regard to conflict situations.

The main emphasis is on Chapter 4, which describes various forms of Norwegian engagement, illustrated by examples of results numbered from 1 to 32.

The examples are taken from countries and regions that have suffered protracted armed conflicts. In some of the countries, like Guatemala and Mozambique, the conflict ended several years ago, while in others, like Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territory, the conflicts remain unresolved. The examples can be read independently of one another, and the emphasis is on information about results. Most of the examples also include reflections on what we can learn from the various projects and programmes that have been carried out. Chapter 5 sums up how the examples in the report can provide insight into issues of relevance for the administration of Norwegian development and humanitarian assistance.
1. THE PREMISE FOR AID IN CONFLICT

Providing support for countries during and after conflict has become an important part of Norway’s development policy because the link between conflict and lack of development is so strong.

CONFLICT HAMPERS DEVELOPMENT

War does not occur only in poor countries, but the connection between armed conflict and a lack of development is manifest. Among the 48 countries classified by the UN as the least developed in the world in 2011, about half have experienced armed conflicts in the past decade. If we go 20 years back in time, the figure rises to two thirds.

In its World Development Report (WDR) 2011, the World Bank writes that in countries affected by violent conflict, the population is three times less likely to get an education, and that infant mortality is twice as high as in other developing countries. An estimate shows that countries in Africa were deprived of over USD 280 billion in potential economic growth due to armed conflicts between 1990 and 2005. That is as much money as all the countries in Africa received in international development assistance during the same period. The negative consequences are not limited to the country in which the conflict is taking place. The decline in growth is spreading to neighbouring countries. Statistics do however also show that life expectancy is rising, and that child mortality is falling, including in most conflict countries. War is now claiming fewer lives than before, humanitarian aid is more effective and people are better equipped to withstand reduced access to health services during conflict due to improved vaccination programmes and increased knowledge of disease prevention.

2 United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island States. www.un.org/ohrlls
3 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
4 Africa’s missing billions, IFVISA, Diem, and Salem, October 2007. The calculation was carried out by comparing the GDP of 23 countries in conflict with the economic growth of peaceful African countries with a comparable economic starting point at the beginning of the period.
5 Wim Naudé, Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, Mark McGillivray (ed.), Fragile States. Causes, Costs and Responses, page 105
Conflicts can have many causes. Sometimes it is a question of access to land or other resources. Chapter 4 contains relevant examples from both the Middle East and Sudan (see Examples 3, 4 and 31). As climate change escalates, such conflicts may increase in the future. In other cases, ethnic groups find themselves ignored in national politics. Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Balkans are all examples in this regard. The amendment of Nepal’s constitution (Example 20) and justice sector reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Example 21) are actions aimed at combating discrimination. Conflicts can flare up more easily in countries with a young population and high unemployment. Examples from East Timor, Sri Lanka, Haiti and Uganda (Examples 12–15) describe steps that have been taken to create employment to ensure stability and development. Creating jobs is one aspect of statebuilding. According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, most armed conflicts since World War II have been interstate wars, or wars of independence in which the warring parties were clearly defined. This is no longer the case. In many conflicts today, the front lines, motives and parties involved are unclear. Political violence and criminal violence are interwoven. A study of development assistance in Faryab Province in Afghanistan shows just how complex the causes of conflict can be. The population cites poverty as the primary cause of violence and lawlessness. People join rebel groups to obtain an income, rather than out of ideological or religious conviction, although the latter is also a factor. The conflicts in the region have also been fuelled by an unstable balance of power, discrimination of ethnic groups and corruption on the part of the authorities and in the legal system. Moreover, a fight over scarce resources triggers local conflicts that are not necessarily related to the general political conflicts in the country.

Box 1: Conflict

The report uses the term “conflict” to refer to organised violence. Various groups may be responsible: the state, parties to a civil war, political factions, local tribes and other groups, persons seeking to gain control of economic resources, criminal gangs or international networks with ideological motives. The definition does not cover domestic violence or other interpersonal violence. Clashes of interest are inherent in every society, and the goal is to resolve such differences through democratic processes and an impartial judicial system.

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8 Ibid. p. 8-23

9 The World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development

All countries and conflicts are different, but conflicts share dramatic common traits. Populations are forced to flee. People’s homes and living conditions are directly affected. Studies also show that the development gap between stable countries and countries affected by conflict has widened significantly in recent decades. Countries in conflict often have weak or debilitated government institutions, making it difficult for the country to lift itself out of poverty. It also makes the countries less resistant to both natural and man-made disasters.

The majority of civil wars and wars of independence end when one side defeats the other militarily, although more and more civil wars are being terminated through negotiations. The challenges that remain once the fighting has died down are considerable. In many places, the biggest problem is not political conflict between population groups, but organised crime related to natural resources, drugs and human trafficking.

The World Bank writes that many countries struggle to create stable political conditions, with the result that violence and conflict flare up again. Finding political solutions that effectively resolve the underlying causes of conflicts has proved to be difficult. Some 90 per cent of the armed conflicts that began after 2000 broke out in countries that had previously experienced civil war.\(^\text{12}\) There can be many reasons for this. Large groups of refugees and former combatants who return to their homes over a short period of time can lead to unrest, particularly if the disarmament process has not been completed or if there are few possibilities of making a living. In a climate of political instability and weak government institutions, new conflicts can arise. Local conflicts that have been latent can flare up when an oppressive regime is removed. When former enemies seek to resolve disputes by means of democratic mechanisms, new unrest may arise due to election fraud or certain groups’ lack of political influence. A study of the phenomenon of reversion to conflict after a peace agreement has been signed, concludes that in most cases foreign intervention, for instance in the form of peacekeeping forces and financial aid, are essential prerequisites for achieving a lasting end to a civil war.\(^\text{13}\)

### Aid is important but requires complex considerations

Conflict situations are unpredictable. Consequently, there is a greater risk that aid will not succeed in such situations than in other places. Some aid may produce quick, concrete results, such as shelter for refugees or the demining of farmland, while goals such as poverty reduction or more democracy are harder to achieve. Aid personnel working in the field are also more vulnerable in terms of security.

This year’s Results Report differentiates between three categories of aid during and after conflict: conflict resolution and peacebuilding, humanitarian action, and long-term development and statebuilding (see Box 3).

Regardless of the primary objective of an aid initiative, the principle that development assistance must be based on a thorough understanding of the conflict so that the assistance does not aggravate the situation, and so as to strengthen factors that can promote peace, should guide Norwegian aid in conflict settings.\(^\text{14}\) This may sound self-evident, but requires a thorough insight into the situation as well as the balancing of different priorities. For instance, much of the aid for Afghanistan has gone to the regions where conditions are the most unstable. The population in more peaceful areas therefore talk about a “peace penalty”, and many feel that leaders gain no advantage from combating violence, because the result may be less aid. Moreover, some be-

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**Box 2: Countries in conflict and fragile states**

Countries in conflict are defined as countries where there are more than 25 deaths per year as a result of hostilities between warring parties.\(^*\) This definition excludes countries which face many of the same challenges as conflict countries, but where there is either no direct conflict between defined parties or where there are low-intensity conflicts resulting in less than 25 deaths per year. The definition includes countries that are not relevant in a development assistance context.

The term “fragile states” is often used in development policy today. The OECD Development Assistance Committee defines fragile states as states that are unwilling or unable to provide basic services. Examples of such services are security and social services, or maintaining control of their own territory. The World Bank keeps an annual list of states that it considers to be fragile.\(^**\) Of the 33 countries and situations on the list in 2011, 23 are also on the UN’s list of the world’s least developed countries. According to the 2008 white paper Climate, Conflict and Capital (Report No. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting), Norway is to give priority to efforts in fragile states. The term is largely synonymous with the term “countries in conflict”, but there are fragile countries that do not fall within the definition of conflict, and there are countries in conflict that are not considered to be fragile.

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\(\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\) Hartzell, Caroline A. Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\) See the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, Chapter 1, for a broad discussion of the links between conflict and development.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{13}}\) Wilm Naudé, Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, Mark McGlone (ed.). Fragile States. Causes, Costs and Responses, page 25

\(\text{\textsuperscript{14}}\) The white paper Climate, Conflict and Capital (Report No. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting)
Box 3: Three main categories of aid for countries during and after conflict

**Conflict resolution and peacebuilding** seek to end violence and prevent a relapse into conflict. Conflict resolution requires political involvement, but can be complemented and supported through aid that strengthens forces for peace. Peacekeeping operations, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants are all measures used to prevent relapse into conflict. Attempts are also made to quickly provide the population with other concrete advantages linked to the end of conflict, for instance by creating new income opportunities, facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, or demining land areas to enable the population to return to their homes, schools and farmlands. The return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, reconciliation efforts and, if appropriate, judicial retribution are also important elements of these efforts. Several of these forms of aid can help to avert conflict. It is a question of lowering the level of conflict, preventing the parties from resorting to violence, and averting the renewed flare-up of conflicts.

**Humanitarian action** aims to relieve suffering and protect civilians, irrespective of their political, ethnic or religious affiliation. Typical activities are the establishment of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons, distribution of food, water and other vital necessities, provision of basic health and education services, and the creation of opportunities to earn a temporary income. Advocacy to prevent breaches of international law is part of the work of protecting civilians, as are demining programmes and information campaigns to prevent injuries caused by mines and other explosive devices. A review* of the humanitarian system in 2005 determined that there was insufficient linkage between emergency relief and long-term development cooperation. **Early recovery** consists of activities which support local resources in an emergency relief phase, and which help to restore sustainable services and infrastructure that will advance development.

**Long-term development and statebuilding** are the goal of all development cooperation. In countries that are in or have just emerged from violent conflict, economic and social development and the development of government institutions are particularly important and particularly difficult. Statebuilding is more than building institutions. It means developing a good system of governance based on the principles of transparency and accountability. This often entails efforts to weaken the factors fueling the conflict, such as discrimination and exclusion of minorities, corruption and inequitable distribution of the country’s resources, human rights violations, oppression of civil society and obstacles to a free press. Eliminating these causes is essential both to ensure lasting development and to create a society that can resolve conflicts of interest in a peaceful manner.

* UN OCHA, Humanitarian Response Review. 2005...


lieve that aid has become another resource to fight over. Another example of the unintended adverse effects of a project is found in DR Congo, where the road network was upgraded to enable security forces to conduct patrols and to facilitate the distribution of emergency relief to the local population. However, the improved roads have also made it easier to transport illegal products, such as logs from protected forests. Besides destroying the natural environment, this activity creates a source of income for militia groups. It is important to be able and willing to take risks if aid is to be used as a means of promoting peace and development in countries during and after conflict. The possibility that a project may not be completed, that political changes may undermine a reconciliation process, or that newly built infrastructure may be destroyed if war is resumed are risks that must be assessed and dealt with. Such assessments are emphasised in the guidelines for risk assessment and risk management in Norwegian development assistance. In conflict situations, quick decisions must sometimes be made, and the question of whether the negative consequences of not doing anything are greater than the risk of the project failing must be weighed. The example of the observer force on Sri Lanka (Example 7) describes one case where a quick decision was made in order to try to protect the peace.

Norway’s goal in providing aid to countries in conflict was defined in the white paper Climate, Conflict and Capital – Norwegian Development Policy Adapting to Change (Report No. 13 (2008–2009) to the Storting): “War causes humanitarian crises and exacerbates poverty; economic growth and development help to prevent war. (...) The Government will seek to resolve armed conflicts through close coordination between political and diplomatic efforts, and allocation of funding to both humanitarian and development measures.” The white paper describes the close interaction between foreign and development policy, and between diplomatic efforts and development assistance.

Box 4: Conflict sensitivity – Do No Harm*

Conflict sensitivity means understanding local conditions: which factors are fueling conflict, and which factors can promote peace. Any action that is taken must not exacerbate the situation; it must strengthen the forces for peace. This applies whether the aid is directly aimed at creating peace, or whether it seeks to alleviate suffering and promote development in spite of the conflict. The principle and the method are called “Do no harm”.

* See also OECD-DAC’s 10 principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations on page 3177 of this report.
The international community’s view of conflict, in particular internal conflicts, has changed. When the UN Charter was written in 1945, conflict was regarded as a matter between two states, or as part of a country’s internal affairs. Since then, conflict both in and between countries has to a greater degree come to be regarded as a matter of international ethics and security. The war in the Balkans and the genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s brought public pressure to bear on the international community to prevent further massacres and ethnic cleansing. In 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The UN Peacebuilding Commission was established later that same year.

Since 1993, Norway has developed a strong foreign policy engagement for peace and reconciliation. Several white papers presented in the 1990s and up to the present accentuate Norway’s commitment to peace. This emphasis has also had consequences for Norway’s development policy. Peace has been placed on a par with development as a goal for Norwegian development assistance.

While there are examples of Norway’s peace engagement prior to 1993, it was largely the lessons learned from the negotiations culminating in the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) that led to the promotion of peace gradually becoming a prominent feature of Norway’s foreign policy. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that small countries like Norway can play a role that superpowers cannot. The close cooperation between Norwegian non-governmental organisations, research institutions and government authorities has given rise to the concept of the Norwegian model.

In many places, the network of contacts built up over time in conflict-affected areas by civil society organisations and researchers has been a significant driver of Norway’s engagement. Norway’s involvement in Guatemala (Box 5; see also Example 1) illustrates the importance of an effective, broad-based local network.

The purpose of providing support for research on peace and reconciliation is to strengthen Norway’s knowledge of countries and situations in which Norway is engaged, and of various instruments employed in peacebuilding. In some conflicts, research institutions have played an independent role in the peace processes. An evaluation carried out in 2008 assessed whether the grants made to the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), Fafo Applied International Studies, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) contributed to the efforts of the Norwegian authorities to promote peace in South Sudan, Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territory. The period evaluated was 2002–2007. During that period, the institutions received approximately NOK 166 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad for research on peace and reconciliation, security reform, disarmament, humanitarian assistance and human rights.

The evaluation confirms that Norwegian research and Norwegian researchers can play an important role for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in promoting peace. In Sudan, for instance, the research furnished knowledge that was used in the peace process. The research covered key issues in the peace negotiations: concentration of power, political and economic marginalisation, distribution of land, weak authorities and political parties, political rivalry and the failure to distribute oil revenues. Knowledge of these issues was important in determining the right approach to the peace negotiations. Researchers were also used as advisors in the peace negotiations. In some cases, the researcher proved to be at least as useful as the research. Briefings, seminars and contacts are essential to ensuring that research influences policy. In Sudan, the Norwegian institutions’ long-term cooperation with local research institutions proved decisive.

in ensuring that knowledge of vital importance to the peace process was supplied and used.

Successive governments have sustained Norway’s engagement for peace. At one time, particular importance was attached to Norway being an impartial actor. The argument was that, in many conflicts, Norway was perceived as an actor with no strong vested interests, and would therefore be particularly likely to win trust. This is still important as regards the opportunities open to Norway to make a difference in various conflicts. At the same time, Norway’s military engagement in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan sparked a debate on the link between different roles and instruments for promoting peace and security in Norwegian foreign policy. Several of the guiding principles for Norway’s various peace engagements were also examined more closely.

After the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, greater emphasis was placed on international security and engagement in fragile states. By providing assistance for statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile states, the international community sought to prevent these states from becoming havens for international terrorism and organised crime. Peacebuilding became part of Norway’s integrated development and foreign policy, and is an element of Norway’s policy of engagement. “This policy covers aid and the fight against poverty, efforts to promote human rights, peace and reconciliation efforts, and humanitarian policy and assistance. The policy is motivated by our values and is based on an altruistic desire to promote the common interests of mankind. At the same time globalisation implies that we must abandon a narrow interpretation of Norwegian interests and realpolitik. Global developments mean that peacebuilding and efforts to promote an international order and human rights are increasingly becoming realpolitik.”

Some aid actors are critical of the fact that security policy priorities are influencing development policy. Others consider this influence to be positive, because statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile states and countries in conflict lay the groundwork for economic and social development. One concern among critics of the policy of engagement is the risk that aid will become less effective if security policy constraints override assessments of recipients’ needs and capacity. Questions are also being asked about whether the goal of poverty reduction is being diluted.

Norway’s policy is to draw a clear distinction between military and humanitarian engagement. In some cases, the link between aid and security policy objectives has led military actors in some countries to provide aid in order to win the trust of the local population, and to keep the population from being recruited to armed groups. Humanitarian aid actors have criticised this approach for placing the lives of emergency relief workers at risk. There may also be a risk that neutral actors seeking to relieve distress may be mistaken for military actors, thereby becoming a target for rebel groups. A US university has conducted a series of studies to assess whether aid is an effective means of creating security, as was argued in connection with the war in Afghanistan, particularly by US authorities. The military forces in Afghanistan have carried out aid projects in an attempt to generate goodwill among the population. The studies conclude that short-term aid measures are not sufficient to improve the security situation.

Certain researchers have criticised Norway’s peace engagement for failing to achieve results. In 2006, Øyvind Østerud, Professor of Political Science, claimed that “our international peace engagement has generated very few documented positive effects”. The criticism concerned the fact that the political results were not what was hoped for or did not last long. An evaluation carried out in 1998 examined Norway’s peace efforts in Guatemala, Sudan, Mali and Burundi, and more aid-oriented activities in Mozambique and Rwanda. The evaluation concluded that

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20 La. Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Farah Province. Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, 2010. All the studies in the series are available on the university’s website.
the success of a peace process is contingent on a number of factors that are beyond the control of a third party acting as a negotiator or facilitator for the process. Both the internal situation in the country and the stance adopted by superpowers are pertinent factors. According to the evaluation, moreover, it is important to understand any incentives there may be for sustaining the conflict before assuming a role as facilitator. In Guatemala and Mali, where peaceful solutions were achieved, the evaluation team stated that the Norwegian non-governmental organisations’ long-standing local presence and knowledge of local conditions were an important reason why Norway was able to play a constructive role. Box 6 contains a summary of an evaluation of the Norwegian peace effort in Sri Lanka.

Conflicts and peace processes are affected by developments in a number of policy areas. The illegal sale of arms, drugs and natural resources, such as diamonds and coltan, keep conflicts alive. Furthermore, illegal activities such as trafficking and piracy can flourish in places where the state does not control the territory and is unable to combat crime. Those who engage in such activities profit from continued instability. In addition to providing aid and seeking to resolve conflicts, Norway therefore works with other countries to find common solutions to these problems. Examples include the efforts to put in place a global treaty to regulate trade in small arms and light weapons, and the process that resulted in the OECD guidelines for trade in minerals from conflict-affected areas.

Norway’s policy is that arms and other defence materiel are not to be sold to non-allied countries which are at war, where there is a threat of war or where there is a risk that the materiel will be used to commit human rights violations or enforce oppression.

Box 6: An evaluation of Norway’s peace efforts in Sri Lanka

An evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka concludes that there was little that Norway could do to prevent the war from resuming in 2006, and the humanitarian disaster that developed in 2009. Between 1997 and 2009, at the request of the parties to the conflict, Norway worked to support efforts to negotiate a peace settlement, and eventually as a facilitator for the peace process in Sri Lanka. The two parties to the conflict, the government in Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), entered into a ceasefire agreement in February 2002, which led to a decline in violence and the lifting of the trade embargo imposed on northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The parties came together to discuss a peaceful end to the conflict that had lasted since 1983. In April 2003, the LTTE withdrew from the negotiations. Despite persistent attempts on the part of Norway and the stated desire of both parties, expressed, for example, through post-tsunami aid negotiations and new peace negotiations in 2006, it proved to be impossible to bring the process back on a positive track. In 2006, a new war broke out which lasted until 18 May 2009. On that day, the Sri Lankan army won a military victory over the LTTE, and the LTTE leaders had been killed along with thousands of Tamil civilians who were used as human shields in the final stage of the war.

The evaluation acknowledges Norway’s contribution, particularly to the ceasefire agreement and the Oslo Communique in which the parties agreed to explore federal solutions. The evaluation also expresses recognition of the efforts to bring the parties together again after the tsunami in 2004. These efforts led to the parties reaching agreement on a joint mechanism for the allocation of aid funds to the war-affected areas (which was ruled unconstitutional by the Sri Lankan Supreme Court), but were unable to change the conditions that hindered a peaceful solution, or to prevent the parties from once again choosing war. The government that came to power in 2005 mobilised support from China and other Asian countries. This created new opportunities for a military solution, and undermined the will to compromise in order to reach a political solution. At the same time, the LTTE lost much of its international support and was split by internal dissent.

Since the hope of winning international sympathy and support for their cause was one of the main reasons for the LTTE’s willingness to negotiate, the loss of this support meant that they no longer saw any advantage in pursuing the negotiations.

According to the evaluation, Norway should have withdrawn earlier from its role as mediator when the peace process came to a standstill. The evaluation maintains that Norway should have been more alert to the fact that the peace process, as the evaluation team saw it, was strengthening the opposition in Sri Lanka. The evaluation also states that Norway should have made greater efforts to avoid being used as a pawn in the political game by setting clearer conditions for its engagement.

The evaluation team’s conclusion was discussed at a seminar at which the report was presented on 11 November 2011. Minister of the Environment and International Development Erik Solheim, the Norwegian facilitator in the peace process, welcomed the report and underscored the importance of learning from the peace efforts. He and a broad-based panel questioned why the evaluation maintained that Norway should have withdrawn earlier. Solheim pointed out that withdrawing in order to protect one’s own reputation was not a good enough reason, and further mentioned that in 2006 no one knew how the peace process was going to end. Both the parties to the conflict and international actors wanted Norway to maintain its engagement. The Norwegian mediators therefore continued their efforts to reach a peaceful solution. Both Solheim and the panel members pointed out that a number of unforeseen isolated incidents ultimately tipped the outcome towards war. Solheim claimed that the evaluation team was taking the end result for granted: the peace process had a tragic outcome, but could, if individual circumstances had developed a little differently, have led to a negotiated peace settlement.

Engagement for Peace in Many Countries

Norway’s engagement in peace and reconciliation processes takes a variety of forms, depending on the situation in the country concerned, the wishes of the parties involved, the action taken by other international actors, and Norway’s qualifications for contributing to the process. In some countries, Norway acts as a facilitator for negotiations, in others as a supporter for the UN and other actors.

Table 1 provides an overview of Norway’s engagement in peace processes since 1990. The list is organised alphabetically, and includes both countries in which Norway has played a political role and countries in which Norway has provided indirect support for the peace process. It primarily includes diplomatic engagements and contributions to peacemaking or peacekeeping forces. In addition to the involvement shown in this list, Norway facilitates confidential processes that are not public knowledge.

Norwegian non-governmental organisations, financed by Norwegian development assistance funds, have played a key role in the peace processes of certain countries. One example of this is Norwegian People’s Aid in South Sudan.

The role played by Norwegian People’s Aid in the secession of South Sudan

The second civil war in Sudan began in 1983, and is estimated to have cost the lives of more than two million South Sudanese. Around four million people were forced to flee. A peace agreement was signed in January 2005. After a six-year transitional period, a referendum was held on secession from Sudan. A total of 99 per cent of the population voted in favour of secession, and on 9 July 2011 South Sudan became an independent state. President Salva Kiir Mayardit thanked the entire international community in his speech that day, making particular mention of Norwegian People’s Aid on account of the organisation’s history in the country.

In the mid-1980s Norwegian People’s Aid became convinced that it could not remain neutral in a conflict where it wit-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Important aspects of Norway’s role</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Military participation in the ISAF Forces. Support for the Afghan authorities’ own peace and reconciliation initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>Facilitation of negotiations. Participation in NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo.</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Support for the UN Peacebuilding Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Facilitation of negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>Facilitation of secret “back channel” negotiations culminating in the Oslo II Accords. Chair of the AHLC donor country forum. Engagement in dialogue with all parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Support for reintegration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Support for negotiations in connection with the border conflict with Ethiopia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Support for negotiations in connection with the border conflict with Eritrea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Facilitation of negotiations since 2001. Contribution to human rights monitoring as part of the further peace process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Support for confidence-building measures since the mid-1990s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Financial support for mediation in Aceh and monitoring of the peace agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Support for mediation following the conflict triggered by the elections in 2007.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Support for demobilisation processes and security sector reform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Support for the Malinese authorities and the UN for security and dialogue projects in North Mali. Support for Norwegian Church Aid, which played an important role in local peace processes from 1992 to 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Dialogue with the parties to the conflict and other support for peace processes through the UN since 1996. Peace agreement signed in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Support for dialogue between religious groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Active participation in the International Contact Group for Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Key supporter of peace negotiations on South Sudan which led to a peace agreement in 2005. Key participant in coordination of international aid (“Troika member”). Norway headed the international monitoring force in the Nuba Mountains from 2002 to 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (Zanzibar)</td>
<td>Support for efforts to establish a coalition government on Zanzibar in 2010. The election in 2010 was the first peaceful election on Zanzibar. Previous elections have been disrupted by violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Support for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of rebel soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Support for dialogue and reconciliation since 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Norwegian People’s Aid

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24 Source: Norwegian People's Aid
nessed the government in Khartoum deliberately using hunger as a weapon against one population group to force them to leave areas controlled by the Sudan Liberation Army. Norwegian People’s Aid chose sides and decided to collaborate with SRRA, the humanitarian organisation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Norwegian People’s Aid had staff members who were willing to remain in conflict-affected areas when all the other organisations pulled out.

It is controversial for an aid organisation to take sides in a civil war. Norwegian People’s Aid was strongly criticised by the organisations affiliated with the UN-led Operation Lifeline, and has repeatedly been accused of prolonging the war. It has also been alleged that the organisation contributed to arms smuggling. Norwegian People’s Aid denies this.

Norwegian People’s Aid supplied food for hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese every year, and its hospitals provided medical care for tens of thousands. In the 1990s, the organisation began to engage in long-term development work in certain areas, with focus on vocational training and agricultural development. This enabled people to continue to live in areas controlled by the liberation movement. Since the peace agreement, the programme has switched from services provision to nation-building, with activities aimed at developing civil society. Norwegian People’s Aid also runs a demining programme that clears roads for the transport of goods and people, and land for farming.

Western Balkans – high-priority Norwegian aid in a conflict situation

Norway’s engagement in the Balkans reflects the close link between foreign and development policy, and shows how a region that would not normally have received Norwegian aid topped the list of Norwegian aid recipients for many years.

In the early 1990s, various regions of Yugoslavia began to demand their independence. Slovenia succeeded in finding a peaceful solution. When Croatia voiced the same desire, it resulted in war. When Bosnia-Herzegovina, home to Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, decided to become independent, it was largely against the will of the Serbian population. The conflict which began in 1991 did not end until the Dayton Agreement was signed by the parties in late 1995. Meanwhile, there was continued unrest in Kosovo Province, which demanded its independence from Serbia. The unrest led to increasingly violent armed confrontations. In 1999, NATO intervened by bombing Serbia.

Norway became well known as a donor that was quick to respond and flexible. The model based on direct management by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo made it possible to obtain rapid approval of new measures. This was important in an unpredictable situation where significant changes were taking place, and was appreciated by other actors who did not have the same ability to reallocate funds and implement political decisions quickly. At the same time, Norwegian support was criticised for not making better use of local expertise, which to some extent was the result of a lack of predictable funding. Agreements were entered into for no more than a year at a time. This made it difficult for partner organisations to plan long-term capacity-building programmes.

Emergency relief was important during the 1991–1996 war in Bosnia, and again during the 1998–2000 Kosovo conflict. Much of the assistance was used to rebuild houses and infrastructure. Towards the end of the period, funding for measures to promote good governance increased the most.
The use of Norwegian aid money

Priority has been given to providing developing assistance to countries in which Norway is involved in peace processes, but substantial support has also been given to countries in or emerging from conflict where Norway has had no part in the peace process. One such country is Mozambique, an important partner country for Norway.

Of the 10 largest recipients of Norwegian aid in 2010, five are defined as countries in conflict: Afghanistan, Sudan, the Palestinian Territory, Pakistan and Uganda. Haiti is not defined as a country in conflict, but is a fragile state plagued by violence, insecurity and poverty. Norway’s engagement in Haiti is active, but relatively limited, and is aimed at helping to reduce the violence that marks certain parts of Haitian society. The reason why Haiti ranked high on the list of recipients in 2010 is the emergency relief that was granted in response to the disastrous earthquake that struck the country.

Mozambique has enjoyed peace since 1992. The country has been an important partner country for Norway both during the war of liberation and during the ensuing period of peacebuilding and development.

Figure 3 shows that 15 per cent of Norwegian aid goes to countries in conflict. This equates to almost 35 per cent of country-specific aid. The figures do not indicate how much of the support is directly aimed at resolving conflicts. Furthermore, a large amount of aid is channelled through the UN, the World Bank and other global institutions, and is not earmarked by Norway for any specific country. A great deal of this funding goes to countries in conflict, but is not recorded as this type of assistance in Norway’s development assistance statistics. In 1999, OECD-DAC introduced a separate category of aid that is directly oriented towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding. At the time, this was a relatively new specialised area of development assistance. The category includes security sector reform, the peace-building phase of UN peace operations, reintegration of former combatants, measures for child soldiers, and demining. In 2010, Norway spent NOK 1.3 billion on this type of development assistance, accounting for 32 per cent of the support given to countries in conflict.

Most of the support for countries in conflict consists of emergency relief and ordinary development cooperation in sectors such as education, health, roads, energy and governance. This is illustrated by the assistance for Afghanistan. Only a little over 8 per cent of the Norwegian sector-specific aid provided to Afghanistan in 2010 was assistance directly conflict-related. Almost 18 per cent went to emergency relief, and a little over 21 per cent to good governance. In addition, support for the multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was channelled through the World Bank. The fund is the largest item (NOK 285 million in 2010) in Norway’s budget for aid for Afghanistan. The fund’s activities cover reconstruction, good governance and social sectors such as education and health.
Other aid: development, statebuilding
Humanitarian assistance
Directly conflict-related assistance

NOK MILLION

Norwegian aid for Afghanistan, 1999–2010
Source: Norad

FIGURE 4: AFGHANISTAN – A SMALL PORTION OF AID IS DIRECTLY CONFLICT-RELATED

Military expenditure on Afghanistan

Since 2005, the costs of Norway’s military operations in Afghanistan have exceeded Norwegian aid for the country. In 2010, military expenditure totalled NOK 1 billion, while aid amounted to NOK 726 million.

In a few cases, almost all of Norway’s aid for a country has been allocated to peacebuilding. One example of this is Guatemala, where Norway linked all assistance to the implementation of elements in the peace agreement (see Example 1). However, in the statistics, most of the assistance is categorised as “good governance” or “education”, etc., and not as peacebuilding.

Between 1990 and 2010, a total of 27 per cent of Norway’s total aid budget, which includes conflict-related assistance, ordinary development cooperation and emergency relief, went to the countries and areas on the list of Norway’s engagements for peace (Table 1). This assistance totalled NOK 73.8 billion. Some of the largest recipients were the Balkans, the Palestinian Territory, Afghanistan and Sudan. There is a clear correlation between the development of conflicts and the level of the assistance provided.

Figure 5 shows that aid for the Palestinian Territory increased after the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, and that assistance for the Balkans rose sharply at the time of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992. After the Dayton ceasefire agreement was signed in 1995, aid increased gradually at first and then significantly from 1998 to 1999 as a result of increased emergency relief and expenses relating to refugees in Norway. Assistance for Sudan rose in step with Norway’s involvement in the peace process that culminated in a peace agreement in 2005, and continued to increase after the agreement.

A large part of the increase consisted of emergency relief for Darfur. In Afghanistan, aid increased after 2001, as the Norwegian and international military presence intensified. The fluctuations in the support for Afghanistan primarily reflect the upscaling and downscaling of emergency relief.

FIGURE 5: AID PARALLELS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS

In 2010, aid was the largest recipient of Norwegian aid, as the country continued to support the peace agreement.

Aid for selected countries, 1990–2010
Source: Norad

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In a few cases, almost all of Norway’s aid for a country has been allocated to peacebuilding. One example of this is Guatemala, where Norway linked all assistance to the implementation of elements in the peace agreement (see Example 1). However, in the statistics, most of the assistance is categorised as “good governance” or “education”, etc., and not as peacebuilding.

Between 1990 and 2010, a total of 27 per cent of Norway’s total aid budget, which includes conflict-related assistance, ordinary development cooperation and emergency relief, went to the countries and areas on the list of Norway’s engagements for peace (Table 1). This assistance totalled NOK 73.8 billion. Some of the largest recipients were the Balkans, the Palestinian Territory, Afghanistan and Sudan. There is a clear correlation between the development of conflicts and the level of the assistance provided.

Figure 5 shows that aid for the Palestinian Territory increased after the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, and that assistance for the Balkans rose sharply at the time of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992. After the Dayton ceasefire agreement was signed in 1995, aid increased gradually at first and then significantly from 1998 to 1999 as a result of increased emergency relief and expenses relating to refugees in Norway. Assistance for Sudan rose in step with Norway’s involvement in the peace process that culminated in a peace agreement in 2005, and continued to increase after the agreement.

A large part of the increase consisted of emergency relief for Darfur. In Afghanistan, aid increased after 2001, as the Norwegian and international military presence intensified. The fluctuations in the support for Afghanistan primarily reflect the upscaling and downscaling of emergency relief.
Norwegian assistance through many different channels. This also applies to assistance for countries in or emerging from conflict.

In 2010, 46 per cent of Norwegian aid was channelled through multilateral organisations such as the UN, the World Bank and regional development banks. Countries in conflict usually have weak government institutions and a lack of public service systems. Assistance for such countries is therefore mainly channelled through multilateral organisations and civil society organisations. In Afghanistan, 59 per cent of aid is channelled through multilateral organisations, and 38 per cent through civil society organisations (see Figure 6). Examples in this report show that it may be an advantage to use several channels at the same time. A multi-donor fund for disarmament in Central Africa (Example 10) achieved good results in cooperation with the governments of the countries concerned, while a small programme carried out through local churches in DR Congo reached other target groups in areas where the country’s government has little control (Example 11). Example 28 regarding the work of non-governmental organisations in Afghanistan draws a similar picture.

The choice of aid channel may also be influenced by general policies like, for instance, Norway’s policy in the UN and towards the World Bank. Norway supports the role of the UN as a neutral actor in conflict situations, and channels much of its assistance for conflict countries through the UN, the World Bank and other intergovernmental organisations. The UN often also acts as coordinator for the multitude of donors and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations that provide various forms of aid in conflict situations. The UN has been mandated by the international community to provide solutions to global problems, including security problems. The establishment of the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund in 2005 was supported by Norway (see Box 7). Various UN specialised agencies play important roles in relation to demobilisation, reintegration, monitoring of peace agreements and the holding of elections. In 2010, the UN Development Programme supported electoral processes in 60 countries. An evaluation concluded that democracy support provided through the UN is important in fragile states, where there are few other actors present to defend the basic principles of democratic development.

UN agencies also play a key role in emergency relief and development work. The agencies often have a strong presence in countries before a conflict situation arises, and remain involved in the long term, after donors begin to reduce their presence. The UN can play an important role in a transitional situation, since the agencies can often start work on the basis of the capacity they have already established in the country, and can begin planning for long-term development. In Mozambique, the UN played a leading part in the critical transitional stage from war to peace (Example 9).

Funding for development assistance in the transition from war to peace is often a problem because donor countries have earmarked money as either emergency relief or development cooperation. In a transitional situation, many projects and programmes fall somewhere between these two categories of assistance. Norway is one of the few donor countries that makes a special allocation for such situations. A reform of the humanitarian system in 2005 added “early recovery” to the categories of humanitarian measures, thereby making it possible to provide emergency relief for a longer period of time at the transitional stage. This is controversial because emergency relief then becomes a form of support for statebuilding. Some people are concerned that this

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27 The World Bank and the regional development banks are intergovernmental institutions governed by the member countries. The member countries contribute capital to the banks according to their relative size in the global economy. In addition, voluntary contributions are made to various development funds that provide loans to the poorest countries on very favourable terms.

28 The figures are taken from Norad’s statistics portal. Direct support for the public sector in recipient countries accounts for less than one per cent, and is therefore not shown in the figure. Support for the public sector in Afghanistan is provided through the multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

may jeopardise the neutrality of emergency relief. Another concern is that emergency relief will then become more similar to ordinary aid work, thereby reducing the focus on meeting the most important humanitarian needs. In the field, it is often difficult to draw absolute distinctions.

Multi-donor funds that mobilise resources for the recipient country’s government budget are common channels for aid in conflict areas and fragile states. The funds are usually administered by the UN or the World Bank, and can to a certain degree compensate both for the limited presence of donor countries and for authorities who have little capacity to plan and implement development measures. These institutions often have substantial operational capacity and long experience of managing such funds. They have efficient systems for handling large amounts of money, and thus are a channel that ensures the proper administration of the funds provided by donor countries. Such multi-donor funds also make it possible to provide more money for areas where the presence of bilateral donors is limited.

There is no set answer as to what is most effective, but a 2007 review\textsuperscript{30} of multi-donor funds ascertained that multi-donor funds generally lower donors’ overall costs of planning, follow-up and reporting, thus making it easier for donor countries to participate in aid projects in countries in conflict. The funds also create a platform for dialogue between donors and recipient country authorities. This year’s Results Report contains examples of successful multi-donor funds such as the trust funds for disarmament in Central Africa (Example 10), reconstruction in Afghanistan (Example 27) and budget support for the Palestinian Authority (Example 29). There is also an example from Sudan which details criticism of the fund for being overly cumbersome and slow to deliver results (Example 2).

\textsuperscript{30} Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds. Final Report, February 2007. The World Bank and Norad, in cooperation with ODA, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DFID.

The Norwegian Refugee Council is a significant provider of Norwegian aid in conflict-affected areas.
Finding peaceful solutions to armed conflicts is primarily the responsibility of the parties to the conflict. However, the international community can put pressure on the parties, and take steps to facilitate a peaceful settlement. This is largely a political process in which both diplomatic and military means are employed, in addition to aid. In the past 20 years, many new approaches and systems for the provision of humanitarian and development assistance in such situations have been developed.
DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES

The objectives of different measures implemented during and after conflict vary significantly. The objective of humanitarian assistance is to save lives and provide protection. The increase in the engagement of the international community in conflict situations has been paralleled by an increase in aid aimed at helping to avert or halt conflict, or to prevent a relapse into conflict. In the 1980s, such measures focused on conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Recognition of the fact that preserving the peace posed just as great a challenge led the UN Secretary-General to introduce the term peacebuilding in 1992. Peacebuilding means looking beyond the end of armed hostilities and the conclusion of peace. Peace agreements are increasingly regarded as one of many milestones in a long process. State-building and democratisation have become more and more pivotal to peacebuilding.

Figure 7 shows that there are no clearly delimited phases in conflict situations, and that the three main categories of aid overlap one another.
The prevailing thinking used to be that conflict resolution and peacebuilding, humanitarian efforts and long-term development and statebuilding followed in succession as a situation evolved from war to peace. Today, it is understood that levels of violence, human distress and political processes may be of varying prominence at different times, and that the need for various types of assistance is unpredictable. A peace agreement does not automatically mean the end of violence, and different regions develop differently. In DR Congo, a civil war that raged for many years is now over, and in parts of the country the population can concentrate on lifting itself out of poverty and building functioning institutions. At the same time, various militias and an undisciplined government army continue to create unstable conditions, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Somalia is an example of a state that has collapsed, having lost control over large parts of its territory. The population in the southern regions suffers from famine and a state of extreme insecurity. Two regions in the north, Somaliland and Puntland, have managed to establish a certain degree of stability and development, although there is unrest in those regions too.

Different measures must often be implemented simultaneously. This can pose a challenge. It is important to recognise that the objectives for the three categories of aid differ, and that difficult decisions can arise when determining priorities. In certain situations, the work being done within one category of assistance may be perceived as conflicting with the activities being carried out in another category. Some people may, for instance, maintain that emergency relief prolongs a conflict, rather than bringing the parties to the negotiating table. Efforts to promote statebuilding can be perceived as giving legitimacy to a government that is responsible for violating human rights.

THE SITUATION AND THE OBJECTIVE DETERMINE THE CHOICE OF APPROACH

When donors have different objectives in the same situation, the distribution of roles and the choice of approaches are important. The goal of humanitarian actors like the Red Cross and Médecins sans Frontières is to protect civilians and save lives, and these organisations therefore need to be perceived as neutral actors in order to gain access to persons in need and to have an opportunity to speak up on their behalf. When international actors take on the role of facilitator in an attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement, they may become reluctant to draw attention to human rights violations in case this results in the parties abandoning the negotiations. When donors choose to support statebuilding in order to ensure stability, this can be seen as support for the incumbent government.

The possibilities and ability of the international community to influence developments vary from one situation to another. Studies and international experience point to a number of challenges faced by aid in such situations, regardless of whether the objective is to save lives, create and secure peace, or secure long-term development and statebuilding:

- The need for knowledge. Aid actors may lack sufficient understanding of the context in which they are operating. An evaluation of the international aid community’s contributions to peacebuilding in Sudan (page 28) maintains that donors, due to inadequate contextual insight, have focused too much on delivering public services, rather than complementing these efforts by implementing measures that could have helped to mitigate the conflict.

- Aid can unintentionally increase the level of conflict. Aid can do harm by strengthening the factors driving a conflict, or by weakening elements that could promote peace. A dilemma that often arises in this context is whether aid is bolstering an illegitimate regime. Another is whether the presence of aid organisations helps to strengthen the war economy, either indirectly through the goods and services that they use, or more directly through the payment of bribes to armed groups, for example to be allowed to pass through road blocks (see Example 23 on Somalia).

- Aid can unintentionally reinforce injustice. Aid can strengthen existing patterns of discrimination and exclusion, which might have been the reasons why the conflict broke out in the first place.

**FIGURE 7: THREE MAIN CATEGORIES OF AID FOR COUNTRIES DURING AND AFTER CONFLICT**
✓ Not precautionary enough. In some cases, it is easier to mobilise support for intervention once a crisis has arisen than to mobilise in advance.

✓ Coordinating different actors and sectors may be difficult. In a complex landscape with many different actors, it is easy to develop tunnel vision. The multi-donor trust fund for disarmament in Central Africa (Example 9) is an example of good coordination.

✓ Local voices are muted. In their eagerness to achieve quick results, international actors may sometimes overlook local priorities. Solutions can thereby become less sustainable. Particular attention has been focused on the importance of involving women. In the Western Balkans, Norwegian support was criticised for not making better use of local expertise.  

✓ There is a lack of staying power. Solutions designed to create immediate improvements for the population are often necessary, but can be unsustainable. In the Western Balkans, the lack of multi-year agreements made it difficult for partner organisations to plan long-term activities, such as capacity-building.

As a result, donor countries joined forces to draw up ten principles for aid in conflict situations and fragile states. In a review of the way the principles have been implemented in a sample of fragile states, the OECD established that only the two principles relating to non-discrimination and alignment with local priorities are being implemented in an adequate manner. Efforts to integrate the "do no harm" principle, which means ensuring that aid does not exacerbate conflicts, and to support forces for peace, have been less successful.

PREVENT A RELAPSE INTO CONFLICT - BUILDING TRUST

The expectation is that when a peaceful settlement has been achieved, violence in society will decline and the population will be able to live in security. This is seldom the case. Studies show that increased violence in society following a conflict is more the rule than the exception, both today and in the past.

According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, the overriding challenge for the international community is to prevent conflicts from flaring up again. There is often a fundamental lack of trust between population groups within the territory of a country. Moreover, the government may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The World Bank points to three priority areas where the international community can play an important role in helping to rebuild trust between people and restoring people’s confidence in their government:

✓ Create greater security for individual citizens.

✓ Limit discrimination and ensure judicial retribution that is perceived as just.

✓ Create employment, especially for the large percentage of the population who are young people.

These are difficult, long-term processes. In 2008, a group of fragile states established the G7+ group. They drew up a road map for making fragile states robust enough to begin work on achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals. They call on the donor community to commit to principles which ensure greater national ownership in development cooperation with fragile states, and which ensure that development assistance focuses on peacebuilding and statebuilding. The process of building trust between the people and the government must take place in each individual country. This is particularly difficult because the countries’ capacity at the outset is low. On the other hand, building institutions from the ground up can be an advantage.

32 Ibid.
33 OECD (2007), Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, OECD Publishing
34 OECD (2011), International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t we do better? OECD Publishing
An evaluation of Norwegian development assistance for building up government capacity for petroleum management concluded that the programme in the new oil nation East Timor achieved better results than the programmes in Bangladesh and Angola, which both have a long history of oil production. This is probably due to the fact that the established power structures are stronger, and the resistance to reform greater, in countries where the institutions are already in place.

The World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 warns aid actors against exaggerating the emphasis on capacity-building in government institutions. There is a tendency to strengthen the bureaucracy instead of the judicial system, the national assembly and various oversight bodies. The government’s ability to prevent and settle conflicts depends both on the capacity of its institutions and on the population’s confidence in them and the political leadership. This confidence will not be strengthened if people believe that the development assistance is primarily benefiting an elite group. Development assistance may have the unintentional effect of undermining confidence in the government among groups at the centre of the conflict.

In the same report, the World Bank also addresses the issues of gender equality and the situation of women. While most of those killed or wounded in direct hostilities are young men, approximately 80 per cent of refugees fleeing from conflicts are women and children. They are also more often the victims of hunger, poverty and violence. In spite of this, peace agreements are usually negotiated by men. According to UN Women, only 8 per cent of the participants in peace negotiations in recent times have been women. As a consequence, important issues such as protection against sexualised violence and measures to ensure women’s political empowerment are not included in peace agreements.

It is also important that women are actively involved in efforts to build up the trust that is essential to ensure that a fragile peace leads to stability and development (see Box 8).

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**Box 8: Women, peace and security – a priority for Norway**

Where Norway acts as an official facilitator, or is in other ways directly involved in peace processes, priority is given to efforts to ensure the increased representation of women in negotiation delegations. This is a goal in itself, but also a means of preventing, handling and resolving conflicts, and of rebuilding societies once a conflict is over. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was adopted in 2000 to promote women’s participation in all efforts related to peace and security, and to strengthen the protection of women in armed conflicts. Norway was an active advocate of the resolution, and one of the first countries to draw up a plan of action for its implementation. Resolution 1325 has since been supplemented by four new resolutions related to women, peace and security which address the issue of sexualised violence in war.

In line with the resolutions, Norway includes the gender perspective on the agenda when peace agreements are drawn up, and seeks to be a driving force in ensuring that women’s rights are concretised and effectively safeguarded when the agreements are implemented. Norway also supports the UN strategy for women and negotiation, which is a joint effort between UN Women and the UN Department of Political Affairs aimed at involving more women as peace mediators and ensuring that women are included in local peace negotiations. In Nepal and DR Congo, Norway is supporting the development of national action plans to implement the resolutions (see Examples 21 and 24).
The Nobel Peace Prize for 2011 was awarded to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee and Tawakkol Karman for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women’s rights to full participation in peacebuilding work.
4. WHAT HAVE WE ACHIEVED: EXAMPLES FROM NORWAY’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

There is broad consensus in Norway regarding the importance of combating poverty and armed conflict. The aid budget for 2010 totalled NOK 27.7 billion. Approximately NOK 4.3 billion of this funding went to fragile states or countries in conflict. In order to assess the results of aid during and after conflict, account must be taken of several factors.
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF AID

Difficult starting point: War traumatises a country’s population, and destroys its infrastructure and economy. Social institutions must often be rebuilt from scratch. Countries where children and young people have been deprived of schooling, and where the highly educated members of the population have fled during the war, have a difficult starting point. Traumas and insecurity can continue to affect a society for generations after the end of a civil war. In some cases, victims and perpetrators must try to live side by side after the conflict, when internally displaced persons and former combatants return home.
Pursuing different objectives simultaneously (see also Figure 7):

- **Conflict resolution and peacebuilding.** Achieving peace and stability is an ambitious goal, but is nonetheless important as a reason and an objective for many measures supported by Norway. Whether former guerrilla groups turn in their weapons and find alternative sources of income is not very difficult to measure. However, whether this contributes to peaceful development in the longer term is harder to document. The desired result may also be the non-occurrence of an event: that the conflict did not escalate or that war did not break out. Although it is difficult to document, it is important to show the causal connection between measures and their effects.

- **Humanitarian action.** In conflict situations, needs are enormous, and many measures can produce immediate effects. Whether refugees are given a roof over their heads and access to food and water, or whether the number of persons injured by mines declines, is relatively easy to measure. It is more difficult to determine whether there are fewer cases of sexualised violence as a result of protective measures. This is a field in which there is significant under-reporting in rich and poor countries alike.

- **Long-term development and statebuilding.** Most of the development assistance for countries during or after conflict is ordinary development cooperation in an extraordinary context. The objectives are well-functioning states with an active civil society, democratic institutions and economic growth. In this field, it is a relatively simple matter to measure the individual components: the judicial system’s ability to perform its functions, whether the Ministry of Finance’s financial management and auditing procedures have improved, whether the issues of resource allocation and anti-corruption are discussed openly in the media, and whether the availability of hospital services has increased. It is harder to document how these various components contribute to a country’s overall growth or to keeping it from relapsing into conflict.

These categories apart, an assessment must be made of what would have happened without an international presence. For vulnerable groups in a conflict, being seen by the international community can in itself have a protective effect and help to avert further escalation and prolongation of the conflict.

**Distinguishing between strategy and activities:** When measuring results, it is important to distinguish between the results of an individual activity and the results of general development strategies for engagement in poor countries. The strategies are generally prepared in cooperation with other countries, and comprise a variety of policy instruments, of which aid is one of many. Even if Norway’s and the international community’s overarching goal for engagement, for example in Somalia, is to support the development of a stable, peaceful state, a project to provide food for the hungry must be judged on the basis of whether the food actually reached the needy and whether lives were saved. Even when the project is more closely related to the goal of peace, such as in the case of Norway’s support for building up the Palestinian Authority, the activities must primarily be assessed in terms of whether the individual objectives were achieved. In this case, that means ascertaining whether the institutions for which support was provided have been established and are functioning.

**Recognising that aid is a small piece of a large puzzle:** Creating peace is primarily the responsibility of the parties concerned. There must be a political will to make peace. In many contexts, the evolution of conflicts depends on regional or global political relations. Using the presence or absence of armed conflict as the only measure of the success of aid is not very meaningful. The relevant approach is to assess whether aid has helped to strengthen elements that underpin a peaceful settlement.

**High risk.** There is often a greater chance that aid for countries during and after conflict will not generate the desired results than is the case for other types of aid. The situation is unpredictable, and conditions can change abruptly and dramatically.
MEASURES TO CREATE AND SECURE PEACE

As shown earlier in this report, a relatively small percentage of the aid for a country in conflict is specifically aimed at creating or securing peace. However, a broad range of measures is applied. The following section contains some examples of assistance used in conflict resolution, either in connection with, or independently of, the use of diplomacy as a policy instrument. There are also examples of various measures to promote peacebuilding. The examples range from training for personnel for peacekeeping operations to reconciliation measures, initiatives designed to create security and measures to bring about political changes.

AID AND DIPLOMACY

Norway’s policy has been to combine diplomacy and aid as instruments for peace. In some places, the presence of Norwegian civil society organisations has been the starting point for Norway’s engagement in the peace process. In many cases, peace diplomacy has been underpinned by aid work. In these situations, the assistance is primarily seen as an instrument for securing lasting peace and stability once the most acute phase of conflict is over, but is also used to seek to mitigate and resolve conflicts. The evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka also assessed how aid affected the political process. According to the evaluation, the effect of the assistance provided to Sri Lanka was relatively limited in terms of creating peace. The donors’ attempts to impose conditions on the parties had little effect, and instead fuelled nationalistic attitudes. The divided opinions as to how aid should be managed intensified the conflict between the parties. Norway used the assistance to support the peace process, in particular through the assistance provided for non-governmental organisations in Sri Lanka. This gradually gave rise to problems as the political climate changed, and many organisations found it a disadvantage to be associated with an unpopular peace process. The evaluation claimed that Norway faced difficulties in juggling its various roles as mediator, donor and active participant in the observer force, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (see Example 7).

Another example of the combination of aid and peace diplomacy is Norway’s engagement for peace in Guatemala. On 29 December 1996, the 36-year civil war in Guatemala was ended by the signing of peace accords between the guerrillas and the government authorities. The civil war claimed 180,000 lives, destroyed 400 villages and forced 100,000 people to flee to Mexico and one million of the country’s then ten million inhabitants to flee within their own country. Guatemala has long been characterised by significant disparities and discrimination of the country’s large indigenous population, a factor that was a key cause of the war. Norway played a role as facilitator for the peace process. While the peace negotiations were in progress, Norwegian aid rose from NOK 16 million in 1990 to over NOK 97 million in 1996. Norway granted a total of NOK 312 million in aid to Guatemala in the years 1990–1996. Norway’s role in the peace process was evaluated in 1998. The conclusion was that Norway played a significant part in the peace process that brought the civil war to an end. The evaluation also emphasised that Norway, through its willingness to provide funding and its diplomatic efforts, helped to ensure that the UN played a prominent role in the peace efforts. The long-term presence of Norwegian organisations, and the efforts of dedicated individuals, were highlighted as being crucial factors that enabled Norway to play a key part in the process of bringing a peace agreement to the table.
EXAMPLE 1: NORWAY’S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEBUILDING IN GUATEMALA

Background: In the years after the Peace Accords were signed in 1996, all development cooperation between Guatemala and Norway revolved around implementing the various elements of the Accords. Norwegian support was channelled through local and Norwegian organisations, regional organisations and the UN. The main objective of the assistance was to support the peace and democratisation process, with particular focus on the indigenous population. Much of the support went to addressing the core causes of the civil war: poverty, oppression, the skewed distribution of goods and the lack of respect for human rights.

Results: The Peace Accords recognise the indigenous population’s many languages. It guarantees all children a bilingual education, in Spanish and in their mother tongue. Norway has therefore supported education projects through both Norwegian organisations and the UN. Access to bilingual basic education has increased since 1996. In 2010, 630,000 out of a total of 4.2 million pupils attended bilingual schools. An evaluation of the work of six Norwegian organisations in the period 2002–2006 emphasises the results of education projects: more children received schooling, the capacity of cooperation partners was increased, and more teaching materials were available in the Maya language.43

Norway has supported measures to implement the provisions of the Peace Accords relating to constitutional reforms. This helped to promote the adoption of an Act on political parties and elections. The implementation of the Act has had a major impact on the development of democracy and political empowerment. In 2007, for the first time, Guatemala’s president was elected on the basis of rural votes; this is a direct result of the election law supported by Norway. Guatemala now also has several mayors with a Maya background, an impossibility prior to 1996.

The support for the democratisation process in Guatemala provided by Norway through two UNDP programmes in the period 2000–2009, when Norway contributed NOK 93.2 million, was evaluated in 2010.44 The assistance was intended to help strengthen civil society and protection of indigenous rights through the public criminal law system. The main conclusions of the evaluation were that the programme had made a positive contribution despite certain limitations. Through its role as a facilitator and advisor, the UNDP played an important part in strengthening the role of civil society at the local and national level. A stronger civil society has had a positive impact on the development of a democratic system of government. Violence, corruption, organised crime and a weak justice sector have all undermined the programme’s ability to achieve all its objectives.

Norwegian support was intended to strengthen the indigenous population’s access to legal assistance and increase its possibility of being heard in the national judicial system. The evaluation concluded that the programme increased awareness of indigenous rights in the judicial system, and increased access to defence lawyers with knowledge of local languages, culture and traditions. The programme’s ambition of coordinating the traditional system of law with the state legal system was relevant, but unsuccessful.45

The goal of full implementation of the Peace Accords has not been achieved, partly due to the weakness of the central government, a lack of funds in the state treasury, and corruption. Tax reform, which was a point in the Peace Accords and which could have augmented government revenues, has not been implemented. Nor has any land reform been carried out. The country is still plagued by racism, poverty and the inequitable distribution of resources. In addition, the Norwegian Embassy points out that although there is peace in rural areas, the violence has moved to the cities. Statistics on acts of violence are worse than during the civil war.

Lessons learned: Guatemala is an example of the fact that the end of hostilities in a civil war does not necessarily mean the end of violence. Even though the military’s violence against the civilian population ceased when the Peace Accords were signed, more people have been killed each year in the past few years than during the civil war, due to spiralling crime rates ascribable to a drug war and Guatemala’s weak government and legal system.

Sources: The Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, with contributions from historian Ada Nissen. See also footnotes.

45 Ibid.

How much: Over NOK 1.2 billion in Norwegian aid was provided to Guatemala in the years between the signing of the Peace Accords and 2010.
EXAMPLE 2: SOUTH SUDAN – INCREASED STATE LEGITIMACY, BUT LITTLE IMPACT ON SECURITY

Background: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan that was signed in January 2005 marked the end of 20 years of civil war and laid the foundation for a significant escalation of international aid aimed at stabilising the situation until the referendum on independence in 2011. Norway played an important role in the peace negotiation process through former Minister of International Development Hilde Frafjord Johnson, among others. In 2005, Norway hosted the first donor conference, at which aid amounting to around NOK 25 billion was pledged for the period 2005–2009.

How much: No other country received as much Norwegian aid in the period from 2005 to 2010 as Sudan – around NOK 700 million per year. In 2010, well over half went to South Sudan. Norwegian assistance for South Sudan has largely been channelled through the UN, multi-donor funds and non-governmental organisations.

The purpose of the massive injection of aid was to reduce violence and strengthen institutions to enable them to manage conflicts peacefully. Initiatives aimed at improving the population’s everyday living situation were intended to give people belief in the future and to create confidence in the new government structure currently being built up. The uncertainty regarding South Sudan’s future as an independent state, which made planning difficult, posed a problematic political constraint for donors. Norwegian assistance has been focused on strengthening public institutions, gender equality, peace, petroleum management and education.

Results: The effect of Norway’s assistance must be assessed in conjunction with the overall aid provided to South Sudan, although there are several bilateral cooperation projects where it is easier to trace the use of Norwegian funds directly. Norway supported the UN Development Fund’s efforts to implement a referendum on independence. There was considerable concern as to whether it would be possible to hold a proper referendum. The fact that voter participation was so high, and that the referendum was as peaceful as it was, can largely be ascribed to the Norwegian-supported measures. Through the UN Development Fund, Norway is also supporting an exchange programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of the authorities in South Sudan. Through this programme, public officials from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia who have more experience of government administration work closely with their South Sudanese colleagues, thereby ensuring that government functions are carried out in the new state while capacity is being built up. So far, the programme is considered to be a success.

As far as overall international efforts are concerned, a recent evaluation voiced some criticism. The main objection was that the total level of conflict has not been reduced in South Sudan in the past five years. According to the evaluation, donors’ focus has been too one-sided. Some 80 per cent of assistance has gone to basic public services such as health, education, water and sanitation. These measures have benefited the population and helped to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of the South Sudanese authorities, but the evaluation states that these effects have been achieved at the expense of security, because the donors have given little priority to conflict-mitigation efforts, policing and law and order. Furthermore, the donors have not done enough to help reduce local conflicts over such issues as grazing land and water resources (one exception is Norwegian People’s Aid; see Example 4). However, the fact that the difficult period following the signing of the peace agreement actually culminated in the establishment of Africa’s newest state, based on a referendum and internationally recognised elections, must also be taken into consideration.

Lessons learned: The evaluation pointed out that the causes of violent local conflicts were poorly analysed. These conflicts are often rooted in ethnic differences or a lack of employment opportunities for young people and former soldiers. They often revolve around access to land and water. Efforts to help local communities to absorb returnees have been poorly organised. Much of the aid is concentrated on the capital and the Juba region, and the population in other regions feels that it has been ignored. Not enough attention has been focused on the role of local and traditional institutions in ensuring law and order.

The evaluation also pointed out how difficult it is for massive injections of aid to be successful when there is essentially no government structure. Many of the donors, including Norway, chose to coordinate assistance in multi-donor funds. Several of these funds have been strongly criticised for being ineffective. Donor coordination entails time-consuming consultations, and the World Bank and UN agencies have procedures and rules that are difficult to comply with in South Sudan. The evaluation commend ed bilateral programmes that have enough local personnel to monitor projects directly. The USA does well in the evaluation precisely because of such programmes.

Many of the recipients have complained about a lack of continuity and long-term commitment on the part of donors. There is a rapid turnover of staff, and funding is often provided for no more than two to three years. The evaluation also claimed that the major aid actors require more knowledge of local conditions, and that this must be reflected in the aid programmes. An important lesson is that aid easily becomes embroiled in a contest for power and resources at the central level.


RESPECT ACCESS AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM

There are examples of peace efforts focused on a specific problem where all parties will benefit from finding a common solution. The idea is that this will build mutual trust and open up possibilities for dialogue in other areas. One example of this is cooperation on water management in the Middle East (Example 3). The scarcity of drinking water and water for farming is one factor fuelling the conflict in the Middle East; moreover, the countries in the region are dependent on common solutions, such as in the case of the Jordan River system. However, the initiative did not succeed in influencing the political process. Example 31 from South Sudan and Example 32 from Angola also concern resource distribution.

EXAMPLE 3: THE MIDDLE EAST – COOPERATION ON REGIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT

Background: The conflict in the Middle East is one of the longest-lasting, most irreconcilable conflicts faced by the international community. In addition to the numerous political dimensions, one of the issues of contention is access to water. There is a shortage of water in large parts of the region, and many of the parties share water sources and waterways. In 1995, Norway established cooperation with the Oslo-based Centre for Environmental Studies and Resource Management (CESAR). This collaboration arose from the need to find common solutions to the water supply problems in the region. One programme covered Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Area, while another covered Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Iraq. The aim of these efforts was to promote a larger regional partnership.

Results: The programme led to greater contact and, to some extent, to greater trust, but produced few concrete results related to water distribution. Meetings and conferences were organised for experts from different states, and a number of joint projects and programmes were initiated. Information was exchanged to a greater extent between some of the parties, and in 1996 the most important parties reached agreement on a common declaration of principles for cooperation.

The survey of resources did not produce much new information. The evaluation found that there was a lack of local implementation of agreed measures, and suggested possible reasons for this: some of the parties called for a stronger commitment on the part of the Norwegian authorities, there was no legally binding implementation framework; in some cases knowledge from Norwegian experts was not transferred, thereby preventing local implementation, and CESAR did not have enough staff in proportion to the size of the projects. The progress made in promoting a dialogue was also limited. As soon as the more general political processes in the region reached a deadlock, the projects in the programme suffered the same fate. The desired self-reinforcing process of increased trust and cooperation did not materialise.

Lessons learned: The fact that parties otherwise mired in conflict could agree on a common declaration of principles for cooperation shows that the water sector was a good choice of starting point. However, politics remain the determining factor. When political processes moved forward, the programme highlighted the advantages of common solutions. When the political situation in the region grew more difficult, there was little CESAR could do.

How much: Norway’s contributions from 1995 to 2004 totalled approximately NOK 80 million. No funds have been disbursed to the programme since then.

In addition to improving the situation in the water sector, CESAR was to foster better relations in the region. Experts from various countries’ public agencies were to communicate and build a network of personal contacts that could promote greater trust. Based on concrete facts, such as resource surveys, the parties could then go on to discuss more fundamental, political issues. This was to create a self-reinforcing process of increased trust, mutual commitments and solutions to the benefit of all concerned.

EXAMPLE 4: SOUTH SUDAN – SURVEYS OF LOCAL RESOURCES SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Background: Serious conflicts break out regularly between different population groups in the Mvolo district of West Equatoria in South Sudan. These conflicts arise in varying degrees of intensity every drought season. The local population, the Jur, are farmers and fishermen, while the Dinkas from Lakes State are cattle-herders and come to Mvolo in search of grazing land and water for their livestock. The conflicts between these two groups often spring from a fight for land, and result in a vicious cycle of attacks and reprisals. There are also recurring conflicts between various Dinka subgroups in Lakes State.

Since 2008, Norwegian People’s Aid has run a project, Coremap, to map land resources and management in a large area that includes the Mvolo district. Coremap carries out its surveys in close collaboration with the local population and local authorities, and shares its results and recommendations with these groups in order to ensure local ownership and knowledge. Norwegian People’s Aid does not engage specifically in conflict resolution, but one of the project goals is for local communities to reach agreement on how the resources are to be managed. The survey is expected to identify the underlying causes of conflicts over land and resources, but will not in itself provide solutions to the conflicts.

Results: The local inhabitants in most of the districts in Lakes State and the Mvolo district have participated in surveying the resources in their areas, which has resulted in the production of maps with graphic illustrations showing what types of resources they actually have access to and where these are located. This applies to various types of forest, arable land, rivers, grazing land, fauna, infrastructure, and areas which are prone to conflict. Socio-economic studies have also been carried out, and the combination of these efforts has culminated in recommendations applied by local authorities, the local population and organisations when planning further development initiatives. Several of these initiatives have helped to improve the living situation of the local population by creating new income-generating activities and increasing agricultural production, but the local authorities lack the resources to implement the survey recommendations.

Attempts have been made to resolve resource-related conflicts through the legal system, but traditional leaders maintain that they have not been sufficiently included or consulted, and that mechanisms for fair compensation have not been used, with the result that the discontent between the groups continues to fester. At the same time, the local population criticises certain traditional leaders, and the fact that some clans are given higher priority than others. The fact is that the most serious conflicts regularly flare up in the Mvolo and Yirol West districts.

Lessons learned: Although Coremap has made a positive contribution, the more fundamental causes of the conflicts have yet to be addressed. Efforts to find good solutions that both safeguard traditional mechanisms and embrace more modern legal principles have been unsuccessful. With a better analysis of the causes of the conflicts, the project could have promoted conflict-mitigating measures more effectively.

Source: Norwegian People’s Aid, based on project reports.

How much: Norway has provided approximately NOK 6 million in support for Coremap over a four-year period starting in 2008.

Cattle herding in South Sudan, one of the main sources of income in the country. Conflicts often arise between those who wish to use the land for grazing and those who wish to farm it.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In states emerging from conflict, ensuring the security of the population is a key concern. The immediate change that peace is expected to bring is that the population can feel safe from violence. One of the first actions taken is therefore often to deploy peacekeeping forces on the ground. Between 2004 and 2010, Norway allocated NOK 700 million to peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. 47 This funding is not part of the development assistance budget. However, some of the development assistance budget is provided for related measures, particularly for the training of non-military personnel who serve in the peacekeeping forces, and for the civilian work such forces carry out.

One third of all armed conflicts in the past decade took place in Africa, and eight of the UN’s 16 current peace operations are in Africa. African countries have gradually assumed greater responsibility for peace and conflict issues on the continent. The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002, and the subsequent development of capacity for AU-led peace operations, are important milestones. Norway has considered it important to support this process.

47 This consists of mandatory contributions to all UN operations. In the period in question, this applied to a total of 19 operations: three in Europe, three in the Middle East, ten in Africa, two in Asia and one in Latin America. A total of 16 of these operations are still ongoing.
EXAMPLE 5: STRENGTHENED AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

**Background:** In the mid-1990s, a need was seen to develop African civilian and police capacities for participation in peacekeeping operations, and in 1995 Norway created the capacity-building programme Training for Peace in Africa (TfP). At the time, there were no organised police or civilian contributions to peace operations.

The aim of TfP was to strengthen African capacity for participation in international peace operations, with focus on the non-military aspects. Since its inception, the programme has been engaged in training, research and the development of strategy documents and guidelines. TfP has also helped to build up African institutions, such as the civilian unit of the African Union’s Peace Support Operations Division.

The programme activities are mainly carried out by African think tanks and training institutions. The TfP partners are the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), as well as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM).

In the past few years, TfP has worked closely with the East Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASF COM). The Norwegian Police Directorate provides advisors for the police dimension of the programme.

**Results:** Police and civilians were not initially included in peace operations, but by the year 2000, 15 African countries were contributing around 1,000 civilian police officers to UN peace operations. In 2010, this figure had increased to over 5,000 officers deployed in 31 countries. This cannot be attributed to TfP alone, but is an indication that the situation is evolving in the right direction.

In the same way, the AU’s primary focus used to be the role of the military in peace operations. The most important result achieved by TfP in the latest programme period is its contribution to putting the civilian dimension of peace operations on the agenda in Africa as well. Having collaborated with the AU since 2005, there is now agreement that peace operations must also include police and civilians. The African Standby Force (ASF), which is scheduled to become operational in 2015, will consist of military, police and civilian personnel. Moreover, TfP has delivered research results that are having an impact on the way the civilian dimension of peace operations is carried out.

An evaluation has determined that TfP’s activities have been relevant for building up African peacekeeping capacity. The TfP partners constitute an African knowledge-base on peace operations that had yet to be developed properly in 1995. These partners are now at the forefront of training, research on conflict and peace operations, and knowledge-based influencing of decision-makers. The training of police and civilian personnel for service in peacekeeping operations was particularly relevant. TfP has contributed to the development of African institutions for peace and security. At the same time, the evaluation showed that results in some areas, such as training and research, have been uneven, and presented proposals for improvements in the design and focus of the programme.

TfP has provided training for close to 9,000 civilian experts and police personnel since its inception in 1995. No overview is available of how many of these persons have served in peace operations. Changes have been made in the design of the training programme, and efforts are being made to ensure that those who receive training make use of the knowledge they are given. Courses for civilians are now chiefly held for personnel who are already participating in operations, while police training is given to persons who have already been recruited for service. For instance, 650 out of 850 African police officers who received training in the period 2008–2009 later served in a UN or AU operation.

**Lessons learned:** Due to its focus on civilians and police participation in peace operations at a time when other actors were concentrating on the military aspects, TfP has influenced the way peace operations are conducted. This work is being continued in collaboration with the AU and the ASF. The programme has also been instrumental in promoting Norwegian priorities, such as the protection of civilians during conflicts and a focus on Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in the training of personnel for peacekeeping operations.

**Sources:** Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Section for Security Policy and North America.

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EXAMPLE 6: UNIFORMED PERSONNEL IN PEACEKEEPING – PREVENTION OF HIV AND AIDS

**Background:** In conflict-affected areas, uniformed forces, and peacekeeping police and military forces, can contribute to the spread of HIV. However, these forces can also be a potential resource for preventing HIV from proliferating. In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1308 on HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations. Since the resolution was passed, UNAIDS, the Joint UN Programme on HIV and AIDS, has worked to prevent HIV infection among uniformed personnel, particularly in African countries. UNAIDS initiated a partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which resulted in the appointment of special advisors for HIV and AIDS work in the largest peacekeeping operations. The DPKO runs training programmes for uniformed personnel, provides voluntary testing and support, and trains personnel who then work with colleagues to focus attention on risk and prevention.

The UN Security Council took the issue up again in June 2011, adopting Resolution 1983 which affirms that HIV and AIDS still represent a threat to development, peace and stability. The UN will continue to expand its efforts to combat HIV and AIDS among uniformed forces and in conflict-affected areas.

**Results:** As a result of training and the availability of HIV testing, the percentage of uniformed personnel who undergo testing or who make use of support services rose from five per cent in 2005 to 15 per cent in 2010. In 2005, 11 per cent had participated in training programmes, compared to 55 per cent in 2010.

However, a review carried out in 2005 showed that prior knowledge regarding HIV among peacekeeping forces, who are recruited from national forces, varied significantly. It is therefore important to reach the soldiers at home, before they are deployed. UNAIDS has helped the military forces of several countries to introduce HIV prevention measures, testing and treatment. The military forces of 19 countries in southern Africa now have special staff members who are responsible for HIV-related efforts. Testing and treatment are offered to HIV-positive soldiers. According to the DPKO, soldiers from countries where HIV-prevention activities are carried out are also more aware of HIV-related problems when posted abroad.

**Lessons learned:** Experience shows that the most effective way of preventing HIV among uniformed forces is to integrate anti-HIV efforts into the command structure, rather than making such work the responsibility of health services or other outside actors. However, HIV training for uniformed forces must not be isolated from the country’s other HIV-related efforts. Promoting prevention among forces stationed abroad remains an important task. With 120,000 persons in field operations around the world, training in the field is an effective way of reaching a large group of people.

**How much:** Norway granted NOK 1.5 billion in core support for UNAIDS between 2000 and 2010. No information is available on how much of this funding was spent on training for peacekeeping forces.

CIVILIAN OBSERVER MISSIONS

Norway has established and supported civilian observer missions whose task is to help ensure stability by maintaining a presence and reporting violations of ceasefire agreements or human rights in such places as Sri Lanka (Example 7), Nepal (Example 8) and Hebron on the West Bank. Their objective is to stabilise the situation and prevent outbreaks of violence. The following examples show that while observer missions can help to reduce conflict, they have little influence on whether a conflict is resolved peacefully.

EXAMPLE 7: SRI LANKA
– THE OBSERVER MISSION HELPED TO REDUCE CONFLICT, BUT COULD NOT PREVENT WAR

**Background:** Sri Lanka has been torn by ethnic conflict since the 1970s. In 1983, there was an escalation of the conflict between the government and the Tamil Tigers, who were engaged in an armed struggle for secession or greater independence for the Tamil-dominated areas of the island. Norway acted as a facilitator for the process that ended in a ceasefire agreement in 2002. The short-term effect of the agreement was very positive, since the number of deaths and the violence declined radically. In the same year as the agreement entered into force, a civilian observer force, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), was established. In view of the risk that the situation might deteriorate and the country might again be plunged into war, a civilian observer mission was welcomed by both parties. The SLMM was to contribute to achieving the overarching goal of securing a lasting political solution to the conflict.

**How much:** Funding for the SLMM was provided by the five Nordic countries, in addition to some funding from the EU. Norway made the largest contribution, which totalled NOK 350 million. This accounted for close to 40 per cent of the financial costs. Norway also provided personnel for the SLMM.

The SLMM was quickly established, and the personnel were deployed in a relatively short period of time. This was important in order to maintain the positive social climate created by the peace agreement. The observer force consisted of between 90 and 130 non-military observers at any given time. Around half of them were from the Nordic countries, while the other half was recruited locally. The SLMM’s primary responsibilities were to monitor the ceasefire agreement, mediate contact between the warring parties and provide independent reports on the situation in the conflict areas. The SLMM was phased out in early 2008, by which time a total of 319 international observers had been involved.

**Results:** When the SLMM withdrew in 2008, Sri Lanka was a country at war. An evaluation of Norwegian efforts to promote peace in Sri Lanka has concluded that the observer force carried out its functions and achieved its short-term objectives. However, no peaceful solution to the conflict was reached. The final battle was fought in May 2009, when the Tamil Tigers were defeated.

The evaluation made particular mention of three important contributions from the SLMM. Firstly, the mission recorded over 13,000 complaints, and mediated solutions to many of them. Secondly, the mission took part in a number of meetings with the population and held meetings with local committees. Many local conflicts that could have escalated peacefully were resolved in these forums, including through the release of several children recruited by force. Thirdly, the SLMM’s presence led to broader popular support for the peace agreement in the first few years. Furthermore, the SLMM helped to ensure that both local and international media had access to impartial information. For many people, the SLMM’s reports were the most important source of independent reporting from the conflict area.

The SLMM tried to continue its activities despite the growing scope and intensity of the violence in Sri Lanka. From 2006, the situation was so unstable at times that the force could not stay in the conflict zones, and the contending parties gradually ceased to report assaults and violations of the peace agreement. The level of violence fluctuated regardless of whether the observer force delivered the services they were supposed to provide. It became evident that the SLMM had little impact on the conflict.

**Lessons learned:** It is difficult to judge today how the situation in Sri Lanka might have developed without the presence of the SLMM, although it clearly helped to reduce minor tensions. A recent review of the force’s efforts pointed out that the SLMM was created in haste, with no clearly defined objectives and no clear understanding of the results that the various measures were intended to achieve. This made it difficult to determine which efforts produced the best results, and to make necessary adjustments along the way. The observers were not given sufficient training, and the mission was based on an inadequate understanding of the local situation and how the engagement would be perceived by Sri Lankans.


51 Ibid.

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EXAMPLE 8: NEPAL – CONFLICT REDUCED BY UNITED NATIONS-LED MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Background: Nepal experienced ten years of civil war between Maoist rebels and the government that cost 14,000 lives. In 2006, a peace agreement was signed between the rebels and an alliance of seven political parties. Norway supported the creation and administration of an observer corps that was stationed in Nepal in 2005, under the auspices of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The observer corps was mandated to deploy a considerable number of observers in various parts of the country. Their main mission was to monitor the parties’ respect for human rights. The observers were to promote stabilisation by maintaining a presence, conducting investigations and reporting. The corps was also to take up human rights issues with the authorities and support institutions and organisations working to promote human rights.

Results: An evaluation of this initiative in 2011 emphasised that the observer corps was highly relevant. The results were assessed as highly positive. The observers were commended for having played a significant role in pouring oil on troubled waters. On many occasions, the presence of the OHCHR observers helped to prevent potentially dangerous situations from triggering new cycles of violence, and thus contributed to stabilisation in the short term. However, the future is uncertain due to the tense situation in the country, and because the Nepalese government is putting pressure on the OHCHR to leave outlying areas.


THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

As mentioned in chapter 2, the UN has an important role to play in the transition from war to peace. This is partly because the UN is often perceived as a more neutral actor than individual donor countries, and partly because the UN can provide funding through multi-donor funds that is based on a coherent needs assessment rather than on the interests of the donor countries. The efforts of UN funds and programmes with expertise in various thematic areas are coordinated at country level by UN Country Teams. This helps to ensure that an overall assessment of needs is carried out and that different priorities are weighed against each other. These country teams have been criticised for not including civil society organisations in their planning processes. The UN-led humanitarian country teams that coordinate emergency relief include both international and local civil society organisations, and in this respect receive a more favourable review. The following example illustrates the role played by the UN in the transition from war to peace in Mozambique. Examples 2, 5, 6, 8 and 24 also describe various forms of support provided for and through the UN.
EXAMPLE 9: MOZAMBIQUE – THE UN PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

Background: Between 1966 and 1974, Mozambique, under the Frelimo party, fought for its independence from Portugal, which it won in 1975. Around 1980, the apartheid regime in South Africa began to arm an opposition movement, Renamo, which sympathised with the apartheid regime. This triggered a civil war, as a result of which one third of the population was in flight at one point, either within Mozambique or as refugees to Malawi and Zimbabwe. It is estimated that more than one million people died of hunger or disease for which they could not obtain treatment due to the hostilities. A peace agreement was signed in 1992, and as part of the agreement free elections were held in 1994, which were won by Frelimo. The UN did not play an important part in the peace negotiations in Mozambique, but was pivotal in the transitional phase between the signing of the peace agreement and the elections two years later. The UN Secretary-General sent a high-level representative, whose functions included coordinating the assistance provided by the international community. Soldiers on both sides of the conflict were to be demobilised and given assistance to enable them to begin their new lives as civilians. Millions of refugees and internally displaced persons were to be helped to return to their homes and to begin to make a living for themselves. A multi-party culture had to be put in place in order to ensure the development of democracy. A new defence force consisting of soldiers from both sides was to be established, equipped and trained. A legal system grounded in human rights and international conventions was to secure the rights of all citizens. The national economy had to be built up, access to health and education services had to be secured, and roads and railways needed to be rehabilitated.

Results: The UN quickly put in place 6,000 soldiers and police officers, who among other things disarmed former opponents and ensured basic security, thus providing the promise of peace and security that is essential in a difficult reconciliation process. The international community supported the political pressure applied by the UN to the parties to ensure that dissension was resolved through negotiations, thereby helping to advance the development of peace and stability. Norway and other countries backed the UN’s efforts, both with funding and through political talks. Mozambique was hailed by the UN as perhaps the best example of how the international community can work together constructively to promote peace, reconciliation and progress.

Not everything went as expected. On the whole, little use was made of the extensive apparatus of the UN’s refugee organisation, UNHCR, because it was too slow to get started. Most of the refugees returned on their own, rebuilt their huts and tried to do their spring farmwork so that they could quickly harvest a first crop. A programme to provide inputs such as seed corn and tools successfully ensured that people could quickly begin work and start to feed themselves.

Lessons learned: A negative consequence of these efforts was that the rapid build-up of both a civilian and a military UN presence immediately after the peace agreement created major shifts in the local economy. Rents skyrocketed, educated Mozambicans were hired away from local companies and public agencies and employed by donors, the UN and voluntary organisations. When large parts of this apparatus were dismantled almost as quickly as they had been built up after the elections in 1994, a new process of readjustment was triggered that posed problems for local businesses, the labour market and the rent market. This situation is not unique to Mozambique. Such problems commonly arise in many developing countries where there is a large international presence.

The role of the UN during the transitional phase was successful, largely because the international donor community supported the UN’s function as a coordinator and political advocate. This led to more efficient planning, as a result of which resources were allocated to the various regions on the basis of need. When attention turned to more long-term reconstruction and development, donors wanted to become more directly engaged. The UN system’s bureaucracy and close ties with the government were considered to increase the cost and complexity of operations.

Source: Scanteam
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION OF ARMED FORCES

One of the primary tasks in ensuring peace is to persuade armed groups to demobilise and surrender their weapons. Peace is dependent on ex-soldiers finding alternative livelihoods and being reintegrated into society. If the former combatants fail to find work, there is a strong likelihood that they will again be recruited by armed groups. This is a particular problem in Central Africa, because the lack of economic development makes it difficult to find employment. In many cases, therefore, international aid has focused on addressing this problem, and some specific results are described in the following examples.

In addition to the major intergovernmental organisations, Norway often provides support for non-governmental organisations. Their activities are more limited in scale, but are often based on a very good knowledge of local conditions and extensive networks of contacts. Small civil society organisations can work in different ways and with different partners than large multilateral organisations, within the same field. The fact that different aid organisations can complement each other’s efforts to find effective conflict-reducing measures and to deliver assistance to parties in difficult conflict situations is an advantage. Example 11 on local church communities in DR Congo illustrates this strength, as those communities were able to reach militia groups that trusted neither the government nor the UN.
EXAMPLE 10: CENTRAL AFRICA – SOLDIERS FROM ARMED GROUPS HELPED BACK TO CIVILIAN LIFE

Background: The Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced brutal conflicts that have often revolved around control of the country’s enormous mineral resources. The Second Congo War began in 1998, and lasted for five years. The repercussions of the war are still being felt, particularly in the eastern parts of the country. The conflict caused significant regional ripple effects. When the situation was at its worst, eight neighbouring states were militarily engaged in the country, while internal conflicts in six of the neighbouring states were affected by the war. Rebel armies in Angola, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have used DR Congo as a base. One reason why the war lasted so long and why local conflicts easily flared up again was the lack of other job opportunities, which made it easy to recruit young men.

A Multi-country Fund and Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was established to help demobilised government and guerrilla soldiers find alternative sources of income. The fund was administered by the World Bank. The steering group comprised donors and conflict states. The MDRP financed programmes in seven countries: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.

Results: Over 300,000 former combatants laid down their weapons and received assistance enabling them to return home or begin a new life in another place. This constituted 74 per cent of the original target figure. Four countries, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and the Central African Republic, achieved 100 per cent or close to 100 per cent of their targets. The majority of the demobilised soldiers, numbering around 200,000, were from DR Congo and Angola. Because not all the countries had completed their national demobilisation programmes when the MDRP was terminated in 2009, a decision was made to continue the MDRP’s activities for a limited period of time in the form of the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). The TDRP was recently extended until December 2013.

A survey conducted in 2007 showed that 54 per cent of those who had received support believed that they would be able to live on their own earnings in the future. This is the key to ensuring that demobilised combatants do not return to armed groups.

The MDRP also helped to bring about a political dialogue between the parties. For a long time, the programme was the only arena where some of the states engaged in conflict with one another could meet. The major powers, which had differing interests in the conflict, were able to come together to discuss overarching regional problems. Non-governmental organisations reported back on what was happening on the ground, and were allowed to take part in the analyses on which project and programme choices were based. This helped to ensure that efforts were better coordinated. Because it had a great deal of money at its disposal, the MDRP’s decisions guided many parties.

The MDRP became a learning arena for the seven neighbouring states, which all faced relatively similar challenges. Efforts to help special target groups got off to a slow start, but some countries were quick to develop measures adapted to the needs of female ex-combatants, child soldiers, and ex-combatants with war disabilities and traumas. Measures that proved to be effective were used as models by other countries in the region.

Lessons learned: The MDRP illustrates how activities in individual countries can be financed within the framework of regional objectives. The fact that national ownership of the programmes was a key condition for the financing ensured that, to a large degree, the countries themselves implemented the measures they proposed.

The fact that major international actors were part of the steering group made it possible to mobilise the international community to back demands that governments had to carry out the measures they had agreed to. This ensured that the demobilisation process did not come to a halt.

One reason why the efforts to help special target groups were slow to get started was the attempts which were made to keep administrative costs as low as possible. Initially, therefore, there were insufficient funds for quality assurance, technical assistance and training programmes.


EMPLOYMENT

Creating income-generating opportunities is crucial to achieving stability and security. In the short term, it is important that people see the advantages of peace. For many young men, participation in war and the use of violence are associated with an income. In the long term, employment can help to prevent conflict, and providing jobs is an important element in the process of reintegrating people who return to their home areas once security has been restored. It is well known that demography and unemployment are factors which increase the potential for conflicts and the likelihood that people will resort to violence. The presence of a large proportion of jobless young men in a society can create social unrest, and lead to their being recruited to armed groups and organised crime. Although the question of causes is more complex, and unemployment does not automatically lead to violence, creating jobs is important both to avoid resumption of a conflict and to foster economic development and improve the everyday lives of a war-affected population. This was a key reason for Norway’s support for the improvement of roads in East Timor (see Example 12), which created work for tens of thousands of people, half of whom were young people aged 15 to 29. See also the examples from Sri Lanka, Uganda and Haiti (Examples 13 to 15).

52 For a discussion of this topic, see the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, page 79
EXAMPLE 12: BUILDING ROADS IN EAST TIMOR – IMPROVING THE ROAD SYSTEM AND CREATING EMPLOYMENT

Background: Several hundred years of Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian occupation culminated in nation-wide waves of killing and the destruction of 70 per cent of the infrastructure of East Timor before it became an independent country in 1999. The new nation was Asia’s poorest country, with a traumatised population, a large proportion of young people, a very low level of education and few jobs. Settlement was sparse, and many people lived in places that were difficult to access. The overarching goal of one of the initiatives that Norway supported in East Timor was to help improve the population’s quality of life and social stability through regional development and job creation.

The TIM Works project sought to promote economic growth by improving the country’s network of roads, at the same time providing the population with employment. The project was carried out by the UN’s International Labour Organization (ILO) in cooperation with the East Timor government. The project was to generate over one million man-days of work, especially for young people, by repairing roads in sparsely populated areas and maintaining almost 2,000 km of road built in 2002 in the wake of Indonesia’s withdrawal.

How much: The project had a budget of USD 10.4 million, and was financed by East Timor, Norway, Australia, the EU and Ireland. Norway was the largest donor, investing USD 2.5 million in the project in the period 2008–2010.

Results: The project built 300 km of road, and carried out maintenance on 1,500 km of road in outlying areas. This generated temporary employment for 23,500 people. According to ILO, one fourth of the country’s population benefited from this initiative. Half of those who were given work and an income were young people aged 15–29, and 30 per cent were women. In its final report, ILO credited Norway with 40 per cent of the results achieved up to the end of 2010. The project has been favourably mentioned by the country’s president, who has otherwise taken a critical view of the fact that a great deal of aid is not benefiting the country’s population.

ILO’s review of the project in May 2011 emphasised, among other things, that TIM Works is promoting job creation, poverty reduction, economic growth and conflict reduction through labour-intensive infrastructure development. The project has contributed to the substantial development and improvement of infrastructure. For 83 per cent of the participants, this initiative represented their first opportunity of gainful employment. Some 91 per cent of the women participants earned money for the first time through the project. In total, 73 per cent of the money earned went towards household expenditure and the establishment of personal businesses. A total of 71 per cent of new business start-ups were rendered possible by money earned from TIM Works.

While most of the companies in the region had been established before the project began, 15 per cent of the region’s businesses were started as a result of TIM Works. Roads have contributed to a 67 per cent improvement in accessibility for goods, and public transport has increased by 75 per cent.

Source: ILO’s project reports and reviews, the former Norwegian embassy section in Dili, and the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta.

How much: The project had a budget of USD 10.4 million, and was financed by East Timor, Norway, Australia, the EU and Ireland. Norway was the largest donor, investing USD 2.5 million in the project in the period 2008–2010.

Results: The project built 300 km of road, and carried out maintenance on 1,500 km of road in outlying areas. This generated temporary employment for 23,500 people. According to ILO, one fourth of the country’s population benefited from this initiative. Half of those who were given work and an income were young people aged 15–29, and 30 per cent were women. In its final report, ILO credited Norway with 40 per cent of the results achieved up to the end of 2010. The project has been favourably mentioned by the country’s president, who has otherwise taken a critical view of the fact that a great deal of aid is not benefiting the country’s population.

ILO’s review of the project in May 2011 emphasised, among other things, that TIM Works is promoting job creation, poverty reduction, economic growth and conflict reduction through labour-intensive infrastructure development. The project has contributed to the substantial development and improvement of infrastructure. For 83 per cent of the participants, this initiative represented their first opportunity of gainful employment. Some 91 per cent of the women participants earned money for the first time through the project. In total, 73 per cent of the money earned went towards household expenditure and the establishment of personal businesses. A total of 71 per cent of new business start-ups were rendered possible by money earned from TIM Works.

While most of the companies in the region had been established before the project began, 15 per cent of the region’s businesses were started as a result of TIM Works. Roads have contributed to a 67 per cent improvement in accessibility for goods, and public transport has increased by 75 per cent.

Source: ILO’s project reports and reviews, the former Norwegian embassy section in Dili, and the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta.
EXAMPLE 13: SRI LANKA – VOCATIONAL TRAINING MAKES IT EASIER FOR YOUNG PEOPLE TO GO BACK TO WORK

Background: In Sri Lanka, unemployment is high among young people in rural areas and former conflict areas, particularly among former internally displaced persons. This can be a source of frustration and social unrest.

Vocational training provided by a local branch of the World University Service of Canada (WUSC) aims to help young people find employment. The WUSC provides training for teachers in planning and implementing courses, and engages in advocacy towards the authorities and the private sector to increase young people’s chances of obtaining a job when they graduate. Norway has played a leading role in ensuring that the programme benefits both young men and young women. Training is now being provided in both Sinhala and Tamil. Gender equality was originally a donor priority, and is now an integral objective of the WUSC programme.

Results: After the war, when internally displaced persons returned to areas formerly controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), they no longer had any school diplomas to help them find a job. One of the vocational training centres was approved by the authorities to test the level of knowledge of former students. In this way, diplomas could be reissued to 46 young people, all of whom immediately found employment.

Four vocational training centres in the former conflict areas in northern Sri Lanka have been officially accredited, thereby ensuring that pupils receive officially recognised diplomas after passing their examinations. The centres also provide training for prisoners to ease their reintegration into society. A total of 450 students and 400 prisoners received their graduation diplomas in 2010. Seven smaller centres in the former conflict region of Jaffna have been granted official approval to offer 13 new courses. A total of 93 students, including 19 young women, graduated from these centres in 2010.

As a result of efforts to encourage local enterprises to hire young people, 150 former students have been employed by local businesses. Nine men and 71 women found employment in textile factories in Jaffna. Of 77 former students who were given loans to start their own businesses, 22 can live on the revenues they are generating.

Lessons learned: The project highlights the direct link between vocational training and employment, for both men and women. However, the programme also shows that there is a significant difference between gaining acceptance for gender equality among the local partners in the programme and achieving genuine gender equality in society. Of the 77 young people who were offered business start-up loans by the WUSC, only three out of 34 women are now running their own business, compared to 19 out of 43 men. In the continuation of this project, it will be important to take a closer look at the barriers encountered by young women in the private sector.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Colombo, based on WUSC reports.

How much: Norway is providing the WUSC with NOK 16.8 million in funding in the period 2009–2012, and has decided to increase its support by NOK 3 million for a further two years. Canada provides USD 4.7 million in funding for the project.
EXAMPLE 14: NORTH UGANDA – SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED YOUNG PEOPLE

Background: The majority of the population of North Uganda fled to camps for internally displaced persons during the conflict between the authorities and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Over 90 per cent of these people have moved out of the camps since the conflict ended. The return process was marked by both optimism and challenges. Over 70 per cent of the population of North Uganda is between six and 24 years old, and many young people were deprived of normal schooling during the years of conflict. This has put considerable pressure on the education sector, which is hampered by poor equipment and a lack of funds. Many families cannot afford to give their children a formal education. The 14–24 age group is particularly vulnerable because of the potential social stigma attached to being assigned to classes with much younger children.

The overarching goal of Norway’s activities in North Uganda is to promote stability and peace. Improving young people’s education and skills, thereby increasing their possibilities of obtaining income-generating employment, is important. The Norwegian Embassy in Kampala supports the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Youth Education Pack (YEP), a one-year, full-time, non-formal education programme for young people aged 14 to 24. This is a programme for young men and women with no or little formal education. The programme offers training in various trades, literacy and numeracy skills, and life skills. The activities are designed to improve the young participants’ possibilities of finding a sustainable occupation and future income. Local communities participate in deciding which branches of trade are to be taught.

Results: YEP is the highest-profile, most respected project run by the Norwegian Refugee Council in North Uganda. A total of 3,417 young people graduated from the programme in the period 2006–2010. The pupils had acquired skills that are in demand in local communities and that increase their chances of a job and an income. Around 65 per cent of the young graduates used the skills they learned through the training programme. Most of them work in restaurants, kiosks or carpenter’s workshops or as tailors. Many are also involved in farming, and the profit they make is often invested in their farm.

Findings from a 2010 review showed that YEP has been important in the return process, because the programme has helped to establish new income opportunities, bring knowledge of new technologies into local communities and promote social integration. It has enabled the young returnees to become useful citizens who contribute to the development of their own communities.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Kampala, based on reports from the Norwegian Refugee Council.

How much: Between 2006 and the present, the Norwegian Refugee Council has received NOK 22 million for its Youth Education Pack (YEP), most of which was provided by Sweden. Norway has funded around 32 per cent, or a little over NOK 7 million, of the YEP budget.

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EXAMPLE 15: NORWEGIAN-BRAZILIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

**Background:** Haiti struggles to contend with a dysfunctional state, an unstable political situation, natural disasters, significant social and economic divisions, extreme poverty and unemployment. The combination of a young population, high unemployment, poor governance and urban insecurity spawns conflict and crime. The security situation has been particularly chaotic in the capital, Port-au-Prince, since the early 2000s. A UN force was tasked with restoring stability and law and order after the former President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, fled the country in 2004. It took the UN force three years to gain control of the security situation in urban areas. The Bel Air district in Port-au-Prince was rife with violence and gang crime, and lacked such vital services as water and sewage, waste management and health care.

Norway has provided support for the work of a Brazilian organisation, Viva Rio, in Bel Air since 2006. The organisation established its activities in the heart of the neighbourhood, thereby coming closer to the population than other organisations with offices in safer areas. It established direct contact with gang leaders, and introduced systems that made them accountable to the local community. For instance, the organisation started a lottery for educational grants for schooling and vocational training. The lottery is organised each month in an area of the neighbourhood where there have been no incidents of violence. The rationale is that the local community will turn against those who commit violent acts and thereby prevent the award of scholarships. Viva Rio has also created jobs for former gang members and gang leaders. Moreover, the organisation initiated water and sanitation projects, tree planting and neighbourhood clean-up projects, preventive health measures and sports and cultural activities.

**Results:** According to an independent evaluation, these initiatives have helped to create greater trust between the inhabitants in the district. In 2007, Viva Rio entered into peace agreements with 11 gangs to reduce violence and crime. The agreements are respected, and renewed annually. In 2010, 77 leaders signed such agreements.

The number of murders in Bel Air fell from 21 in 2007 to 17 in 2008 and 14 in 2009. Security patrols manned by members of the local community who have been trained by Viva Rio, as well as the presence of the UN force and a strengthened police force, have helped to make the district a safer place.

As a result of Viva Rio’s efforts, neighbourhood water kiosks and school cisterns have now increased water supplies, waste management has improved, and 18,000 inhabitants have been given access to latrines. At least 10 schools are benefiting from the health programme and have access to a doctor and nurses. All in all, the district’s reputation has improved.

**Lessons learned:** Viva Rio has given priority to in-depth social analyses and the identification of needs. By establishing a presence in the neighbourhood, the organisation has won the inhabitants’ trust and quickly achieved noticeable results. Not enough information is available on the original situation in Bel Air to know whether conditions were better or worse than in other poor neighbourhoods before Viva Rio began its work. Although Viva Río’s methods have produced good results, there is no evidence as to whether these methods are better than other approaches.

The fact that few sustainable economic activities have been established constitutes a threat to continued progress.

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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The police, the military authorities and the justice system – those who are responsible for guaranteeing a population’s safety – have often been the perpetrators of abuses, or are too weak to perform their functions. Awareness of the importance of these institutions has grown in the past few decades. It is essential that all relevant institutions are reformed and developed simultaneously. Efforts to strengthen the police have a limited effect if the courts do not function, or if the prison system cannot implement the decisions of the judiciary and ensure relevant treatment for prisoners.

In 2005, the OECD published a handbook on security sector reform that confirmed the importance of seeing the institutions in an overall context. The handbook also covers the topics of private security companies, non-governmental armed forces and the need for small arms control.

The purpose of reforming the security sector is to create physical and judicial security for the population. This is crucial if the state is to be perceived as legitimate. Armed forces such as the military and the police must be placed under democratic control and be given training. The justice system must comply with fundamental legal principles of equality before the law. Appropriate measures include providing equipment for the police, building prisons and courts of law, and providing human rights training and other necessary specialised expertise. Norway supports security sector reform in several fragile states, and attaches great importance to efforts to combat sexualised violence and violence against women.
EXAMPLE 16: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA – BUILDING A NEW JUSTICE SECTOR

Background: Until Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state in 1995, the country was part of Yugoslavia. After its independence, many key public administrative agencies had to be built up from scratch. One of the most important and most difficult sectors was the justice sector, which had been controlled by the party apparatus in Yugoslavia.

Corruption was rampant in the region. The federation was divided into ten cantons, to which extensive authority had been delegated. The justice sector was in the process of being divided up along the same lines, and was under particularly strong pressure as local politicians sought to use the local legal institutions to their own advantage.

The international community put pressure on the parties to reach agreement on an independent, national judicial system. For a while around the year 2000, the climate between the parties was more conciliatory, and they accepted the establishment of a single justice system in the country.

Norway’s primary contribution has been to provide expertise in the field of law and judicial administration, in the form of Norwegian judges, lawyers and police officers. Some of this personnel was assigned to the Independent Judicial Commission, a transitional arrangement put in place until Bosnia-Herzegovina established its own judicial system. Norway headed efforts to examine possible models, and proposed an independent state judicial system, not unlike the Norwegian system of judicial administration. This system approves judges and prosecuting authorities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and can dismiss those who are found to be unsuitable for their position.

Results: An independent state judicial administrative body, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), was established. In the initial clearing-up phase, more than 1,000 judges and prosecuting authority staff were dismissed and replaced by better-trained lawyers who were given the task of spearheading the fight for a better, non-corrupt judicial system. The entire judicial apparatus has been rationalised, and procedures for dealing with misdemeanours have been simplified.

Modern IT-based tools have been introduced to simplify procedures and make legislation and legally binding judgments accessible to all relevant parties. This ensures greater transparency with regard to the grounds for prosecution and judgments.

Politicians in different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina have since said that they regret having surrendered these powers to an independent judicial council. Their efforts to regain them have been unsuccessful. Today, the HJPC is one of the most respected social institutions, and the model is now being considered as a possibility by several neighbouring states.

Lessons learned: Norway provided flexible financing and experienced personnel early on, and became an important part of the process.

Norwegian experience, combined with Norway’s reputation as an impartial country – the fact that Norway is not a member of the EU was seen as an advantage in this context – was important. Norwegian advisors won extensive trust, on which they continued to build by adopting a listening approach to local issues, an attitude for which they were highly praised. The combination of flexibility and expertise was crucial to exploiting the opportunity that arose when local authorities agreed to establish the HJPC.


RECONCILIATION AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Norway has a long tradition of supporting projects to promote dialogue in conflict areas. These projects are initiated both before and during open conflict with a view to dismantling hostile stereotypes between such adversaries as different religious and ethnic groups, and after conflict to foster reconciliation. Conflict often reinforces the lines of confrontation between different groups. The possibilities of building a common future may be limited. Dialogue projects can promote understanding and find peaceful ways of resolving conflicts. The following three examples describe different types of initiatives to promote dialogue and reconciliation.

The first is an interreligious dialogue project run by Norwegian Church Aid. The second is an example of trauma treatment aimed at facilitating the reintegration of former combatants and persons who have survived acts of abuse into their local communities. The third is a dialogue project between ethnic groups. These examples may be small in terms of their percentage of the aid budget, but can be important for creating the political will to seek peaceful solutions.

East Timor has one of the youngest populations in the world. Norway has provided support for projects that specifically target young people and gangs. This picture was taken in a compound belonging to Perguruan Silat Setia Hati (PSHT) in Dili, East Timor. The PSHT is one of several large gangs in East Timor whose members are primarily unemployed young men. The persons in the picture are practising martial arts.
EXAMPLE 17: ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA – DIALOGUE IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Background: Ethiopia and Eritrea are countries with a diversity of religions. In Ethiopia, 43 per cent of the population are Orthodox Christians, 33 per cent are Sunni Muslims and 18 per cent are Protestants. In Eritrea, 50 per cent are Orthodox Christians, 36 per cent are Sunni Muslims and 12 per cent are Catholics. In 1998, relations between the two countries were very tense. It looked as though war would break out, after the political leaderships of the two countries broke off all contact.

Norwegian Church Aid contacted the countries’ religious leaders to see whether it was possible to create a platform for dialogue. The aim was to promote understanding between the two peoples by reminding them of their common historical, cultural and religious roots. Norwegian Church Aid brought together leaders from religious groups in both countries. Nevertheless, war broke out in 1998, and lasted until 2000. The dialogue project has continued, and has been expanded into dialogue projects between religious groups in the two countries.

Results: The religious leaders were given an opportunity to meet across national borders. This would have been virtually impossible without the assistance of a third party like Norwegian Church Aid. The initial meetings took place in third-party countries, including twice in Norway. In 2002, the UN peacekeeping forces assisted in enabling religious leaders from Ethiopia to visit Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and Eritrean religious leaders were able to visit Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Abeba. In both capitals, peace ceremonies were held. A meeting scheduled in Nairobi in 2003 was cancelled because the Eritrean President refused to allow the religious leaders to travel.

In 2005, a joint project under the auspices of the religious leaders was carried out in the border districts. In the town of Selambessa on the Ethiopian side, household supplies were distributed to inhabitants who had been directly affected by the war, and a school and slaughterhouse were built. On the Eritrean side, work on building a mosque and a church was commenced, but was not finished due to a lack of building materials and the difficult political situation in the country.

The project also forged an interreligious platform within the countries. In Ethiopia, these efforts have been continued through the establishment of an Interreligious Council. This has promoted knowledge of and respect for other beliefs, and introduced measures to combat cultural practices that prevent peace and development. For example, it has provided an opportunity to discuss sensitive issues relating to women’s health, such as the circumcision of girls. Female genital mutilation is a problem for Christians and Muslims alike. The religious leaders have denounced the practice, and both the Protestant and the Orthodox churches, which have 35 million and 18 million members respectively, have issued public statements to that effect.

Lessons learned: Although this type of small-scale project cannot prevent war, the project has strengthened forces for peace, both between and within the countries. The example also shows that interreligious dialogue can lead to cooperation on combating shared problems.

Source: Norwegian Church Aid, Ethiopia. Based on project reports and field visits.

How much: Between 1998 and 2011, Norwegian Church Aid received a total of around NOK 8 million for its dialogue project. In addition, funding for the interreligious dialogue in Ethiopia amounted to NOK 1.5 million in the period 2003–2011.

Tagay Tadesse from the Orthodox church and Shieh Abdulahamid Ahmed from the local mosque in Agaro, 400 km southwest of Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. After two churches in the town were burnt down in October 2006, the two leaders joined forces to bring people from different religious communities together in an attempt to repair the damage to the community and to build relations that could prevent new conflicts. They have won the population’s confidence and the local authorities’ respect and recognition. They use churches and mosques in their efforts to reach out with their message of peace, particularly to young people. They have also initiated efforts to involve women. Not long ago, they met the country’s president and told him about their engagement for peace.
EXAMPLE 18: UGANDA – RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRAUMA TREATMENT AND TRADITIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION METHODS

Background: The 20-year-long conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in North Uganda made over one million Ugandans refugees in their own country. The suffering continued for many of them in the camps for internally displaced persons. After a peace process in 2006, the LRA moved out of Uganda to areas in neighbouring countries, where the conflict continues.

As a result of the Government’s amnesty, former LRA soldiers can return home without facing punishment. This often gives rise to conflict in their local communities. Young girls who were ab ducted by the LRA are stigmatised. This applies in particular to young women who have had children with LRA officers and who are rejected by their families when they come home. Family structures were destroyed in the camps, with the result that many women were abandoned by their husbands. Moreover, many were widowed by the hostilities. A great many of those who survived are still traumatised.

Local organisations are well suited for efforts to reach out to the survivors. A local organisation called the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) helps survivors reconcile themselves with their past and their surroundings by preparing a written account of their experiences.

How much: Between December 2009 and June 2011, the Ugandan organisation, the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), received NOK 3.6 million in funding from Norway.

Results: Funding has primarily been used to establish a centre in Gulu where people meet to share their experiences and write down their stories. A total of 50 people have received training in heading survivor groups. They lead local meetings that are attended by 100–200 people every time.

The organisation has organised a series of reconciliation gatherings in villages, where dialogue is conducted in accordance with traditional conflict resolution and documented. Conflicts concerning LRA returnees have been resolved in the returnees’ home communities, and mutual acceptance has been achieved. Through this process, many survivors have been given the strength to carry on in life. Women, including young mothers who were held prisoner by the LRA, have received both trauma treatment and training to enable them to find income-generating work.

The JRP has documented abuses in its publications and on the project website, regardless of which armed group committed the abuse. This means that information on abuses which the authorities and others have suppressed for years is now emerging. Through its projects, the organisation is helping to ensure that the authorities’ general amnesty is combined with reconciliation at the local level. This enables perpetrators and survivors to be reintegrated and to function together in society.

Lessons learned: This collaboration has revealed a need for a long-term approach in this type of post-conflict work. This need will be addressed in future cooperation. Women survivors’ knowledge of local conditions and their role as a driving force and mutual resource were underestimated when the project first started. There will be more emphasis on the situation of these women in future efforts.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Kampala, based on JRP reports.
EXAMPLE 19: THE NANSEN DIALOGUE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

**Background:** The break-up of the former Yugoslavia largely followed ethno-cultural divisions.

The conflict was often particularly bitter in areas in which different groups lived together, and ethnic cleansing was one of the most terrible consequences. Although the fighting ended many years ago, several of the new states are still racked by antagonism and distrust, sometimes severe. Many local politicians have built their careers on confrontation and fear of “the others”.

**How much:** In the over 10 years that the dialogue programme has existed, Norway has provided around NOK 150 million. In addition, the Nansen centres have secured other financing for their activities, and some activities are now financed by local authorities. USAID has part-financed the Sarajevo centre’s work in Srebrenica.

Since the mid-1990s, the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer has made active efforts to promote inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation. In the early years, the focus was on training younger leaders from the different groups in how to support dialogue processes. The participants then took the initiative to establish a series of “Nansen Dialogue Centres” (the Nansen Centres) in the various parts of the former Yugoslavia. Although the individual Nansen Centres are in principle free to determine their own work programmes, they cooperate across national borders, use shared methodology and exchange experiences. This provides an opportunity which few other measures in the region offer: to build relationships, tackle conflicts, and support reconciliation and long-term cooperation, both between groups and across borders.

**Results:** The Nansen programme has built a network of centres led by dedicated, local individuals who now possess extensive experience and expertise in the field of dialogue processes and reconciliation. Reconciliation centres have been established in some of the most traumatised, conflicted areas in Bosnia, Srebrenica and Prijedor. Moreover, two new centres have recently been opened. The centres in Srebrenica and Prijedor have now, after several years of work, secured the active support of the local municipal administrations. In Bujanovac in southern Serbia, four years of work were required before a multi-ethnic municipal council was elected in the winter of 2011.

In Macedonia, the Nansen programme has established the first bilingual, multi-ethnic schools in the country. It is clear that such schools are valued by the local community: local authorities are now running such schools themselves in two municipalities, and similar schools are to be opened in two additional municipalities. In October, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) rewarded the programme’s efforts by presenting it with the annual Max van der Stoel award in recognition of its contribution to multilingual education and cooperation between ethnic groups. One example of the fact that the local communities view the work of the centres positively is that the Kosovan government is paying for the return of Serbs within the framework of a programme developed and led by the Nansen Centre in Pristina.

Many of the several hundred people who have completed Nansen training now hold important posts as ministers, mayors or school principals in their communities, including 19 of the current members of the Montenegrin parliament.

An evaluation of the development assistance provided by Norway in the Western Balkans praised the programme for the results achieved. At the same time, the Nansen programme was encouraged to strengthen its ties with other actors who in different ways and arenas are also contributing to reconciliation and the construction of democratic, multi-ethnic societies.

**Lessons learned:** Dialogue and reconciliation efforts often involve groups which are uninterested in approaching one another and finding joint solutions. As the example of the municipal council in Bujanovac shows, long-term efforts are required to achieve results. This means that donors must be willing to accept that timelines may sometimes be long.

Source: Scanteam

CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In many situations, an important part of the stabilisation process is to ensure that clear political changes occur soon after peace is agreed. Examples may include a transitional government acceptable to all parties or a new constitution and electoral law which provide the basis for democracy and put a stop to discrimination. Fair elections must be held, perhaps for the first time. Formerly excluded groups must be allowed to participate in the peace process and to influence political developments. Popular engagement and participation are important. In Nepal, Norway has contributed to such improvements in connection with constitutional amendments (Example 20), and efforts to promote the participation of women in society (Example 21).
EXAMPLE 20: NEPAL – WIDE-RANGING DEBATE ABOUT A NEW CONSTITUTION THROUGH MOBILISATION OF THE MEDIA AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION

Background: A constitution is key to building a well-functioning state and laying a foundation for development. A constitution requires the support of the people in order to achieve its purpose. Against this backdrop, Norway has worked to ensure that important, marginalised groups receive information about the country’s constitutional process, which has been at a standstill since 2006, and have the opportunity to participate in the debate. Norway is providing funding for a project with the objective of ensuring a democratic constitutional process. This project is run by a national voluntary organisation called Media Initiative for Rights, Equity and Social Transformation (MIREST). The organisation has an extensive network of journalists and organisations, and works to ensure that the public, and particularly traditionally weak groups in Nepalese society, such as lower castes and mountain tribes, are involved and heard in the process of negotiating a constitution for the new Nepal. The project includes the provision of information about the constitutional process to marginalised groups, discussion meetings and the communication of information about the priorities of these groups to politicians.

Results: There has been no independent evaluation of the measure, but the Embassy in Nepal reports that the measure has helped to improve the quality of the current draft constitution. Another important result, albeit unplanned, is an important legislative amendment. Corruption is widespread among Nepalese politicians, and a draft law proposed making the Supreme Court accountable to parliament. In other words, the intention was to enshrine a political review of legal decisions in law. A major public outcry and the efforts of MIREST resulted in the law being redrafted. The Supreme Court is now responsible for interpreting the constitution, without the intervention of elected representatives. The democratic division of powers has thus been safeguarded.

The organisation has succeeded in promoting increased public discussion through TV debates and by arranging meetings between parliamentarians and their constituents in the districts.

The project has also produced and published an information document called “The Will of the People”. This is published in all of the country’s many official languages and covers important issues within the area of responsibility of each committee in the constitutional assembly.

This means that politicians are held more accountable to their electorate. It has also contributed to increased engagement and information exchange among the marginalised and poor, and resulted in a public discussion regarding how the electoral system should be designed in order meet the needs of marginalised groups. The Embassy is of the opinion that this has helped to increase understanding, and reduce animosity, between different political groupings. By promoting greater understanding between the different groups, MIREST is considered to have contributed to a reduction in the number of armed groups, from 108 in 2008 to 35 today.

Lessons learned: MIREST acknowledges that many of the issues on which it works are controversial, and may increase the climate of confrontation in society. Channelling support through a local organisation with strong grass-roots support appears to have created an arena for dealing with such controversies in a peaceful and democratic manner.

The results achieved by the MIREST project also clearly demonstrate the important role of the media at the peacebuilding stage. The media have great influence, and independent media are crucial for holding politicians and other persons in power accountable. In addition, the media ensure greater transparency about complex and controversial issues, and can help to build a more inclusive, tolerant society. The MIREST project also shows that dialogue and information can assist in reducing the level of conflict in a society which has recently experienced widespread conflict.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Kathmandu, based on reports received from MIREST.
GENDER EQUALITY IN PEACE PROCESSES

The fact that Norway gives priority to gender equality in peace processes means that it supports local women’s organisations and meeting places where experiences and knowledge relating to the issues can be exchanged. Norway is also supporting the preparation and distribution of information on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and other relevant resolutions. In the Philippines, where Norway is involved in two separate peace processes, women have participated extensively in grass-roots movements which support the processes. As a result of Norway’s efforts, an umbrella organisation for Filipino non-governmental organisations has integrated efforts to promote the participation and protection of women into all of its activities. In Nepal, priority has been given to supporting women’s networks and developing a national action plan on women, peace and security.

EXAMPLE 21: NEPAL – A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

Background: In Nepal, one objective has been to draft an official action plan for strengthening the rights of women to protection during conflicts and to participate in peace processes – an action plan that safeguards the rights and needs of Nepalese women. The plan is intended to ensure the implementation of both Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and Resolution 1820 on sexualised violence in conflict situations.

Since 2008, the Norwegian Embassy in Kathmandu has chaired a group of donor countries and UN organisations, the Peace Support Working Group (PSWG), which is mandated to assist the government of Nepal in developing an action plan of this kind in order to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. Norway has also funded a series of meetings in 18 of the country’s 75 districts, at which women from all over the country were given an opportunity to make recommendations regarding the content of the action plan. These meetings were organised by several women’s networks, including the Women’s Alliance for Peace, Power, Democracy and the Constituent Assembly (WAPPDCA), which is also financed by Norway. In total, 52 of 75 districts were covered.

Results: A national action plan for the implementation of the two UN resolutions was launched in February 2011. The nationwide process, during which 1,500 recommendations were gathered concerning the content of the plan, has also been recognised internationally as a good example from which other countries can learn.

As a result of these efforts, much greater attention has been devoted to women and gender equality, both in the capital and in villages. The dialogue between donor countries, the UN and the Ministry of Peace has been strengthened, and relevant actors have given the resolutions high priority on their political agendas. The expectation has been established that at least 33 per cent of representatives in political positions and on committees of importance to women and peacebuilding in the country should be women, although no women have yet secured a seat at the peace negotiating table. The action plan is to be implemented by various specialist ministries under the leadership of the Ministry of Peace, in partnership with civil society and with the continued support of and pressure from the international community. It is too early to conclude whether, or how much, the action plan, women’s meetings and media attention will advance the peace process. Norway and PSWG remain key actors in the context of supporting the implementation of the action plan.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Kathmandu.

How much: The initiative for the development of the action plan has cost NOK 400,000. In addition, Norway has given support to the WAPPDCA women’s network totalling NOK 2.6 million for the period 2008 to 2010. Norway’s role as a facilitator has been as important as the financial contribution.
HUMANITARIAN MEASURES AND EARLY RECOVERY

A large proportion of the development assistance Norway gives to conflict countries takes the form of humanitarian assistance. Emergency relief given to areas in conflict presents particular challenges compared to emergency relief given to countries which are not in conflict. Humanitarian assistance is governed by principles regarding neutrality and independence. It is important to distinguish between emergency relief on the one hand and diplomatic and military measures on the other. If no distinction is made, there is a risk that emergency relief will not be perceived as neutral, and this may prevent humanitarian actors from gaining access to those in need.

Another challenge is how short-term measures can be implemented so as to ensure that they provide a basis for long-term development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prepared its own report on the results of Norway’s humanitarian assistance work. Below, examples are given of three challenges relating to humanitarian assistance in conflict situations: thinking long-term, managing relations with opposing parties, and protecting civilians.

THINKING LONG-TERM

One example of emergency relief which provides a basis for long-term development is educational measures for children affected by war (see Example 21). On the one hand, such measures have an immediate humanitarian effect by maintaining a degree of normality for children living in an extreme situation. On the other hand, the measures prevent entire year groups from suffering educational gaps. The nation is given a better foundation for reconstruction and development. A country’s educational level is decisive as regards whether it will remain a fragile state or manage to work its way out of fragility and underdevelopment. What children learn then also becomes important.

58 Wim Naudé, Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, Mark Gillivray (ed.) Fragile States. Causes, Costs and Responses, page 96: Fragile states which feature enduring fragility typically have small, poorly educated populations.

Increased focus on education in emergency situations

Background: There is increasing recognition of the fact that education can play an important role in conflict situations. Education helps to create a feeling of normality. Formal and informal education can promote enlightenment and provide vital information which may save lives. Schooling can impart hope for the future. In long-term crises in particular, it is important for children and young people to receive an education, to prevent entire generations from missing out on schooling.

Norway has helped to direct focus onto education in emergency and fragile situations, among other things through its support for the Inter Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). INEE was founded in 2000, and is made up of field staff, researchers, non-governmental organisations, UN organisations, developing countries and donor countries. INEE develops guidelines and courses for field workers engaged in educational work in emergency situations.

How much? Norway is one of the largest contributors to INEE, providing funding of between NOK 400,000 and 800,000 per year since 2004. The Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children Norway and Norad are members of INEE’s working group on minimum standards.

Results: INEE has developed minimum standards for education during crises. The standards provided the basis for the UN resolution on the right to education in emergency situations adopted in 2010. INEE’s advocacy efforts also provided an impetus for the UN Security Council’s adoption of a resolution condemning attacks on schools. The resolution means that attacks on schools are reported to the Security Council more frequently than before.
EXAMPLE 22: SAVE THE CHILDREN – MORE AND BETTER SCHOOLING FOR CHILDREN AFFECTED BY CONFLICT

**Background:** One consequence of conflict is that children miss out on schooling. Schools are closed, families flee, and children are recruited as soldiers or taken out of school to work at home. In 2005, Save the Children launched a campaign aimed at protecting the right to schooling of children in conflict countries. Another objective was to improve learning outcomes. Education is not only about being able to attend school, but also about learning something. The Rewrite the Future programme was run between 2005 and 2010, in 20 countries. The target group totalled 10 million children.

**How much:** Internationally, Save the Children has collected NOK 2.5 billion for the programme. The Norwegian authorities’ contribution totalled NOK 1.35 million.

**Results:** In 2011, Save the Children published an evaluation of the entire Rewrite the Future campaign. The evaluation summarised findings from reviews of selected programme countries. The following findings are taken from the evaluation. During the civil war in Nepal, Save the Children facilitated negotiations between school districts and local armed groups to protect schools from attacks and interruptions. Pupils, parents and teachers reported that this helped to prevent the terrorisation of schools, reduced fears about attending school, and contributed to more teaching and less violence at school. In 2009, project schools provided, on average, 14 days more teaching than other schools. This was an important step forward in a situation where schools were often used more as a political arena than for teaching purposes. Pupils and teachers in two districts also reported that corporal punishment was no longer used in schools, although this practice could still be observed in other schools.

Small schools which have the support of the local community, including catch-up classes, have proven to be an effective means of providing education to various vulnerable groups in crisis situations, for example young people without previous schooling, children displaced by conflict, children who live far from urban centres, children from minorities, and girls. In Angola, reading tests of all pupils in catch-up classes showed that 58 per cent of the pupils could read well, compared to 26 per cent in other schools. Some 43 per cent of the girls read well, compared to 20 per cent in other schools. In Afghanistan, such local, short-term schooling solutions achieved a school attendance rate of 48 per cent for girls, compared to the national average of 37 per cent.

In Afghanistan and South Sudan, Save the Children has given training to parent groups and local communities on issues relating to the education of girls. The proportion of girls in project schools in South Sudan increased from 22 per cent in 2008 to 28 per cent in 2010. In Afghanistan, the proportion of girls in schools supported by Save the Children Norway was below 30 per cent in 2005, but had increased to 39 per cent in 2009.

In the unstable parts of Uganda, many children have no access to schools. Save the Children took the initiative to establish a flexible, mobile school model to give children in these areas access to schooling. To ensure the sustainability of the initiative, Save the Children has worked with politicians and educational authorities to make this school model part of the formal education system. In 2009, the legislation governing schools was amended to include all types of informal education in the formal school system. Since then, the Ugandan Ministry of Education has given priority to training teachers in informal schools.

**Lessons learned:** Efforts to keep schools neutral must be made in close cooperation with the local community. Direct negotiations between the opposing parties in the civil war in Nepal and schoolchildren, parents, teachers and village councils were a major factor in securing the combatants’ agreement to the proposition that schools should be peace zones. There are also individual examples of cases where this contributed to local peace processes, both by increasing security in the local area and by supporting the reintegration of child soldiers into the local community, enabling them to continue their schooling.

MANAGING RELATIONS WITH ARMED GROUPS

Since the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863, the humanitarian imperative – to reduce human suffering wherever it may be found – has guided those who provide emergency relief in conflict situations. Emergency relief must be provided to all those in need, regardless of ethnic, social, religious or political affiliation. This can give rise to dilemmas in relation to the Do No Harm principle: development assistance actors who save lives may be criticised for prolonging the war, by enabling people to remain in disputed areas; see the example of Norwegian People’s Aid (page 26). When development assistance actors pay militia groups for protection in order to be able to deliver emergency relief, the dilemma becomes even clearer. The following example illustrates how the Norwegian Refugee Council found a way to satisfy both the humanitarian imperative and the Do No Harm principle.

EXAMPLE 23: SOMALIA – REACHING PEOPLE IN NEED DESPITE CONFLICT

Background: Two decades of civil war and statelessness in Somalia have created one of the world’s most severe, longest-running humanitarian crises. The drought now raging in the Horn of Africa has left Somalia suffering its second famine in 20 years. The UN estimates that four million Somalis – half the country’s population – need emergency relief, and that 750,000 Somalis risk starving to death before the end of the year.

Results: During the seven years for which the Norwegian Refugee Council has been operating in Somalia, tens of thousands of people have received emergency relief. In 2011, the Norwegian Refugee Council provided primary education to 6,900 children, built 90 classrooms with latrines, offices, storage facilities and playgrounds, provided shelter for 15,600 people, and distributed essential articles like cooking vessels, water containers, cutlery and soap to 50,000 people. Some 29,000 people have been provided with latrines, improved sanitary conditions and hygiene information. Through the refurbishment and drilling of wells, 10,000 people have gained access to clean water.

In response to the drought and famine which is currently affecting the Horn of Africa, the Norwegian Refugee Council launched a major project in the famine-affected areas. In August 2011 alone, 70,000 people received food aid in these areas. In addition, the Norwegian Refugee Council is working in the refugee camps in Dadaab, Kenya, which are home to 450,000 refugees. The refugees are being provided with food and shelter, although there is still a great need for latrines, shelter and educational opportunities.

Lessons learned: Gaining access to those in need in Somalia has demanded thorough knowledge of local conditions, ongoing analysis of the security situation, and sufficient flexibility to react quickly to exploit opportunities which arise. Good local relations are decisive in such extreme situations.

Source: The Norwegian Refugee Council, based on project reports.
PROTECTING CIVILIANS

Assistance to protect civilians encompasses measures aimed at protecting the rights of civilians under humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of opposing parties in conflict situations, and under the Refugee Convention and human rights instruments. An important target group is internally displaced persons. Although there is no separate convention for this group of people, they are protected by humanitarian law and human rights instruments. Measures may range from peacekeeping forces, via efforts to get opposing parties to respect humanitarian law, to measures to assist people who have been assaulted. An important aspect of these efforts is preventing, and responding to, sexualised violence in conflict situations (see Example 24). Another important activity that protects civilians is mine clearance (see Example 25). Example 26 illustrates how local civil society organisations protect civilians by providing legal assistance.


A woman carries her food ration in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Photo: The Norwegian Refugee Council
EXAMPLE 24: COMBATING SEXUALISED VIOLENCE IN DR CONGO – AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Background: Hundreds of thousands of people have been victims of sexualised violence in DR Congo since the conflict started in 1996. Eastern Congo is considered to be the region in the world where sexualised violence in conflict situations is most prevalent. Sexualised violence is used as a weapon against the civilian population, not least in the fight for control of mineral-rich areas. In the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, sexualised violence has also become a major problem in peacetime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long supported the efforts of Norwegian organisations to provide medical and psychosocial follow-up for survivors.

How much: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided around NOK 110 million in financing for the project in 2010 and 2011.

In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a project aimed at intensifying these efforts through the adoption of a more integrated approach to preventive work and judicial follow-up. This initiative was a response to UN Security Council Resolution 1820 on sexualised violence in conflict situations. Funding was channelled through Norwegian and international organisations which are reaching the civilian population through cooperation with local organisations. The implemented measures include capacity-building in the health sector, the establishment of mobile courts and the training of judges to reduce the impunity with which perpetrators operate, efforts to change the attitudes of men, and funding for the attachment of civilian observers to the UN MONUSCO force to prevent new assaults. The project has also encompassed funding for research which aims to build a better understanding of the causes and consequences of sexualised violence.

To tackle the underlying causes of the conflict, Norway has helped to strengthen international efforts to prevent trade in conflict minerals. Norway has also given its support to the UN’s efforts to combat sexualised violence in DR Congo, including the development of a national action plan.

Results: Norway’s efforts to combat sexualised violence in DR Congo and the African Great Lakes region have been strengthened and become more coherent. This has also resulted in improved coordination with other donors.

With Norway’s support, DR Congo has introduced a national strategy for combating sexualised violence. Research has contributed to a greater understanding of the causes of sexualised violence and which measures are most effective in reducing the number of assaults. The causes include traditional gender roles in the region. The project has therefore been expanded to support measures to strengthen the participation of women in DR Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, for example by supporting the development of national and regional plans for implementing the UN Security Council’s resolutions on women, peace and security.

Two mobile courts have given survivors access to the judicial system where they live. In addition, the training of 89 judges, legal personnel and law students has improved the ability of the judicial system to deal with cases of assault. Norway’s efforts are being coordinated with those of other donors who are supporting the training of military and police personnel, the national judicial system and the construction of prisons to reduce the impunity of perpetrators. The training of civil society actors and six radio campaigns have also helped to educate the general population about laws and women’s rights.

Thousands of survivors have received medical and psychosocial support. The range of health services on offer is being improved in areas in which sexualised violence is very widespread. A large hospital with a much greater capacity to monitor maternal and child health is being constructed. Health personnel have been trained in the treatment of the physical and psychological injuries of survivors.

Norway supported the development of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. These guidelines are to prevent such trade from resulting in crime, assaults and sexualised violence.

Lessons learned: The strength of the project has been the opportunity to examine sexualised violence in a broader regional context. This has allowed measures to be directed at several of the underlying causes simultaneously. Research has provided insights into sexualised violence trends and causes. The primary causes are weak state institutions, a power vacuum in Eastern Congo, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, a lack of security-sector reform and widespread impunity for perpetrators. Traditional gender roles may also have an influence on sexualised violence trends. Achieving a significant reduction in sexualised violence in DR Congo and the African Great Lakes region requires permanent solutions to the conflicts in the region.

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa I Section (Central, Southern and Western Africa), based on project reports.
EXAMPLE 25: DEMINING IN MOZAMBIQUE

Background: Mines were used extensively during the civil war in Mozambique. The opposition forces laid mines on roads, bridges and other important civilian installations to weaken the country’s economy and community services. Forces loyal to the government used minefields to protect infrastructure and military installations. Few maps were made of the mined areas, and because the conflict lasted a long time, the mines were moved and spread by floods. Mines were a major problem in some parts of the country, due both to the number of mines and to the fact that no-one knew where the mines were anymore. When the peace agreement was signed in 1993, Norwegian People’s Aid launched a demining programme in Central and Northern Mozambique. The programme ran until 2006.

Results: By the time the demining programme ended, Norwegian People’s Aid had cleared almost 14.5 million square metres of roads, bridges, fields and important civilian installations such as schools and health centres. More than 21,500 mines and other explosives were removed and destroyed, resulting in a dramatic drop in the number of mine victims. The programme enabled the local populations in some of the most war-torn areas to cultivate fields and to access important community institutions without the fear of mine accidents. Norwegian People’s Aid also trained pupils and villagers in mine safety.

Norwegian People’s Aid helped to strengthen Mozambique’s own authority in the mine-clearance field, improved the country’s database of remaining mines and unsafe areas, and trained mine clearance personnel who have not only taken on assignments for other clients in Mozambique but also assisted in other countries. When Norwegian People’s Aid ended the project in 2006, it provided the authorities with a thorough survey of the remaining minefields in five of the country’s 10 provinces, as a starting point for Mozambique’s further demining efforts.

In the beginning, the work was based on incomplete information about the location of mines and which minefields the population wanted cleared first. The first evaluation of the programme in 1998 resulted in the organisation’s 500 mine clearance personnel being divided into smaller teams, and in clearance priorities being based more on the priorities and needs of local communities.

Lessons learned: Results are achieved through long-term efforts and a focus on local expertise. The results were achieved due to the gradual improvement and focusing of the work. Norwegian People’s Aid transferred responsibility, expertise and resources relatively early on, enabling Mozambique to take on more of the mine clearance challenges which the country still faces.

How much: Between 1993 and 2006, the programme cost around NOK 200 million.

Source: Scanteam

The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) in Cambodia trains dogs to search for mines.
EXAMPLE 26: LEGAL ASSISTANCE PREVENTS HOUSE DEMOLITION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

Background: It is difficult for the Palestinian population to obtain buildings permits in East Jerusalem and other areas on the West Bank which are under Israeli civilian and military control. Many buildings are erected illegally to house a growing population, and their residents face threats of demolition and expropriation. The consequences of demolition and eviction include increased poverty and reduced access to services such as water, health and education. In addition, those who are affected often have to pay for the demolition. It has been calculated that over 24,000 houses have been demolished on the West Bank, in East Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip since 1967. In the period 2006–2010, Ma’an renovated 150 homes with Norway’s support. This has enabled Bedouin families to remain in the Jordan valley and to continue to base their existence on agriculture. The project is thus contributing to a continued Palestinian presence in a disputed area, and the Bedouins are able to maintain their traditional way of life.

House demolition and eviction results in the relocation of the Palestinian people, and makes it easier for Israeli settlers to appropriate the areas in question. Norway considers it politically important to support the safeguarding of the fundamental human rights of Palestinians, and therefore supports projects that provide legal assistance to resolve property disputes and avoid house demolitions.

Norway supports various organisations which provide Palestinians with legal advice on property law. The Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (HRC) aims to ensure the legal protection of Palestinian properties in Hebron’s old city. The Ma’an Development Centre promotes the rights of the Bedouin population in the Jordan valley.

Results: Through the various projects, Norway has helped to ensure that a number of Palestinian families and institutions have been able to keep their homes and properties. For example, the HRC has contributed to an increase in the number of Palestinian inhabitants of Hebron’s old city from around 400 in 1996 to 5,500 in 2010. Most of these people live in houses renovated by the HRC. During the same period, 163 shop owners have been able to reopen their shops. The increased presence of Palestinians has meant that Israeli settlers have been unable to settle in empty houses.

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Legal assistance has helped Palestinians to keep their homes, and is an important service which strengthens the rights of Palestinians. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Palestinians to remain in East Jerusalem and the parts of the West Bank in which Israel was granted control of civilian issues under the Oslo Accords. More Palestinians have been made homeless during the first six months of 2011 than during the whole of 2010. Legal assistance must therefore be combined with political pressure from the international community, and a final solution will only be achieved through a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

How much: In the period 2006–2011, Ma’an has received NOK 2.9 million. The legal department of the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee has received NOK 5.9 million in the period 2004–2011.

Source: The Representative Office of Norway to the Palestinian Authority, based on Ma’an and HRC’s reports.

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STATEBUILDING AND LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT

Much of the assistance given to countries during and after conflicts is dedicated to establishing state institutions – the judicial system, parliament, social services and the public administration. The absence of such institutions, and the fact that they may have been instruments of discrimination, are often underlying causes of conflict. Moreover, they also help to explain why fragile states are doing very poorly as regards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The G7+ group of fragile states has developed a road map for the achievement of the MDGs. The group is asking donors to focus their assistance on peace- and statebuilding. One important problem caused by a lack of state institutions is that their absence creates a wide scope for illegal activities such as international terrorism and organised crime. Supporting statebuilding is a major challenge in various countries and regions in which the situation is highly unpredictable and assistance is provided in societies racked by armed conflict and violence. Such framework conditions influence both the organisation and implementation of long-term assistance.

An armed conflict often leaves roads, bridges, power stations and railways in ruins. Hospitals, health centres and schools may be hit, or the conflict may have prevented adequate development of these services. Needs and national implementation capacity will vary. The situation in Afghanistan is entirely different from that following the war in the Balkans. A common challenge is the desire to be able to point to quick results on the ground and improved living conditions for the population.

RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

The following examples from Afghanistan show how Norway is using different channels to provide reconstruction and development assistance. While the multi-donor fund administered by the World Bank is a good instrument for supporting national priorities and the country’s own development strategies, non-governmental organisations can operate in fields which are difficult for the national authorities to access for political or capacity-related reasons.

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67 In addition to the examples below, Norad’s website offers examples of the reconstruction and improvement of the health service in Liberia, and the development of the power industry in Mozambique and the oil industry in East Timor.
EXAMPLE 27: AFGHANISTAN – LARGE-SCALE BUDGET SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Background: The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was established in 2002 to support the reconstruction of the country. The reason for channelling financing from multiple donors through a joint fund was to make it easier for the national authorities to plan and administer the funds. In addition, the fund functions as a financing channel for donors which do not have a sufficient presence in the country to administer large amounts of funding. The money is used to finance current government expenditure, particularly in the health and education sectors, and development projects given priority by the authorities. The ARTF comprises 17 programmes in sectors such as infrastructure, education, hydropower and health.

How much: The ARTF is the world’s largest post-conflict fund, with commitments totalling a little more than USD 5 billion. USD 4.3 billion has been paid by 31 donors. Norway has made commitments of almost USD 295 million. To strengthen the national administration, Norway’s contributions have not been earmarked for special programmes since 2010.

Results: The EQUIP educational programme, which is financed by the ARTF, has contributed to the increase in the number of children in school from around one million in 2001 to around eight million in 2011. From a very low starting point in 2001, the proportion of girls in school has increased to around a third of all schoolchildren. Never before in the history of Afghanistan have more girls attended school than now. These figures are highly uncertain due to the way the statistics are calculated. Among other things, children are counted as pupils for two years after enrolment, even if they only attend school for a single day. The authorities report that 4.5 million children of school age, mostly girls, do not go to school.

The number of teachers has increased from around 20,000 in 2002 to 170,000 in 2011. Whilst it was almost unthinkable in 2002 to have women teachers, today around 30 per cent of teachers are women. Significant challenges remain, particularly as regards teaching quality. The educational level among teachers is low. The Ministry of Education has estimated that 78 per cent of the teachers have the required qualifications. The building of schools is the most costly part of EQUIP’s expenditure. Little success has been achieved in this area. The most recent review by the World Bank and the Afghan authorities criticised the construction work. The quality of the school buildings is deemed to vary between poor and very poor. The World Bank has stopped payments to the schools construction programme until damage to existing schools is repaired.

The ARTF has several programmes covering road construction.

Afghanistan’s infrastructure was largely destroyed after three decades of war. More than 10,000 kilometres of road have been improved, including 4,000 kilometres of asphalted road. The improved roads include the stretch between the country’s two most important cities, Kabul and Kandahar. Afghanistan’s increased level of economic activity can to some extent be linked to the fact that travel is now easier within the country.

Since 2002, almost 27,000 local development groups have been established. This has helped to build up the administrative and planning expertise of local communities, and enabled the groups to implement more than 45,000 locally defined projects focused on irrigation systems, road construction, electrification and the supply of drinking water.

Through the ARTF, Norway is supporting a national institution which offers administrative and management education. The aim is to contribute to the training of qualified personnel to run the state administration, and to develop the private business sector. In September 2011, 1,058 accountants, administrators and computer experts graduated, 22 per cent of whom were women.

According to the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, several of these individuals have secured jobs in public or private enterprises.

An evaluation of the ARTF conducted in 2008 concluded that the ARTF was too influenced by donors, and that there was a need to strengthen Afghanistan’s influence. The fund’s activities had to be integrated more closely with the country’s own plans and budgets. Since then, representatives of the Ministry of Finance have been given a more influential role in the decision-making system of the fund. The expertise and capacity of the Ministry of Finance and line ministries have been improved significantly.

The reputation of the authorities is important for ensuring political stability. This reputation has been strengthened as the population has become aware that social services and development programmes are being financed by Kabul. Strong economic growth and increased public transparency may also have helped to strengthen the authorities. Afghanistan’s growth is partly linked to the war economy, and cannot be ascribed solely to development assistance, although infrastructure development, for example, has played an important role. The long-term effects of the authorities’ increased legitimacy are difficult to judge, as this is being undermined by corruption, conflict and increasing opposition to the presence of foreigners.

Good development results have been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001, despite the hostilities. Nevertheless, the country’s starting point was so poor that Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest countries. Development requires long-term commitment, and it has been decided that the fund should continue until 2020.

Lessons learned: The ARTF illustrates that donors must monitor development assistance funds to ensure that results are achieved and to reduce the risk of corruption. The World Bank has stopped payments for the building of schools until damage

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to existing schools is repaired. When corruption was uncovered in connection with Kabul Bank, which also channels large amounts of public funding, including money from the ARTF which was transferred to the Afghan authorities, Norway and other donors stopped large payments. The authorities had to satisfy a long list of demands relating to Kabul Bank in order to secure an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), before payments were re-started.


EXAMPLE 28: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS ARE IMPORTANT FOR ACHIEVING RESULTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Background: Given the difficult framework conditions, and following several decades of conflict, development efforts in Afghanistan require the participation of and contributions from many actors. Various non-governmental organisations have operated in Afghanistan under changing regimes, from the 1970s up to the present. They cooperate directly with local groups and decision-making systems. They have a good reputation, and often operate in areas which the public authorities cannot access. Non-governmental organisations can support the increased acceptance of local voluntary organisations as bridge-builders between families, clans, the public sector and the business sector. The organisations promote principles which are fundamental to Norwegian development assistance, including efforts related to gender equality, human rights and environmental protection.

The organisations work on projects related to health, education, water supply and road construction. Many of the projects focus on improving local expertise in these fields. The organisations with which Norway is cooperating work primarily in the Faryab province.

Results: The availability and quality of water, a precondition for better health and quality of life, have been improved for more than 558,000 people. Poor hygiene is a cause of illness in several regions, and information campaigns have therefore been run to improve public attitudes towards, and the implementation of, personal hygiene. One organisation has used questionnaires to document that over 42,000 people have improved their hygiene practices as a result of these efforts. The training of more than 5,000 health personnel has made health services more accessible in Faryab province. More than 130,000 people in Faryab province benefited from health services in 2010.

In a region in which many people have no electricity, another organisation has provided solar power for 2,850 households which were previously without electricity. To ensure sustainability, local technicians have been trained in the operation and maintenance of the installations.

In the area of skills-building, literacy training, job training and general education have equipped people to better help themselves, their families and their local communities. One organisation has reported that almost 7,000 women have a more stable income and can provide for themselves better as a result of such training. More than 400 teachers and employees at school district offices have attended courses organised by one of the organisations, and 1,834 young people have participated in job training. Two organisations have enrolled 4,630 people in a nine-month vocational literacy course. The agricultural sector has been strengthened through the vaccination of over 320,000 farm animals.

Lessons learned: Local experience means that the organisations can utilise adapted measures. At the same time, the large international organisations benefit from being able to build on their experiences from other countries and from combining these with local knowledge.

The difficult security situation in many provinces presents considerable challenges to development and humanitarian actors. Channelling development assistance through non-governmental organisations will probably continue to be an important part of the development cooperation with Afghanistan in the years ahead.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, based on reports by the organisations.

How much: Six large organisations had framework agreements with the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul in 2010. These were the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Norwegian Church Aid, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the French organisation Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), the Switzerland-based Aga Khan Foundation and the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR). In 2010, these organisations received a total of NOK 135 million.

The proportion of girls in school in Afghanistan has increased greatly since 2001, as has the proportion of women teachers. Today, around 30 per cent of teachers in Afghanistan are women.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, based on reports by the organisations.
STATE INSTITUTIONS

The 2011 World Bank development report\textsuperscript{69} states that statebuilding and long-term development measures can influence peacebuilding. A functioning state and economic development that benefits all parties are prerequisites for stabilising a situation. This includes institution-building, measures to increase state revenues, and the development of the health service and infrastructure. Civil society must have the capacity to formulate expectations of the state and to demand that they be satisfied.

Technical institutions are insufficient to ensure that a state enjoys popular legitimacy. Improved public services and greater transparency within the administration are often important instruments for building such legitimacy. The following example from the Palestinian Territory shows how budget support has contributed to improved administration.\textsuperscript{70}


\textsuperscript{70} Norad’s website provides a further example of a development assistance measure in the Palestinian Territory which has resulted in improved public administration. The example concerns support for the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. The Bureau has contributed to knowledge and transparency about the conditions under which various groups in the country live, and to better social planning.

\textbf{Photo: Ken Opperman}
EXAMPLE 29: BUDGET SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY – BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Background: The vision of the international community for a peace solution in the Middle East involves a negotiated two-state solution that includes the establishment of a Palestinian state. Norway supports this vision, and uses development assistance as an instrument to help equip the Palestinian Authority to run a state.

How much: The World Bank’s current multi-donor fund to support the Palestinian Authority was established in 2008. Norway, along with the UK, promoted the creation of a multi-donor fund. Norway has contributed almost NOK 1.2 billion. Other donors include the UK, Australia, France and Kuwait. Large donors like the USA, Saudi Arabia and the EU provide bilateral assistance through separate funds or through direct payments to the Ministry of Finance.

Norway has given budget support to the Palestinian Authority since 1993, to support statebuilding and the running of important state institutions. The budget support is channelled through multi-donor funds adjusted to the development plans of the Palestinian Authority. The Authority’s own systems have been used to administer the development assistance. The fund is administered by the World Bank. Funding has been linked to improvements in public financial management.

Results: The multi-donor funds, in combination with the World Bank’s control functions, have achieved good results as regards contributions to Palestinian statebuilding. Reports made by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN to the meeting of the group of donor countries to the Palestinian Territory in the spring of 2011 confirmed that the Palestinian Authority has developed sufficient institutional capacity to form a well-functioning state.71

The budget support has contributed to the maintenance and running of public services, such as education and health. The cost efficiency of the social welfare system has been strengthened, among other things through the merging of different social support programmes. The public deficit was reduced from 27 to 13 per cent of GNP from 2008 to 2010,72 partly due to the revenue basis being strengthened through tax reforms and improved expenditure controls. Expenditure linked to maintenance of the electricity supply from Israel was reduced by improving supervision of municipalities and restructuring the payment system for electricity supply.

The budget support has also contributed to greater transparency and accountability in public financial management, through the strengthening of the budget and accounting departments of the Ministry of Finance. The International Monetary Fund considers the management of public revenues to be very good. The audit function has also been improved. This means that foreign donors can make greater use of the Palestinian Authority’s own systems for the administration of development assistance, in accordance with the principles of aid effectiveness.

Lessons learned: It is reasonable to assume that improved public financial management and greater transparency have helped to legitimise the Palestinian Authority. Maintaining these institutions and making them independent of development assistance will require political will on the part of the parties and the international community. This in turn depends on progress in the political processes and a continuation of the authority’s reform efforts.

The Representative Office of Norway to the Palestinian Authority.


72 “Recent Experience and Prospects of the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza. Staff Report Prepared for the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee” (New York, September 18, 2011, International Monetary Fund).
A FREE PRESS AND A VIBRANT CIVIL SOCIETY

Ensuring that state institutions are subject to democratic control is dependent on an open public debate and a well-functioning civil society with active interest groups, trade unions and academics. Realising this vision requires respect for human rights, including freedom of association and freedom of expression. Moreover, a free press is needed. The truth is one of the first things to be lost during a conflict, and journalists are often put under pressure to tell the story in the way one of the parties to the conflict wants it to be presented. An evaluation has shown that Norway’s support for a free press has achieved good results as regards promoting human rights, and that countries have been influenced in a democratic direction. In Sri Lanka, the media have been under pressure for a long time. Norway provided support for journalism training and the establishment of a press council. The example given of anti-corruption initiatives in Angola (Example 32) further illustrate how civil society can be strengthened.

EXAMPLE 30: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SRI LANKA

**Background:** During the war years, the media in Sri Lanka were subject to strict limitations and self-censorship, but even after the civil war, the country ranks low on the press freedom index, taking place 158 of 178.74 Journalists are attacked, persecuted or disappear without trace. Threats lead to self-censorship. Financial and political groups use their influence to gag critics, or use the media to spread propaganda. Given that Sri Lanka now intends to pursue peaceful development and reconciliation, it is important for all voices to be heard and for politicians to be held accountable. This can only happen if the media are allowed to work freely and the press becomes more professional. Support for the media sector is part of the development assistance Norway is giving to Sri Lanka. An example is the support given to the Sri Lanka Press Institute (SLPI), which was formed by the country’s largest media organisations in 2003.

The institute is tasked with developing and nurturing an informed general public exchange of information in Sri Lanka, by means of:

- Journalism training provided through the Sri Lanka College of Journalism
- A complaints mechanism modelled on, amongst others, the Norwegian Press Council
- Efforts to influence policy-making to secure greater press freedom and change legislation.

**Results:** Over 80 per cent of the students of journalism have found jobs in the media sector, including several in important positions. The students are bringing with them new knowledge and demands for higher journalistic standards. As they begin to occupy leading positions, they may begin to change the sector from inside.

The complaints council is helping to promote ethics and source criticism in the Sri Lankan press. The council considered 131 complaints last year, most of which were resolved through an agreement between the complainant and the media institution. Only a few cases were rejected due to a lack of evidence. This is boosting transparency and the public’s trust in the media.

The process of promoting laws that protect the right of access to information has been difficult and time-consuming. The SLPI has proposed a new media law, which may prove to be significant in the nation-building and reconciliation process. The law may also help to increase the safety of journalists who report on politically sensitive matters.

**Lessons learned:** An important lesson is that donors must be patient and keep the cooperation going even if the results are not achieved immediately. The institute was established at a time when there was progress in the peace process. The optimism at the time imparted hope that the press could be changed from the inside. When war broke out again, the public debate was once again dominated by strongly polarised and politicised news reports. Journalists were harassed, and the institute was subjected to threats and attempts to exert control. Like many other Sri Lankan journalists, key SLPI staff fled the country. This illustrates some of the risk involved in providing support to civilian organisations in a conflict situation. Despite the difficult conditions, efforts continued, although they were less intensive. External support enabled the institute to keep operating. The threats against the institute helped to bring the various media industry leaders closer together in defence of press freedom. The institute has an important role to play in counteracting forces that wish to limit the freedom of the media.

**How much:** Norway has contributed NOK 15.7 million since 2003, while Denmark and Sweden together have contributed NOK 22 million. The agreement will run until 2012. The institute finances 30 per cent of its budget, and aims to double its contribution in the next few years.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Colombo, based on reports received from the SLPI.

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74 Reporters Without Borders 2010.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

It is important for countries which have extensive natural resources and which are emerging from conflict to implement measures to ensure that the resources are used to benefit the country’s development. The term “resource curse” is used to describe countries which fail to experience economic development despite being rich in resources. Instead, they are often characterised by poor public administration, wealth disparities and corruption. Moreover, in many countries, resource riches lie at the core of armed conflict, as in the case of mineral deposits in DR Congo and oil in the former Sudan (see Example 31).


**Background:** When the Sudanese civil war flared up again in 1983, the newly-discovered oil resources quickly became a key part of the conflict, helping to finance and intensify it. To secure control of the oil fields, villages were burned and people were displaced. The pollution of grazing land around production sites, disagreement regarding the distribution of income and claims of extensive corruption intensified the conflict. In 2006, Norway established a cooperation project with the authorities in both the north and the south focused on building capacity and developing systems for managing the oil resources. Although the largest reserves lie in the border areas and in the south, pipelines leading north to refineries and terminals are the only means of exporting the oil. The new state of South Sudan depends on Sudan to export the oil it produces.

**How much:** Since the start of the project in 2006, Norway has spent NOK 66 million.

When the division of Sudan was decided, various matters still had to be clarified. The most thorny of these were the distribution of oil revenues and transitional financial arrangements. Oil revenues completely dominate the national budgets of both South Sudan and Sudan, and an abrupt loss of revenue may have dramatic consequences. Norwegian experts in reservoir technology, law and environmental issues became involved in providing training for Sudan’s petroleum administration. In South Sudan, efforts are more extensive. Support has been provided for the development of a national legal framework for petroleum activities, environmental problems have been addressed, and the state-owned oil company Nilepet has been established with the assistance of Norwegian experts. Important challenges include identifying how the production yields of the fields can be increased, the probable operating life of the fields and whether there are alternative export opportunities towards the south. Groups of oil engineers from the north and the south have participated in joint training programmes in Bergen and Stavanger.

**Results:** In addition to developing the expertise of Sudanese professionals, the project has helped to reduce the conflict level. Joint training initiatives have helped to forge ties between the parties. One example is a wide-ranging project in which persons from both Khartoum and Juba participated to increase oil production yields. Both countries may benefit in the form of increased revenues for many years into the future. It was found that the certainty that there is less oil than many people thought helped to reduce the tension between the parties.

Through the cooperation project, Norway’s oil experts gained the trust of the parties and a good insight into the Sudanese oil sector. Both parties sought to secure the services of the Norwegian oil experts as advisers during the final, demanding negotiations led by former South African President Mbeki. The aim of securing an agreement before division was not achieved, although the parties did agree to continue negotiations.

Norway’s oil advisers have been asked to continue assisting the parties in the further negotiations. Norway will continue to cooperate with the authorities in Sudan and South Sudan, and multi-year capacity-building programmes are planned in the areas of resource management, revenue management, anti-corruption efforts and environmental efforts.

**Lessons learned:** The combination of a long-term commitment, continuity of personnel, strong professional expertise and the absence of Norwegian commercial interests has given Norway credibility in the cooperation project.

Source: Norad, based on project reports and project follow-up.
COMBATING CORRUPTION

There is increasing awareness of the importance of combating corruption as a part of peace-building. In 2010, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published a report on the fight against corruption in post-conflict countries. Several studies have established that corruption is a factor which is found again and again in countries where conflict reignites. Countries which are rich in oil or other natural resources receive large-scale foreign investments. At the same time, the systems for controlling resource management, such as the national audit function, the police, the prosecuting authority and ombudsman schemes, as well as banking systems and bank audits, are often non-existent or very weak. This is particularly true of countries in which investments have been made during a conflict, where the administration has been shaped by the dynamics of the conflict. If such systems are not introduced quickly, corruption will be widespread, and there will be a considerable risk of illegal capital flows.

Corruption can help to uphold power structures and practices that have existed during a conflict, and may undermine efforts to ensure economic development and equitable resource distribution. An evaluation\textsuperscript{75} of support for anti-corruption measures has shown that reforms of the public administration are time-consuming but necessary. This is true, not least, of public financial management reforms. Support for the national audit function has produced good results, while expectations of anti-corruption agencies have been unrealistic and characterised by weak mandates and impatience. Support for civil society organisations, internet access and open information about state revenues have been important factors in democratisation processes aimed at ensuring a more equal balance between the state and society.

EXAMPLE 32: RESEARCH INTO AND INCREASED PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND CORRUPTION IN ANGOLA

Background: In 2002, Angola succeeded in ending a 27-year civil war which caused the country enormous losses. The war created a political culture in which the president’s supporters were rewarded with privileges. Angola is a country with huge oil deposits, and production has more than tripled since 2002. This occurred without the strengthening of institutions which are important for controlling public spending. Angola is plagued by various forms of corruption, which mix private, political and public interests. This is preventing the population from benefiting from the oil revenues, and undermining confidence in the political system. Angola is under increasing international pressure to tackle the corruption problem. Norwegian companies are making large investments in Angola’s oil industry, and the Norwegian Embassy is giving great emphasis to increasing the focus on resource distribution and corruption.

In 2006, the Norwegian Embassy took the initiative to launch a cooperation project involving the Catholic University of Angola in Luanda and the Chr. Michelsens Institute (CMI) in Bergen. The aim was to develop a critical debate about the challenges of governance and public administration in Angola, including the use of oil revenues. The project has largely focused on supporting the centre for research and studies at the Catholic University. The activities include research and the communication of results.

Results: The most important effect of the measure is that it has contributed to a more open debate in Angola and greater transparency about public spending. The Catholic University and CMI produce an annual report covering the situation of the Angolan economy. It is presented at a broad-based meeting attended by government ministers, the press, academia and civil society organisations. The creation of this meeting place has given civil society an opportunity to point out weaknesses and inconsistencies between rhetoric and real policy. The findings in the report are reproduced in various media and ensure greater public scrutiny of the authorities’ management of Angola’s resources.

The project has succeeded in strengthening academia, both institutionally and professionally, by building up a research centre that specialises in issues related to governance and public administration. In addition to the annual report, the centre also publishes other relevant research of a high academic standard. The centre has won legitimacy, giving it the confidence to deal with sensitive topics. For example, the centre and CMI are working on a study of public infrastructure investments, a sector which in many countries is characterised by the misuse of funds. The fact that an independent study of public financial management is being produced at all represents progress from the past.

Lessons learned: The cooperation project was considered important for building up the expertise of civil society, and its capacity to conduct a dialogue on governance and the use of oil money. The inclusion of a Norwegian institution like CMI has helped to strengthen Norway’s knowledge about Angola. Moreover, the project secures access to information which the embassy needs in its advocacy efforts.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Luanda.

How much: Since 2007, Norway has spent NOK 25.1 million on the cooperation project. The project will run until the end of 2013.

Source: The Norwegian Embassy in Luanda.
In Vietnam, Norway is supporting measures to ensure good resource management. The Dinh Co gas plant in Vietnam refines gas which is used for heating and the production of electricity, petrol and artificial fertiliser.
5. LESSONS FOR NORWEGIAN AID

The report contains examples of a broad range of aid-financed measures implemented during and after conflicts, and illustrates that numerous channels of assistance are used. How aid can best be used to achieve different objectives, and what results it is reasonable to expect, are important questions. Knowledge about the field of aid and conflict is growing.
The examples in the report show that aid can have different strategic objectives: building peace, relieving humanitarian need, or laying the foundation for long-term development in countries ravaged by conflict. Some measures simultaneously contribute to the achievement of several objectives. In other cases, the different objectives may be perceived as mutually exclusive.

The debate focuses on what results are achieved by aid during and after conflict, how aid can best be used to achieve different objectives, and what change aid can reasonably be expected to make. The introductory chapters provide an overview of the field of aid and conflict, the international experiences gained and the lessons learned from a selection of initiatives which Norway has supported. Finally, this provides a basis for reflecting on the following questions:

- What role can aid play in peacebuilding?
- How can aid help to ensure lasting peace?
- How can aid contribute to better living conditions during and after conflicts?
- How can risk be managed in conflict situations?
- How patient should we be?
- How do we use our knowledge?
WHAT ROLE CAN AID PLAY IN PEACEBUILDING?

Peacebuilding primarily revolves around political processes. Experience has shown that peace agreements are more robust when they include long-term development considerations and priorities. Previously, peace agreements were often regarded as the conclusion of a process focused on ending a conflict. It then became clear that in over fifty per cent of cases, violence re-erupted. Now, there is increasing understanding of the fact that peace agreements should be viewed as the start of a long process focused on peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Aid actors can play an important role when they are integrated into a peace process, in cooperation with the parties to the conflict, the national authorities, conciliators and security actors. In the context of peace processes, aid may, for example, help to create long-term visions for society, something which may be important in order to instil in the parties a belief in peaceful solutions. Often, cooperation between international aid actors and local organisations can help to ensure that the interests of marginalised groups are included in negotiations. Aid organisations can also assist in ensuring that peace agreements are made known to the population and enjoy broad popular support, and note popular demands for adjustments.

As the experiences from Sri Lanka (Example 7) and the Middle East (Example 3) indicate, it is important to have realistic expectations regarding the potential contribution of aid as an instrument for achieving peace solutions. Aid can influence the parties or create space for dialogue, but in order to be effective, it must be combined with the necessary political will to build peace. Conflict situations are generally complex. They change rapidly, and are subject to the influence of both internal and external factors. Even though all peacebuilding is associated with risk, inclusive peace processes have a better chance of succeeding. Aid can play a role in this regard. It is important to be aware that aid may also exacerbate conflicts if it is not planned and implemented properly.

Aid can help to create or highlight opportunities for a peaceful solution, and create space for dialogue. Aid can help to make peace processes more inclusive, and thus increase the likelihood of lasting peace. The potential for using aid to influence peace processes is context-dependent, and must be assessed carefully in each individual case in which Norway becomes involved.

HOW CAN AID HELP TO ENSURE LASTING PEACE?

Peacebuilding is about stabilising the conflict situation, promoting political dialogue and preventing a return to conflict. Peacebuilding primarily takes place once a peace agreement has been concluded or violence has begun to decline for other reasons.

Stabilising the situation: Aid can be an effective means of securing peace in the short term. Support for the observer force in Nepal and disarmament and alternative employment measures for soldiers in DR Congo and the African Great Lakes region are examples of effective support for stabilisation of the situation. To have the best possible effect, disarmament measures must ensure not only the demobilisation of former soldiers, but also their reintegration into their communities. This normally entails providing them with access to work or land as alternatives to survival through membership of an armed group.

The evaluation from South Sudan, referred to in Example 3, states that donors did not sufficiently assess how aid could be targeted to reduce tensions and prevent conflict. An excessively one-sided emphasis on the improvement of traditional development assistance sectors resulted in the deprioritisation of the security sector78 and factors which could have helped to reduce local conflicts. Studies79 from Afghanistan show that short-term aid measures implemented by the international military forces have had only a negligible positive effect on the security situation.

Popular opinion in support of peace: The idea behind many aid initiatives during the period of transition from war to peace is that aid, in addition to meeting basic needs and carrying out reconstruction, can ensure that the civilian population experiences that peace gives real rewards. Work opportunities and access to health and education are examples in this regard. The report includes examples of measures which have affected employment and education.79 Peaceful coexistence requires more than satisfying the population’s need for work and social services. The reconciliation initiatives pursued in Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Western Balkans are attempts to generate political will to build peace by creating greater understanding despite ethnic and religious differences. These are small measures, but they have achieved important results.

Statebuilding for security and economic development: Statebuilding is the instrument which fragile states themselves request. The G7+ group of fragile states has developed a road map describing how fragile states can become sufficiently robust to begin work on achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals. The road map emphasises the importance of building legitimate political institutions which can function as conflict resolution mechanisms:

- establish security and justice for the entire population
- generate economic development and stimulate employment
- strengthen public financial and resource management
- increase administrative transparency

The objectives are consistent with the conclusions of the World Bank regarding the factors which build stable societies: security, justice and work.79

78 The security sector covers all of the institutions and actors in a society which contribute to the security of that society. The police, the military, the judicial system and the prison service are examples of such institutions.
77 For example: Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Farah Province. Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, 2010. All of the studies in the series are available on the University’s website.
A more inclusive and open society: The examples in this report illustrate both that Norway supports institution-building and that it supplements these efforts by strengthening civil society. Examples in this regard include support for academic institutions in Angola and a free press in Sri Lanka. There are also examples of measures which have succeeded in giving marginalised groups an opportunity to participate in the peace- and state-building process in Nepal. Such measures are based on the principle that statebuilding must be broader than institution-building to ensure that the state has legitimacy. Measures to ensure equitable resource distribution and to combat corruption are also important to ensure legitimacy. In this context, an important principle is that efforts must be pursued in tandem with efforts to put in place formal control institutions and to support a free public debate on these issues. An evaluation of support for anti-corruption measures has shown that reforms of the public administration are time-consuming but necessary. This is true, not least, of public financial management reforms.

Support for the national audit function has produced good results, while expectations of anti-corruption agencies have been unrealistic and characterised by weak mandates and impatience. Support for civil society organisations has been an important factor in democratisation processes aimed at ensuring a more equal balance between the state and society.

Flexibility in the selection of channels and recipients: The selection of recipients of and channels for aid is important for achieving the best possible results in conflict settings. Multi-donor funds may in many cases be an effective means of channelling support for institution- and capacity-building in fragile states. The support given to South Sudan (Example 2) shows that adhering to the principle of aid harmonisation presented major challenges. In 2005, when aid was scaled up, this principle was high up on the political agenda, and this influenced the decision to establish multi-donor funds. The absence of a functioning state administration in South Sudan made it impossible to transfer money directly to the authorities. The World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF were tasked with administering the funds. All three organisations experienced difficulties in achieving a rapid start-up, due to their own bureaucratic procedures and problems in deploying competent staff. The funds are now operating more effectively, but it has taken five years. The Basic Services Fund was the most effective as regards implementing measures during the initial phase. This fund is administered by a consultancy firm which channels money to organisations with a local presence. Given that the aim is to build a functioning state, this is a short-term solution, but it does illustrate the necessity of pursuing multiple strategies simultaneously.

It may be necessary and correct to employ a mix of channels and recipients, and to have a clear division of responsibility both between the donors and the aid organisations. The examples given of reconstruction and development measures in Afghanistan (Examples 27 and 28) and disarmament and reintegration in Central Africa (Examples 10 and 11) demonstrate that a mix of channels can be a good solution. In both cases, civil society organisations reach areas and people which other actors cannot easily access. Regardless of the channel selected, the selection must form part of a holistic consideration of needs and approaches. In choosing an organisation, emphasis must be given to the need for the organisation to be able to establish a presence on the ground quickly. The international community must contribute its best experts in the most difficult situations. Good results are normally achieved by using organisations which have built local knowledge and good relations through a long-term presence.

Aid can be an important factor in stabilising the situation and reducing tensions when the parties have agreed on a ceasefire or concluded a peace agreement, and when measures are based on a good understanding of what will help to stabilise the particular situation. Aid is also an important instrument for building up state institutions and civil society. The state must have legitimacy in the eyes of the population to be able to ensure stability. It gains such legitimacy by offering the population security, justice and work. Measures to ensure equitable resource distribution, eradicate corruption, ensure a free press and ensure an active civil society are also
Important elements in this regard. A fundamental principle is that such measures can only be implemented and be effective if they enjoy solid local support. Aid is important for building up post-conflict states, but in the end donors have a limited ability to ensure that societies are democratic and stable, and that resources are distributed equitably. These changes must be driven forward by internal processes.

How can aid contribute to better living conditions during and after conflict?

No fragile state has achieved even a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG). 82 Fragile states have the furthest to go to achieve the MDGs. Norway channels a great deal of aid to fragile states because that is where the needs are greatest. They are the poorest, and the security situation is often precarious. Contributing to security and the resolution of conflicts in these countries is necessary to build a basis for development and improved living conditions.

Emergency relief saves lives: Emergency relief is important during conflicts for saving lives and alleviating suffering, and can help to lay a foundation for post-conflict economic development. Educational measures focused on children affected by conflict equip children and young people with reading and writing skills, enhancing their opportunities to secure an education and work once the situation stabilizes. An important lesson learned in this regard is that short-term measures can be organised in a manner that also supports long-term development. In conflict situations, actors who deliver emergency relief may be caught in asqueeze between the humanitarian imperative 83 and the Do No Harm principle. Armed groups may demand taxes for granting emergency relief organisations access, or may attempt to influence who receives emergency relief. The example of emergency relief operations in Somalia illustrates that aid actors can uphold both principles to some degree by ensuring that activities enjoy local support. How this can be done varies from situation to situation, and depends on good local knowledge and the ability to win the trust of different actors. There are no easy recipes for success.

Conditions for economic development: It is crucial that states which are emerging from conflict kick-start economic growth and increase employment quickly. The report contains several examples of measures which have contributed in this regard. Reintegration measures provide participants with work experience, and have a stabilising effect. The reconstruction of infrastructure, capacity development and statebuilding lay the foundation for long-term development. The projects of the Oil for Development Initiative have facilitated improved management of and knowledge about the petroleum resources of the participating countries. This has provided a basis for transparency about state revenues, more stringent financial controls and control of resources. Increasing expertise within state institutions, for example in South Sudan and East Timor, has also been an important programme objective. Introducing reliable national public financial management systems, including tax systems, and transparency about the sources of revenue, enables the authorities gradually to assume greater responsibility for the financing of social services and other state functions, and to become less dependent on aid. Aid which stimulates the economy must be combined with measures to combat corruption and to increase democratic influence on resource distribution. In countries in which no political solution has been found for power-sharing, donors should exercise care with regard to measures which facilitate an increase in the revenue base of individual groups.

Although aid is based on demand and need, the results depend on the recipient’s capacity to implement the plans. Often, transfers of money by themselves are insufficient to increase this capacity in the short term. Both the order in which measures are implemented and the specific uses to which funds are put are important. At worst, large cash flows into countries with limited capacity can have a negative impact on the economy. Unfortunately imbalances can be created when there is competition for the best local staff for aid projects, and when aid offers sizeable remuneration in countries where wage levels are generally low. This may undermine private- and public-sector activities which do not receive aid funding. As a result, dependence on aid may increase – the exact opposite of what is intended. Moreover, the desire to deliver results quickly can lead donors to participate in the construction of parallel structures which duplicate those of the public authorities but are unsustainable without support. This illustrates the importance of the international donor community and recipient countries agreeing on a division of responsibilities that permits help to be delivered sufficiently quickly and flexibly, without undermining the development of state institutions.

Aid saves lives, and can be an important factor in improving living conditions during and after conflicts. In conflict situations, donors need to identify how the objectives of peace and development can be integrated. The fact that fragile states have weak institutions with limited capacity poses a particular challenge. 84 Identifying the needs of recipients and their ability to absorb aid, as well as their capacity to administer development assistance via national institutions, must therefore form part of the assessment, and must guide initiatives in the country.

How can risk be managed in conflict situations?

An aid project may be regarded as favouring one party to a conflict, and thus increase local tensions. An area in which measures are being implemented may suddenly become too dangerous for aid workers. These risks have consequences for aid. Moreover, there may be a high risk that the situation of the population affected by war will worsen if there is no intervention by the outside world. This illustrates certain challenges:

> the need to assist people in a conflict situation

> the need to point out results achieved by Norwegian tax money in some of the most unstable situations in the world

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83 To reduce human suffering wherever it may occur. Human life, health and dignity shall be protected in accordance with fundamental human rights and needs.
84 One conclusion from the multi-donor evaluation of South Sudan was that parts of the support given to good governance were overambitious, given South Sudan’s low capacity.
the importance of also assessing aid measures in the light of the conflict dynamics, not only the appropriateness and relevance of the measures by reference to development plans and needs.

Several of the examples in the report illustrate how changes in the conflict situation can alter the assumptions underpinning the project. The report also contains examples of the fact that risk-taking can bear fruit. When Norway launched its Oil for Development cooperation with Sudan in 2006, the distribution of the oil resources between the North and the South constituted an important element of the 2005 peace agreement. Through the project, Norway has contributed advisers and a petroleum-resource knowledge base during the negotiations concerning the establishment of the new state. Even though important progress has been made, South Sudan has a long way to go to become a robust state.

The absence of strong institutions and the need to build such institutions in fragile states poses particular challenges in the aid context. In some cases, a starting point of this kind may constitute an opportunity to build institutions which have good control systems in place from the start. This may prove to be easier than altering existing systems.85

Knowledge requirements: Understanding local conditions is vital for managing risk and increasing the likelihood of results achievement. Some matters can be identified in advance, acquiring new information and reacting to it during project implementation is key. The alternatives are to withdraw, change course or continue as before. The examples from Haiti (Example 15), DR Congo (Example 24) and Angola (Example 32) illustrate how approaches were adjusted as new knowledge was obtained. Acquiring sufficiently in-depth contextual understanding requires a long-term engagement and presence, so that all nuances of the development of a conflict are known. The white paper on the main features of Norwegian foreign policy (Report No. 15 (2008–2009) to the Storting) established that expertise and experience are becoming increasingly important, and that Norway must prioritise its engagement based both on where the need is greatest and on where Norway can make a difference.86

Allies: Several of the examples in the report demonstrate the importance of working with local partners, such as churches in DR Congo and civil society organisations in Nepal. In the example related to water distribution in the Middle East, for example, such cooperation was lacking in certain project areas. Cooperation with research institutions in Norway and in recipient countries, and maintaining a presence over time, are important for building up necessary knowledge. In addition, achievement of results, particularly in the case of a small actor like Norway, depends on good coordination with other donors and aid actors.

The risk of misuse of aid funds: The risk of corruption is high in fragile states.87 Reducing the risk of aid funds being misused requires that reliable risk assessment be conducted before decisions regarding support and aid channels are made. Close project follow-up is required to allow for quick reactions to any irregularities. Norway channels much of its aid for fragile states through multilateral organisations and civil society organisations with good administrative systems. This may compensate for deficient management of public revenues and audit procedures in the recipient country. At the same time, the international organisations often help to build such capacity, so that gradually more aid can be transferred directly to the state. Norway practices zero tolerance for the misuse of aid funds, regardless of the recipient country.

Knowledge of local conditions is a well-known prerequisite for results achievement, and is even more important in the case of aid for conflict and post-conflict countries, to ensure satisfactory risk management in demanding conditions. The dilemma is that the need to act quickly is often correspondingly great.88

One objective should therefore be close follow-up of measures in conflict countries, and for risk to be assessed and managed based on new knowledge gained and analyses conducted during implementation. This can be achieved through, for example, reliable reporting, field visits and meetings with partners, as well as the use of evaluations and research.

HOW PATIENT SHOULD WE BE?

Endurance – long-term engagement: One of the mantras of the aid community is that it is necessary to be patient in order to achieve development results. One of the OECD’s 10 principles for support for fragile states and conflict countries is to act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.89 Several examples in the report, such as the work of Norwegian Church Aid and the Norwegian authorities in Guatemala and the efforts of Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian authorities in South Sudan, indicate that observing this principle produces results in conflict countries. It is clear that a long-term perspective and presence are required to achieve results and secure the trust of important national actors. This is particularly important when international interest in the conflict fades.

Long-term engagement must be combined with flexibility, particularly in conflict situations. Political changes can occur rapidly. The level of aid often has to be adjusted, as do recipient groups and types of projects. A worsening of a conflict may necessitate an increase in emergency relief, while road-building, for example, has to be stopped.

… but also demand results: Patience is not the same thing as not imposing requirements or avoiding the measurement of progress, even if the finish line lies far ahead. Measuring progress and demanding results may mean amending a measure on the way, or terminating a cooperation project which is not producing results or having undesired effects. In the case of water management in the Middle East (Example 3), a lack of results led to Norway’s termination of the cooperation project. This is not inconsistent with a long-term engagement in the region.
Predictable financing: Several evaluations have pointed out that one- to three-year allocation terms may be too short, and may hinder long-term aid planning. Recipient countries and cooperation partners face the challenge that donor countries often allocate programme funding for a period of one year. Multi-year framework agreements, trust funds and other long-term financing mechanisms are one means of creating predictability.

Development policy engagement and financial engagement, both in the form of state-to-state support and support channelled through Norwegian and international organisations, must be sufficiently long-lasting to ensure results achievement and sustainability, even when high-level political interest fades and during periods when a conflict flares up again. When aid is reduced or phased out, it is important that this is done in a manner which ensures that the effects of the project are sustainable and that there are no destabilising consequences.

HOW DO WE USE OUR KNOWLEDGE?

Norway’s engagement is ambitious, and demands in-depth knowledge. The lessons learned from the examples in the report are supported by existing knowledge about how aid should be organised. Support for conflict and post-conflict countries is a relatively new field of study, and efforts are continuously being made to gather experiences and develop approaches which produce better results, including in fragile states. Examples of using such knowledge in the development of aid measures include:

- **A holistic approach and supplementation of knowledge:** To combat sexualised violence in DR Congo (Example 24), Norway has cooperated with other donor countries, the Congolese authorities and research institutions to implement measures in a number of areas. This work is based on the existing knowledge that such problems have to be tackled from several angles simultaneously. While Norway is supporting the courts, other donors are supporting the prison service. In combination with efforts to change men’s attitudes, Norway has supported the Congolese authorities in the development of a national strategy for strengthening the position of women in society and combating sexualised violence. Mobile courts are giving women who have suffered an assault access to the judicial system. These courts also have a preventive effect, as local communities observe assailants being brought before the court and sentenced. To tackle one of the causes of violence in the region, Norway has also supported the development of OECD guidelines intended to prevent trade in minerals from conflict areas from resulting in crime and violence. Through its support for related research, the project has received a continual inflow of knowledge about the causes of sexualised violence and how it can be combated.

- **Local support, close follow-up, and good disarmament and reintegration methods:** Multi-donor funds for disarmament and reintegration in DR Congo and the countries in the African Great Lakes region (Example 10) also provide an example of how an inflow of knowledge and lessons learned may influence project design. The programme enabled seven neighbouring states facing similar challenges to learn from one another. The knowledge that disarmament must be combined with reintegration to prevent people from obtaining new weapons and returning to the armed groups was an important part of the programme from the start. Lessons about how to design projects to meet the needs of women and children who had participated in armed groups, and for those who required special follow-up due to physical or psychological injuries, were learned during the course of the programme, and influenced its design en route. The fact that the programme was based on national plans, coupled with constant pressure from the international donor group, was an important reason why many of the countries achieved their targets relating to the number of disarmed and reintegrated soldiers.

- **Employment measures for reintegration and stabilisation:** The lesson that creating jobs for people immediately after the end of a conflict can contribute to stability has led many donors to support short-term employment measures. The International Labour Organization’s road-building project in East Timor (Example 12) provided temporary jobs for 23,500 people, contributing to employment, reconstruction and conflict reduction. Such short-term measures may be important for ensuring stabilisation, and may improve people’s prospects of securing permanent employment by giving them work experience. A more sustainable increase in employment requires economic development, which in turn depends largely on security and good governance so that the country attracts investment. Vocational training measures in Sri Lanka and Uganda (Examples 13 and 14) not only helped to secure jobs for people after the end of the respective conflicts, but also increased their chances of work and an income in the longer term. In Haiti (Example 15), vocational training scholarships were linked directly with the reduction of violence, as an area had to be free of violence for a month in order to be permitted to participate in the scholarship lottery.

A review of the OECD guidelines for engagement in fragile states and conflict situations shows that compliance with the principles varies. It is particularly worrying that important principles such as good co-ordination and the Do No Harm principle, referring to the avoidance of unintended effects and exploitation of opportunities to promote peace, are scoring poorly. Four examples of the latter are:

- **A lack of neutrality in the distribution of aid.** Afghans who talk about the peace penalty of aid is an example in this regard.

- **Aid which first and foremost benefits an elite.** The causes may include a lack of security outside the capital city, an insufficient focus on and knowledge of the project in Sri Lanka was implemented for young people across the country, not only those who had been internally displaced by the conflict. 90 OECD (2011), International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t we do better? OECD Publishing.


89 The project in Sri Lanka was implemented for young people across the country, not only those who had been internally displaced by the conflict.

about local politics, and attempts by a central elite to manipulate aid distribution. Example 2 from South Sudan raises several such problems.

> When aid and an international presence monopolise human resources and inflate the local economy, which then collapses when the international presence is reduced, as illustrated in Example 9 relating to Mozambique.

> An evaluation of the international aid given to South Sudan has claimed that aid had an excessive focus on traditional development aims in the social sector. As a result, insufficient consideration was given to factors which could have helped to dampen local conflicts, such as improved resource management.

It is often difficult to achieve good results and at the same avoid unintended negative consequences. Nevertheless, the reviews conducted by the OECD show that donors and aid actors can do much more to integrate the Do No Harm principle in practice. Why is it so difficult translate principles into practical actions?

The concept of a peace dividend: Examples in the report point out that the idea that aid can contribute to a quick peace dividend means that donors make decisions without conducting the necessary analysis of the potential unintended consequences of aid.

The need for a rapid response: Changes in the situation on the ground can often require rapid action. It is difficult to combine this with thorough assessments. Sometimes, budget cycles and the need to score political points may generate pressure to make rapid payouts. Where recipient countries have weak institutions, donors have to accept that the countries will not always have the capacity to absorb aid as quickly as donors wish to distribute it.

Extensive knowledge requirements: The fact that the same lessons are highlighted in several evaluations is not unique to aid in conflict situations. Learning and knowledge management internally within organisations is a challenge. As regards aid during and after conflicts, the lessons learned in many different specialist fields must be combined. This includes general lessons from aid history, specific lessons from aid during and after conflicts, and lessons from specific countries and specialist fields, such as health or energy. Combining these lessons requires good mechanisms for exchanging knowledge between the various specialist fields, and between those who develop guidelines and those who implement them. A mid-term review\(^2\) of the implementation of Norway’s humanitarian policy recommended a number of measures in this area. The proposals are relevant beyond Norway’s humanitarian policy, and include increased dialogue between different actors and stricter reporting procedures to demonstrate how guidelines are implemented in individual projects.

Lessons learned affect aid decisions to varying degrees. Knowledge about aid given during and after conflicts is in constant development. Experiences and new knowledge help to ensure that some measures are amended along the way. Turning lessons into practical action can be a particular challenge in the context of providing aid for conflict and post-conflict countries, due to the need for a rapid response.

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Result report 2011

Part 1

Aid and conflict
In recent years, the development assistance debate has increasingly revolved around results. Results must be documented and communicated, and aid projects have to be monitored from the resources committed to the effect on the target group. The debate concerns to what degree the effects of different forms of aid can be measured. The discussion covers both whether aid organisations and donors have sufficient documentation on the results achieved with development assistance funding and whether the results which are achieved are good enough. This part of the report introduces policy initiatives, measures and newer studies which influence results management in the context of Norway’s development assistance efforts. It also contains information on the results achieved by multilateral development assistance.
1. RESULTS MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF NORWEGIAN AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
What is results management in the context of development assistance?*

The following must be documented before a project is launched:

- What the starting point is; for example, the number of people without access to healthcare, or the proportion of undernourished children. This is called baseline data.

- What the objective is, and when it is expected to be achieved; for example, the number of people who have a health centre within a five-kilometre radius, or how much the proportion of undernourished children in an area has fallen. Objectives are defined as effects of the project, not as activities which are to be carried out.

- How the measure is to contribute to achievement of the objective; for example, building health centres or educating health personnel.

- How success and failure are to be measured; for example, through national statistics or special questionnaire surveys and field visits.

- What the risk is, and what steps have been taken to reduce and manage risk; for example, successive payouts for the construction of a health centre, based on verification through field visits, to ensure that the centre is constructed as agreed.

The following shall be documented during implementation, and once the project has been completed:

- Progress by reference to the starting point and how much remains to be done to achieve the objective.

- Whether the project is on schedule to achieve the objective, and what, if anything, needs to be changed to achieve the objective by the set deadline.

- Whether the project has contributed to the achievement of the objective as planned, or whether other factors have played a role.

- Whether the expected risk has materialised, and how it has been handled.

- Whether new risks have arisen, and how they have been handled.

* Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation, Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.
CURRENT NORWEGIAN RESULTS MANAGEMENT

It is important for Norway to be able to document the results of development assistance. Official rules on financial management require it to be possible to assess the degree of goal achievement in respect of projects financed using public funds.

These are some important elements of Norway’s work:

- Norway is one of the few donor countries to publish an annual report containing selected results of development assistance. The 2011 report, prepared by Norad, is the fifth in the series.

- Norway influences results management in multilateral organisations. In the context of UN funds and programmes, the World Bank and the regional development banks, this primarily occurs through the boards of directors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ information sheets about multilateral organisations highlight the organisations’ results and the ministry’s assessments of the individual organisations. The information sheets are published on the ministry’s website (see textbox).

- In addition, Norway is an active participant in several international networks working with results of development assistance: the OECD’s Working Party for Aid Effectiveness, the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network, which evaluates the working methods of multilateral organisations, and the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability programme, an international initiative to promote accountability in public financial management.

- In 2008, Norad, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation. This document gives guidance on results management to all those who work with Norwegian development assistance. Norad has a department dedicated to methodology and results, and emphasises results management throughout the organisation.

- Every year, Norad conducts around 10 administrative reviews at Norwegian embassies and in Norad departments. These reviews check whether development assistance is being planned, implemented and documented in accordance with applicable laws and basic quality requirements. An important aspect of the reviews is assessing the results management and providing training to improve it.

- Norad’s evaluation department has its own set of instructions and an independent mandate. The mandate covers all Norwegian development assistance. The department hires researchers and consultants to evaluate Norwegian development assistance on an independent basis. In 2011, Norad won a prize for its evaluations. The jury commended Norad for transparency and active communication of the evaluations, which generate professional and public interest in achieved, and sometimes controversial, results. Norad published 11 evaluations in 2011.

- The statistics portal on Norad’s website facilitates transparency in the use of Norwegian development assistance funds.

In January 2011, the Office of the Auditor General of Norway completed a performance audit of the results-orientation of Norwegian development assistance. The study was based on a review of seven bilateral measures in the health and education sectors in Tanzania and Nepal. The Office of the Auditor General also examined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ follow-up of development assistance funds channelled through the UN Development Programme, the UN Children’s Fund and the UN Population Fund.

The study revealed, among other things, that there were deficiencies in the follow-up of goal hierarchies, result indicators and baseline data. It was also found that for several projects, results were presented without assessing whether the results corresponded to the performance requirements set. The study showed variations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ follow-up of UN funds and programmes, not least the degree to which assessments of results management had been raised in the relevant board meetings.

In its response to the report, the ministry agreed that there was a need for improvements in the management of development assistance, and pointed particularly to ongoing efforts to strengthen risk management in the development assistance context. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also pointed out that new standardised procedures for grant management requires all administrative staff in Oslo and at foreign service missions to use the same electronic system for financial management and project monitoring. The new system allows more systematic assessment of baseline data, risks, results and the risk of misuse of funds, before a promise of support is made.

Results-based financing mechanisms - no payments until results are achieved

The 2010 Results Report presented Norway’s approach to payment in arrears in the context of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. The largest project is support for the Amazon Fund in Brazil, under the auspices of the larger-scale REDD+ forest initiative. The aim of REDD+ is to help restrict climate change by developing a system of incentives under which developed countries compensate developing countries financially for reducing emissions from the forestry sector.

There is growing interest in financing mechanisms which link development assistance payments more closely to achieved results. In recent years, several

2 OECD Working Party for Aid Effectiveness.
3 Every year, the Centre for Public Financial Management (Senter for Statlig Økonomistysetting – SØD) now the Norwegian Government Agency for Financial Management (SOFI), awards a prize to a state body that has implemented successful measures to achieve effective use of resources.

5 There are many different results-based financing schemes. Even though there are slight differences between the schemes, the main feature is that payment takes place in arrears. Accordingly, the collective terms “results-based financing schemes” and “results-based financing” are used in this summary. Some people prefer to talk about results-based development assistance to distinguish it from recipient countries’ own results-based financing of public-sector measures, while others prefer to avoid collective terms and rather talk about specific systems: cash on delivery, output-based financing, pay4results.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has evaluated 29 multilateral organisations and global funds.*

Almost half of the Norwegian development assistance budget is channelled through multilateral organisations, and Norway is the fifth-largest contributor to the UN’s development activities and humanitarian operations. In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its first review of multilateral organisations. In November 2011, new reviews were presented in the form of 29 profile sheets published on the ministry’s website.

The 2011 profiles contain more information on results than the 2009 profiles. The assessments provide insights into the ministry’s views on the results management and control mechanisms of the organisations, including anti-corruption efforts.

The review shows that the organisations are achieving important results in areas to which Norway gives priority. This applies, for example, to good governance, human rights, protection, emergency relief, food security, maternal and child health, education for girls, gender equality, the environment and sustainable development.

The profiles also indicate areas in which the different organisations can make improvements. Many of the organisations are in the process of implementing important reforms in order to focus more on their core areas.


Norway supports the UN Children’s Fund. The picture was taken in a camp for internal refugees in Dili, East Timor, in 2008.
countries and international organisations have implemented results-based financing of development assistance programmes. Results-based financing schemes are being discussed more frequently in international forums like the UN, the World Bank, the development banks, the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the Centre for Global Development think tank.

Results-based financing means that a donor pays support in arrears, based on results actually achieved by reference to agreed targets. The fundamental idea is to stimulate the recipients’ self-interest in achieving results. At the same time, recipients are given greater freedom in implementation, and a clearer responsibility for results. This form of financing also makes it easier to highlight the uses to which development assistance has been put.

Donors have little interest in becoming involved in actual implementation. This presents a development policy dilemma: donors want recipients to have the greatest possible ownership of policies and their own development, but also want to promote important principles and values applicable to the use of development assistance funds, such as anti-corruption, human rights, gender equality and poverty reduction. It is important to find a balance between the sovereignty of the recipient countries and the demands of donors.

Results-based financing shifts the entire risk of failure to achieve results from donors to recipients. It has been pointed out that there is a risk that development assistance will become oriented towards the financing of short-term results which are easy to measure. Another risk is data manipulation. Reliable monitoring and reporting of achieved results is a prerequisite if results-based financing is to function as intended. This necessitates stringent requirements in relation to data collection and verification.

Norway is involved in several projects relating to results-based financing. Along with the World Bank, Norway is contributing to the development of models for results-based health financing in 16 low-income countries. Results-based financing is part of Norway’s bilateral health cooperation with the five countries included in the initiative to achieve Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5: Tanzania, Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Malawi. Norway also supports the GAVI global vaccine initiative and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, both of which employ results-based financing.

There is a need for more knowledge about how the use of results-based project financing by Norway and other countries affects results in the long term. Norway is therefore working on systematising knowledge about the significance of results-based financing schemes for aid effectiveness.

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – what now?

The development policy debate primarily revolves around how the international community can contribute more effectively to the reduction of poverty, and what factors contribute to change and development. The form of cooperation also influences the results achieved.

The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in Busan, South Korea in November 2011.⁶

The meeting had two main purposes: to assess the status of follow-up to the Paris Declaration and to establish a new global platform for development. The role of development assistance was discussed in the light of new global challenges and the changes which have occurred in the development landscape in recent years in the form of new actors, arenas and forms of cooperation.

The Paris Declaration of 2005 is central to the process of improving aid effectiveness. The Declaration sets out five principles which donors and recipients of development assistance should follow to achieve better results through development assistance:

1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.
2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.

3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.

4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.

5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results.

An evaluation of the Paris Declaration shows that the global campaign to make international development assistance more effective has produced results. The evaluation concludes that the Paris Declaration has been relevant to all types of countries and development assistance organisations. Global standards for good development assistance practice have been strengthened, the quality of the partnerships between donors and recipients has been improved, there is greater transparency about development assistance transfers, and development assistance has become less donor-driven. As regards the development effect, the evaluation points to the progress made in the health sectors of many countries, and that some of this progress can be ascribed to reforms consistent with the Paris Declaration. In other areas, such as the UN Millennium Development Goals, the evaluation found no basis for drawing conclusions. It pointed out that little progress has been made in most developing countries as regards giving priority to the poorest population groups, and women and girls in particular.

The implementation of the Paris Declaration has proceeded slowly, and the results have varied greatly among both partner countries and donors. The most progress has been made in relation to ownership, but little has been achieved in the form of institutional capacity development in the partner countries. Much remains to be done with regard to donors’ use of national administrative systems, mutual accountability and results-oriented administration. The partner countries continue to bear huge administrative burdens arising from the management of a growing number of donors.

The evaluation shows that partner countries have met more of their obligations than donors, who have been unwilling to take risks in efforts to amend development assistance practices. The report recommends that pressure be maintained to ensure that the necessary action is taken to secure compliance with key effectiveness principles in the context of development cooperation. It also recommends that new development actors be invited to participate in these efforts.

Although the principles and the many obligations which countries and international organisations have signed up to generally remain equally relevant today, the debate in the run-up to the Busan conference demonstrated that views differ. New development assistance actors outside the OECD, and many emerging developing countries, would like to see greater flexibility and less supranational coordination.

2. RESULTS OF NORWEGIAN AID CHANNELLED THROUGH MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

Most of Norway’s multilateral aid is provided as part of larger programmes run in conjunction with international organisations or groups of countries. This makes it difficult to distinguish the results achieved by Norwegian aid from the results achieved by the aid of other countries.
For illustration purposes, calculations can be made of Norway’s share of the results achieved by multilateral organisations. In some cases, this may be considered speculative, but if sober estimates are adopted as the basis for the calculations, they can provide a comprehensible impression of the proportions. For example, it could be claimed that Norway, through its contribution to the development fund of the Asian Development Bank from 2004 to 2010, built around 1,350 classrooms, trained 6,700 teachers, built 440 kilometres of road, and installed or refurbished 180 kilometres of water pipeline and 340 kilometres of electricity grid. This is based on the Asian Development Bank’s results reports and Norway’s share of the financing, which was about 1 per cent. This illustrates what development assistance funds can achieve, but is an imprecise method for calculating a donor country’s share of the results.

8 Delivering Results through the ADF, ADB 2011.
9 ADF VIII Donor’s Report, ADB 2000 and ADF IX Donor’s Report, ADB 2004
Identifying the results achieved by Norway through multilateral channels in a particular country or sector is more difficult than this example indicates. In a given sector, both national actors and development assistance actors contribute to the achievement of results, in different ways. Several multilateral organisations may be working on the same issue. One example is efforts relating to child health. UNICEF works with children, including on health issues. The World Health Organization works on health issues, including child health. The World Bank also runs projects that affect child health. In addition, an organisation may sometimes transfer funds to another organisation to enable it to carry out projects. One example in this regard is the results achieved by UNICEF and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. UNICEF uses the Global Fund to carry out projects, but both organisations report on the project results. In these circumstances, it is impossible to determine what proportion of the results can be ascribed to which organisation. The results are also affected by factors other than public funding. Calculating an estimate of Norway’s share of the results requires investigation of which actors are responsible for which shares.

The accuracy of this type of analysis depends on the kinds of results which are evaluated. If sufficient information is available about what a multilateral organisation has delivered, for example in the form of new health centres, Norway’s contribution can be estimated. If the objective is reduced child mortality, it will be almost impossible in individual cases to specify Norway’s share of the result, unless Norway has supported a measure that has played a crucial role in a particular area and the causal connection can be determined.

Below, some examples are given of results achieved through multilateral organisations, based on their annual reports. The results should be read in the light of the limitations outlined above.

The UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF

Norway was the third-largest contributor to UNICEF in 2010. Norway’s contribution totalled NOK 1.3 billion. This amounted to 5.5 per cent of UNICEF’s total available funds, including the organisation’s own revenues.

UNICEF has a special global responsibility for children’s rights. It focuses, among other things, on child development through good health, nutrition, clean water and good sanitary conditions, and the education and protection of children. UNICEF states that it has contributed to:

- 293 million children receiving vitamin A capsules to strengthen their immune systems
- 12.9 million children being registered at birth, an important prerequisite for child welfare and development
- 42 million homes being equipped with mosquito nets to protect against malaria
- 19,500 health clinics providing better services to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV
- 7,800 health centres being better equipped to deal with acute pregnancy complications
- 3.8 million homes gained access to clean drinking water.
- 2.4 million homes gained improved sanitary conditions.

In 2010, 80 countries in which UNICEF is working offered primary education focusing on quality and child development, compared to 43 countries in 2005.

UNICEF is a key humanitarian actor, providing support in acute disaster situations and long-term crises, and for reconstruction. In 2010, Norway gave NOK 144 million of humanitarian assistance directly to...

The UK gives marks to the UN and the World Bank

In March 2011, the UK’s development assistance agency, the Department for International Development, presented a report with reviews of multilateral organisations. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) assessed 43 organisations which receive support from the UK. The conclusion was that nine organisations gave very good value for money, 16 gave good value, nine gave satisfactory value, and nine gave unsatisfactory value. The organisations were evaluated using general criteria, but with sufficient flexibility to adapt the criteria to each individual organisation. The organisations were awarded marks for their contributions to the UK’s development targets and their capability for delivering good results.

The UK authorities define “value for money” as delivering results, combined with low costs. However, the actual results achieved by development assistance play little part in the assessment. Only two of the 10 components in the assessment considered development results, and even then first and foremost the likelihood of positive effects.

The MAR helps to systematise data in a field which has previously been poorly covered. The report may have a considerable influence on the UK’s allocations to the organisations. Among other things, the UK has withdrawn its core contributions from four organisations. The UK authorities hope that this tough approach will result in better performance by the organisations, and thus in improved development results.

Although Norway and the UK share a number of objectives for development assistance through multilateral organisations, the UK’s conclusions cannot be fully applied to Norwegian policy regarding multilateral organisations. Norway does not support all of the same organisations, and the emphasis given to them in the development policy context varies. Nevertheless, an analysis as comprehensive as the MAR will influence the thinking about multilateral development assistance in...
UNICEF. In addition, Norway made contributions via various humanitarian funds. Through its engagement in 2010, UNICEF achieved the following, among other things:

- Over 38 million children benefited from health services.
- 8.5 million children benefited from education services.
- Over 15 million children benefited from various nutrition-related projects.
- 28,000 children and 11,400 child soldiers in a total of 14 countries were able to return home or were reintegrated.

If Norway’s share of UNICEF’s budget of 5.5 per cent is taken as the starting point, one can say that in 2010 Norway contributed, for example, to over 200,000 homes gaining access to clean drinking water, to over 460,000 children affected by humanitarian crises benefiting from educational measures, or to 627 former child soldiers being able to return home. These results support progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals. Many other actors and factors are also contributing to the progress being made. It is difficult to estimate the precise proportion of UNICEF’s and Norway’s contribution to progress.

The GAVI Alliance – a global vaccine alliance

Norway is the second-largest donor to the GAVI Alliance, contributing NOK 631.2 million in 2010. Norway has been active in the expansion of the GAVI cooperation. During 2010, GAVI introduced new vaccines in many countries, including vaccines which protect against some of the illnesses most commonly suffered by children: pneumonia and diarrhoea.

The rotavirus vaccine against diarrhoea was introduced in four of five countries in which the vaccine has been formally approved.

The first vaccine against pneumonia was delivered to nine low-income countries only a few months after being introduced in high-income countries. Normally, many years pass between new vaccines reaching the market and them becoming available in poor countries.

67 of 72 countries entitled to support have introduced a vaccine against hepatitis B, and 38 million more children were vaccinated against hepatitis B in 2010 than in the preceding year.

A new meningococcal vaccine was introduced in three countries, and will be offered to a further 19.

In addition, existing vaccination campaigns continued. The number of children vaccinated against Hib disease with the support of the GAVI Alliance increased from 63 million in 2009 to 90 million in 2010. The number of children vaccinated against yellow fever with the support of the GAVI Alliance increased by 34 million.
in 2010. The GAVI Alliance estimates that, between 2000 and 2010, it has helped to prevent a total of 5.8 million deaths through vaccination. Norway contributes around 10 per cent of the support received by the GAVI Alliance, and one could therefore credit Norway with 10 per cent of the results achieved. This equates to 580,000 lives saved.

Norway has supported the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) since 2002, and was the eleventh-largest donor in 2010, with a contribution of NOK 375 million. The fund estimates that since 2002, it has helped to save 7.7 million people from dying from AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis. This has been achieved through, for example:

- 3.2 million people received HIV treatment
- 8.2 million people received tuberculosis treatment
- 190 million anti-malaria nets and 2.7 billion condoms were distributed

The 20 countries which receive the most support from the fund have reported more rapid falls in the rate of new HIV infections. Along with increased access to treatment, this has resulted in a 25 per cent drop in HIV-related deaths in these countries. Through the programme area of reproductive health and rights, UNFPA is promoting Millennium Development Goal 5 concerning the reduction of maternal mortality and universal access to reproductive health. Access to a full spectrum of reproductive health services is key in this regard. The term “reproductive health and rights” means sexual health, family planning, safe births, prevention of dangerous abortions and the eradication of genital mutilation and sexualised violence.

UNFPA has helped to increase the proportion of births attended by qualified health personnel in developing countries to 63 per cent in 2010, representing an increase of two per cent since 2007. The increase is not occurring rapidly enough to achieve the goal of an 85 per cent coverage ratio by the end of 2011.

UNFPA’s work has helped to strengthen the reproductive rights of women. The proportion of countries which have introduced such rights in national laws and regulations has increased from 67 per cent in 2009 to almost 70 per cent in 2010. This means access to health services such as family planning, sexual health, safe births and the prevention of dangerous abortions.

In collaboration with UNICEF, UNFPA is implementing the world’s largest programme to combat genital mutilation. This work appears to be bearing fruit. Calculations indicate that the proportion of women suffering genital mutilation has fallen considerably in Burkina Faso, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal.

These are results to which UNFPA has contributed through its programmes and political work, but which have largely been achieved by the countries themselves.

12 GAVI: GAVI’s impact. http://www.gavialliance.org. This represents an increase of over 40,000 people compared to the previous year’s update.
13 GFATM (2011). http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/diseases/. This represents an increase on the previous year’s update, when this figure was 5.7 million people.
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs profile of GFATM, 2011.
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs profile sheet. The ranking is based on basic support and earmarked funds. If basic support alone is considered, Norway is the third-largest contributor.
UNFPA’s contribution is often important in the design of health services, legislative texts and national action plans, but it is difficult to determine what proportion of these results can be ascribed directly to UNFPA. Estimating Norway’s share of the results is therefore not possible.

**The UN Development Programme – UNDP**

Norway was the sixth-largest donor to UNDP in 2010, contributing around NOK 2 billion in total. Norway’s contribution equates to approximately five per cent of UNDP’s total income.16

The organisation is engaged in many tasks in many countries. These tasks range from clean-up and reconstruction work in the aftermath of humanitarian crises to institution-building, energy effectiveness and work on global standards to promote sustainable and equitable development. UNDP also has extensive responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the various UN development assistance actors. This broad mandate may be one of the reasons why UNDP continues to experience considerable difficulties in reporting what the organisation as a whole has achieved. Nevertheless, there are examples of good results follow-up, particularly at country level. UNDP has stated that it has achieved the following results, among others, in 201017:

- Following the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, UNDP and other actors helped to provide temporary employment for 240,000 people in efforts to remove one million cubic metres of rubbish and rubble.
- In Pakistan, UNDP helped more than 200,000 flood victims.
- In Kenya, UNDP supported the holding of a successful and peaceful referendum on the constitution, two years after elections in the country were marred by violence and unrest. UNDP also helped to facilitate the holding of a referendum on South Sudan’s independence.
- In 2010, UNDP’s efforts in the area of energy effectiveness and renewable energy prevented the emission of a total of 24.5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide.

If Norway’s share of 5 per cent of the UNDP budget is adopted as the starting point, Norway’s share of these results is, for example, a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 1.2 million tonnes and that 10,000 flood victims have been able to rebuild their homes. Where UNDP does not specify the proportions of results for which it and its partners are responsible, as in the case of the temporary employment measures in Haiti, Norway’s share cannot be determined either.

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*The website of the commission: [http://www.everywomaneverychild.org/resources/accountability-commission](http://www.everywomaneverychild.org/resources/accountability-commission)*

**UN Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5, which concern child and maternal health, are the goals on which least progress has been made since 1990. In 2010, the UN Secretary-General launched a global strategy for women’s and children’s health to lift the issue higher on the political agenda. The UN Commission on Information and Accountability was established in January 2011 as a direct response to the strategy. The objective is to ensure that obligations relating to financial investments are met, and to secure progress in relation to women’s and children’s health.**

The commission has had an important function in driving forward the mobilisation and effectiveness of global efforts in the run-up to 2015, and has made clear recommendations for the strengthening of accountability and the focus on results in individual countries and regions, and globally.

Norway has been actively involved both in the global strategy for women’s and children’s health and in the work of the commission through Prime Minister Stoltenberg’s Global Campaign for the Health Millennium Development Goals. Norway’s contribution to the implementation of the commission’s recommendations totalled NOK 50 million in 2011. Norway is also contributing through expert cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Statistics Norway and the University of Oslo to strengthen health information systems and help to establish birth and death registers in countries with weak systems. Improved baseline data are crucial for measuring development effects.

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16 Factsheet on UNDP 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Part 1
Aid and conflict
The statistics section of the results report comprises three main parts, each of which contains statistics selected to illuminate developments and trends in Norwegian development cooperation. The first part gives an overview of the volume of Norway’s development assistance in 2010 and how it has developed over the last 10 years. The second part places Norwegian development assistance in an international context and compares it to the development assistance provided by other donor countries. The final part presents selected statistics on developmental trends in the 10 countries which received the most Norwegian aid in 2010.
In order for a country to be approved as a recipient of development assistance, it has to satisfy several criteria\(^1\). The most important is that the country must not be classified as a high-income country by the World Bank. This means that countries with a gross national income (GNI) of more than USD 11,456 (2007) may not receive development assistance. In addition, countries which lie below this level but are members of G8 or the EU, or are candidates for EU membership, do not qualify for development assistance.

\(^1\) OECD/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC)
Norwegian development assistance as a percentage of GNI 2001–2010

Source: Norad

Norwegian development assistance by type of aid. 2001 and 2010 (Total development assistance in 2001 and 2010: NOK 12.1 billion and NOK 27.7 billion)

Source: Norad
Norwegian development assistance, by type of aid 2001–2010. NOK billion

Norwegian development assistance in 2001 and 2010, by region. Totals: NOK 7.9 billion in 2001 and NOK 20.4 billion in 2010

Source: Norad
The 10 countries which received the most development assistance in 2010 all received significantly more than in 2001. Much of the increase is linked to the fact that the Norwegian development assistance budget has more than doubled during the intervening period. Most of these countries have traditionally received large amounts of development assistance. Brazil was the largest recipient of Norwegian development assistance in 2010, but has traditionally not been a large recipient of Norwegian aid. Brazil is considered to be a middle-income country, and is therefore an approved aid recipient country, even though it is on a considerably higher economic development level than the other large recipients of Norwegian development assistance. The increase in the development assistance given to Brazil is linked to the focus on fighting climate change and deforestation. Pakistan and Haiti also received significantly higher development assistance transfers in 2010, compared to 2009. The explanation is the emergency relief given after Haiti’s earthquake disaster and Pakistan’s catastrophic floods. As a result of Pakistan’s flood disaster, aid rose from just over NOK 290 million in 2009 to more than NOK 500 million in 2010, up more than 70 per cent. The earthquake in Haiti led to an increase in aid to the country from around NOK 27 million in 2009 to NOK 400 million in 2010. This represents a 15-fold increase, and illustrates how individual incidents can quickly trigger large amounts of aid funds.

The development assistance given by Norway to multilateral organisations has grown from just under NOK 6 billion in 2001 to almost NOK 13 billion in 2010. This development assistance comprises both core support and earmarked support for the multilateral organisations.

The 10 largest recipients of Norwegian development assistance in 2010. NOK million

Source: Norad

![Figure 17: Brazil was the largest recipient of Norwegian development assistance in 2010](image)

FIGURE 17: BRAZIL WAS THE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 10 largest recipients of Norwegian development assistance in 2010. NOK million

Source: Norad

![Figure 18: Increased development assistance for multilateral organisations](image)

FIGURE 18: INCREASED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Regional development banks</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Development assistance funds for multilateral organisations 2001–2010. NOK billion

Source: Norad
The largest recipients of Norwegian development assistance are the UN organisations, the World Bank and the regional development banks. Although there was a relatively strong increase in the transfers made to multilateral organisations, there were only small changes in the distribution between the largest recipient groups. There was an increase in the category “other groups” from 2001 to 2010. Much of the reason for this is the growth in the number of global thematic funds in the 2000s. The largest of these are two health funds: the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Norway’s bilateral development assistance can be divided into six thematic categories, as shown above. The allocation of aid to the environment and energy has increased significantly. From 2009 to 2010, this allocation increased by 88 per cent, evidencing the political focus on climate change. Funds for the education sector amounted to NOK 1.6 billion in 2010. This is a drop of 9 per cent compared to 2009, when the support amounted to NOK 1.8 billion. Health-related development assistance was also reduced. From 2009 to 2010, health-related development assistance fell by over NOK 430 million, a reduction of 18 per cent.
During the last 10 years, the distribution between the different thematic areas has been fairly stable, with the exception of the environment and energy and health sectors. Environment and energy-related development assistance stands out as the sector in which the greatest increase has occurred. From 2001 to 2010, its share rose from 11 to 22 per cent. The largest relative decrease occurred in health-related development assistance, which fell from 17 to 10 per cent. Although bilateral health-related development assistance has decreased, it is important to note that many of Norway’s health-related efforts have been made through multilateral channels which are not visible in the statistics.

Bilateral development assistance by sector in 2001 and 2010. Totals: NOK 7.9 billion in 2001 and NOK 20.4 billion in 2010

Source: Norad
2. NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

This part of the report compares Norway as a donor with a selection of other donor countries in the OECD. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a forum which sets standards for, and monitors, the aid practices of the member countries. The OECD/DAC comprises 23 member countries and the EU.
With its share of 1.1 per cent, Norway was the country which provided the most development assistance proportionate to GNI in 2010. Norwegian development assistance accounted for just below 4 per cent of the total development assistance provided by OECD/DAC members.

**FIGURE 22: FOUR PER CENT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMES FROM NORWAY**

- USA: 23%
- UK: 11%
- France: 10%
- Norway: 4%
- Other countries: 52%

Development assistance provided by other OECD/DAC members in 2010

Source: OECD/DAC
The figure shows how large a share of development assistance funds comes from Norway. Norwegian development assistance accounts for more than 8 per cent of the development assistance received by Brazil and Malawi. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Haiti are the countries in the sample for which Norway’s share of total development assistance is smallest. In these countries, the Norwegian development assistance share is less than 2 per cent. These are countries which receive considerable aid funds from the USA.

Norway’s share of the total development assistance provided by OECD/DAC countries has increased from 2.6 per cent in 2001 to 3.6 per cent in 2010. Although the total development assistance from OECD/DAC countries increased from 2009 to 2010, certain factors indicate that the development assistance total will decline from 2010 to 2011. The main reason for this is that several OECD/DAC countries have cut their budgets due to the financial crisis. Ireland, Greece and Portugal have decided to make substantial cuts to their development assistance budgets, while the Netherlands intends to cut development assistance to 0.7 per cent of GNI.
Since 1970, the UN has had the objective of ensuring that development assistance amounts to at least 0.7 per cent of donor countries’ GNI. Norway passed this threshold in 1976, and since then has never had a development assistance ratio of less than 0.7 per cent. The Scandinavian countries have traditionally had a high level of development assistance relative to GNI, and all of them have a development assistance level above the UN target. The USA is the country which donates the most money in total, but this amounts to a small percentage of GNI. Japan also provides large amounts of development assistance, but as in the case of the USA, this is a small percentage of GNI. In recent years, the UK has increased the proportion of development assistance relative to GNI to achieve the 0.7 per cent target. The increase has been made during a period in which the country is making large cuts in public expenditure.

Different donor countries split development assistance differently between multilateral and bilateral development assistance. The USA provides the smallest proportion of development assistance, 13 per cent, in the form of core support for multilateral organisations. The average for the OECD/DAC is 29 per cent. Norway also stands out as a country which gives a relatively small share of development assistance, 21 per cent, in the form of core support for multilateral organisations. Japan, Sweden and the UK are the countries in the sample which give the largest proportion in the form of multilateral development assistance, with shares of around 35 per cent.
Least developed countries (LDCs) are the countries with the lowest economic development levels. Three criteria have to be met to qualify as an LDC. The country must have a low GNI per capita and low development level measured by health and education indicators and, additionally, the country’s economy must be vulnerable or unstable. Forty-eight countries are classified as LDCs. The average proportion of development assistance given to LDCs is 20 per cent among OECD countries. Denmark and the USA stand out as the countries in the sample that provide the highest proportions of development assistance to LDCs, around 28 per cent.

Figure 27: Denmark gives the greatest proportion of development assistance to the least developed countries

Proportion of development assistance given to the least developed countries, 2010

Source: OECD/DAC

Figure 28: The Nordic countries score highly on the Commitment to Development Index

Commitment to Development Index 2003–2010

Source: Center for Global Development
Economic development and the reduction of poverty are affected by more than only development assistance. Other policy areas like trade, technology, migration and the environment also have an effect on development in poor countries. The Center for Global Development has developed the Commitment to Development Index to provide an overview of how the policies of donor countries affect developing countries. The index takes account of a country’s size and evaluates how good the policies of donor countries are in relation to the potential of each individual donor country. The Nordic countries stand out in this context as countries with particularly good development policies. In the 2010 index, Norway took fourth place, behind Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. Norway scored highly due to its large investments in developing countries, its development-friendly migration policy and its high level of development assistance as a percentage of GNI. The factor which pulled Norway down on the index is trade. Due to its high tariff barriers on agricultural products from developing countries and high agricultural subsidies, Norway ranked 21st out of 22 countries in relation to the trade component of the index.

Norway has reduced tariffs for the least developed countries. The Commitment to Development Index is based on the tariff barriers for all developing countries, including those which are not classified as least developed countries.
3. THE DEVELOPMENT SITUATION IN SELECTED RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

This section presents development trends in the 10 countries which received the most Norwegian development assistance in 2010. The statistics covers poverty trends, health, education, infrastructure, economic development, the environment, governance and aid dependency. Various sources of statistics have been used. It is often difficult to gather reliable statistics in countries with weak systems. The statistics presented here are the most recent available figures, but some are not complete for all countries or all years. Methods may also have changed from year to year. This means that not all figures are comparable, and that some countries are missing in some of the summaries. Nevertheless, international statistics are improving steadily. New indices are being produced, and more countries are being included. This is making it increasingly easy to compile and compare statistics.
The figure shows how Norwegian development assistance for the five countries which received the most Norwegian development assistance in 2010 has developed over the last 30 years. Tanzania has received a high level of support for the entire 30-year period. Brazil received little or no development assistance until the last couple of years, when development assistance increased from NOK 34 million in 2008 to just under NOK 1.5 billion in 2010. This increase is linked to Norway efforts to prevent climate change and deforestation. The development assistance given to the Palestinian Territory was increased after the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, and grew steadily until 2010. Afghanistan received little development assistance until 2000, but has been one of the largest recipients of Norwegian development assistance for the last 10 years. Sudan has also benefited from large increases in development assistance transfers from Norway in the last 10 years, particularly since 2005, when the peace agreement between northern Sudan and South Sudan was signed.

**FIGURE 30: SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BRAZIL**

![Graph showing development assistance for Brazil, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Palestinian Territory over the last 30 years.](image-url)
One of the most common ways of measuring poverty is to consider the proportion of the population living on less than USD 1.25 per day, adjusted for variations in purchasing power between different countries. By this measure, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest proportion of poor people. The three countries in the sample with the highest poverty ratios are all from this region. Brazil, with its poverty ratio of less than 4 per cent, is the country in the sample with the lowest poverty level. Although many of the countries still have a high poverty ratio, there is a general trend of declining poverty. None of the countries in the sample had a higher registered poverty ratio in 2010 than at the end of the 1990s. The ratios of Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique sank from over 80 per cent to 68, 73 and 60 per cent respectively. Similar trends can also be observed among low-income countries which are not included in the sample.

The UN Human Development Index is an index that ranks countries’ development levels. The index combines indicators relating to health, education and income to measure the living standard. The development level is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest possible development level. Of the countries in the sample, Brazil is the only country considered to have a high development level. Mozambique ranks lowest among the countries in the sample. Although improvements have been made in Mozambique since the end of the civil war, it remains one of the countries in the world with the lowest income and greatest health- and education-related challenges. The remaining countries in the sample are also at a low level. In recent years, most countries in the world have experienced an improvement in relation to health, education and income levels. This trend can also be seen in the countries in this sample, and is leading to significant improvements in the level of human development as measured by the UN Human Development Index.
The Gini index\(^3\) can be used to measure economic inequality. The index is a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 means that a country has no inequality, while countries with values closer to 1 have a high degree of inequality. Although there are no examples of countries at the extreme ends of the scale, there are great variations between countries. According to the Gini index, countries in Europe have a high degree of equality. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America feature great differences between rich and poor. Among the countries which received the most development assistance from Norway in 2010, Haiti and Brazil had the highest levels of economic inequality.

\(^3\) Developed by statistician Corrado Gini.
In recent years, various developing countries have achieved improvements in public health. Among other things, there has been a clear increase in life expectancy in most developing countries. Several of the countries in the sample have reported an increase in life expectancy of more than five years compared to the early 1990s.

Child mortality is often measured in terms of how large a proportion of children die before they reach the age of five years. Child mortality has declined in almost all of the countries in the sample compared to the level in the year 2000. The reduction is largest in the countries which had relatively high levels of child mortality in the year 2000. One of the UN Millennium Development Goals is to reduce child mortality by two thirds from 1990 to 2015. When all of the countries in the world are considered together, the average child mortality rate is 6 per cent (corresponding to 60 in the figure on the left). This represents a reduction of one third compared to the 1990 level. Accordingly, a sharp and rapid fall in child mortality is required in the next five years if this Millennium Development Goal is to be achieved. Haiti stands out from the other countries in the sample. As in the other sample countries, child mortality was falling in Haiti, but this was reversed by the earthquake which struck in 2010. Child mortality in Haiti doubled from 2009 to 2010.
Another UN Millennium Development Goal is to reverse the spread of HIV by 2015. The figure on the left shows that the proportion of people living with HIV is falling in several of the countries in the sample. In Malawi, Tanzania and Haiti, the proportion has been dropping since 2000, while it has been falling in Uganda since the beginning of the 1990s. In both Mozambique and Sudan, the proportion of HIV-positive persons has increased since 1990.

![Figure 36: The proportion of HIV-positive persons is reduced in several countries](image)


Source: World Bank
The Palestinian Territory and Brazil are the countries in the sample with the highest literacy rates. The Palestinian Territory stands out because it is among the recipients of aid with the highest literacy rates despite the fact that a relatively small proportion of the population has access to primary education. Pakistan, Mozambique and Haiti are the countries in the sample with the lowest proportions of persons able to read and write.

**FIGURE 37: LITERACY RATE HIGHEST IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY**

- The Palestinian Territory
- Brazil
- Tanzania
- Uganda
- Malawi
- Sudan
- Pakistan
- Mozambique
- Haiti

Literacy rate among persons aged over 15. Latest available figures 2005–2010

Source: World Bank

**FIGURE 38: TANZANIA HAS THE MOST CHILDREN IN PRIMARY EDUCATION**

- Tanzania
- Brazil
- Mozambique
- Uganda
- Malawi
- The Palestinian Territory
- Pakistan

Proportion of children with a place in primary education. Latest available figures 2005–2010

Source: World Bank
Economic development is one of the most important factors for lifting a population out of poverty. Brazil has experienced strong economic growth in recent years, and stands out as the country in the sample with by far the highest income level. The countries with the lowest income levels are Afghanistan and the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Most of the countries in the sample have experienced economic growth every year. Most of the countries enjoyed higher economic growth at the beginning of the period. One of the causes may be the financial crisis. Haiti stands out due to a sharp drop in 2010. This must be considered in the context of the catastrophic earthquake it suffered at the beginning of 2010.
Infrastructure can be both a prerequisite for, and a result of, the development level of a country, and can be measured in different ways. Electricity consumption may, for example, give an indication of a country’s development level. Brazil has both the highest level of and the most rapid growth in electricity consumption. Pakistan and Mozambique have relatively high electricity consumption levels compared to the other countries in the sample. The remaining countries in the sample have low consumption levels. By way of comparison, electricity consumption in Norway was over 24,000 kWh per person in 2008. This was more than 10 times the consumption level of Brazil during that year.

**FIGURE 41: BRAZIL HAS THE HIGHEST ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION**

**FIGURE 42: INCREASE IN THE USE OF MOBILE TELEPHONES**
There has been a strong increase in the number of persons in developing countries with access to modern communications technology. In 2001, there were few internet and mobile telephone subscribers in the countries in the sample. From 2000 to 2009, there was strong growth in the use of modern information technology. Brazil is the country in the sample with the most internet and mobile subscribers, with 60 mobile subscribers and 39 internet users per 100 persons in 2009. By way of comparison, Norway had 111 mobile subscribers and 92 internet users per 100 persons in 2009.

4 There may be several mobile subscriptions per person.
A considerable proportion of global greenhouse gas emissions result from deforestation. Brazil is responsible for significant CO2 emissions. Norway’s support for climate and forest projects has the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by paying to reduce deforestation. Norway’s cooperation with Brazil is particularly important in the context of this initiative. Of the countries in the sample, Brazil has both the greatest total land area and the largest proportion of rainforest-covered land area. On a global basis, only Russia has larger forested land areas than Brazil.
Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territory are the development assistance recipients in the sample which both receive the most development assistance and in which such support accounts for the highest proportion of GNI. In Afghanistan, development assistance accounted for 46 per cent of GNI in 2008, while the proportion in the Palestinian Territory was almost 25 per cent in 2005.

**AID DEPENDENCY**

**FIGURE 46: AFGHANISTAN RECEIVED OVER 46 PER CENT OF GNI IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportion of GNI accounted for by development assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of GNI accounted for by development assistance. Latest available figures 2005–2010

Source: World Bank

**FIGURE 47: AFGHANISTAN RECEIVED THE MOST DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total development assistance 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Territory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total development assistance 2009

Source: World Bank
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL'S ANNUAL INDEX MEASURES INHABITANTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN A COUNTRY. IN THE SAMPLE, IT IS THE INHABITANTS OF BRAZIL AND MALAWI WHO PERCEIVE THE LEAST CORRUPTION. GIVEN THAT SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES LIE AT AROUND LEVEL 9, THE FIGURE INDICATES A GENERALLY HIGH LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN THE COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE.

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENDER INDEX (SIGI) ILLUSTRATES THE DEGREE OF GENDER EQUALITY. BY COMPARING 12 DIFFERENT VARIABLES RELATING TO THE FAMILY SITUATION, RIGHTS, INHERITANCE AND PHYSICAL ABUSE, THE INDEX GIVES AN INDICATION OF HOW EQUAL SOCIETIES ARE. THE SCALE RUNS FROM 0 TO 1, WHERE 0 REFERS TO COMPLETE GENDER EQUALITY AND 1 INDICATES THAT THERE IS NO EQUALITY. THE FIGURE SHOWS THAT SUDAN AND AFGHANISTAN ARE THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH WOMEN AND MEN ARE LEAST EQUAL. BRAZIL IS THE MOST GENDER-EQUAL COUNTRY IN THE SAMPLE.
A Palestinian woman gazes out at two Israeli soldiers outside her house in Hebron.

Photo: Ken Opprann

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