Evaluation of NPA’s approach in humanitarian assistance and relief based on cooperation with local partners

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27 May 2014

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INTRODUCTION TO REPORT

This is an internal report to NPA’s International Department on an evaluation of NPA’s experience in humanitarian assistance and relief based on cooperation with local partners. The main evaluation purpose was to assess the effectiveness of NPA and partners to provide humanitarian assistance and relief, in order to contribute to organisational learning and development. Appendix 1 gives detailed Terms of Reference.

The report begins with a brief summary of recommendations. It then describes these recommendations in more detail within nine themes that emerged from the evaluation:

1. Overarching Strategy, Resilience and NPA’s Partnership Model
2. Values and Policy Alignment
3. Learning and Knowledge Management
4. NPA’s Niche
5. Networks and Alliances
6. Programme and Project Management, Proposals, Reporting and Analytical Power
7. Predictability and Multi-Year Framework Agreements
8. Supervision and Support
9. Marketing, Communication and Fundraising Capacity

The remainder of the report consists of the Appendices outlined in the Table of Contents.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluation team consisted of four people who were together for over three weeks of fieldwork and by distance communications at other times. The authors thank Haifa Jammal (NPA Lebanon) and Ahmed Farah Mohamed (NPA Somalia) for their considerable contributions and all that they brought to the work professionally and personally.

We relied heavily on teams from two NPA country programmes. We are deeply grateful to Wafa El-Yassir and her colleagues in the Lebanon programme, and to Khamis Chome Abdi and his colleagues in the Somalia programme. These teams of people provided far more guidance and hospitality than can be detailed in this simple acknowledgement. They provided the highest quality support and the evaluation would have been impossible without them.

The situation in Somalia was not always easy. Special thanks go to Shukri Yusuf Abdi, Mohamed Hussein Elmi and to the team of guards, drivers and office staff who ensured that all was well and that the evaluation could proceed.

We thank the officials and staff in Norwegian ministries and overseas embassies, staff from other NGOs and agencies, previous NPA staff, NPA volunteers in Norway, and NPA staff in Oslo and country programmes, who all gave their time with valuable reflections on the evaluation questions.

Trude Falch and Svein Olsen led the evaluation project group. We thank them for the strong and enabling support they provided throughout the evaluation process.

We thank the staff from the 18 NPA’s partner organisations that we met in Somalia and Lebanon for their reflections and insights. They gave considerable time to explain how they experience partnership work with NPA and other agencies, and how different partnership approaches translate into their ability to deliver change, humanitarian assistance and relief. Alongside NPA country teams, they also arranged for us to meet beneficiaries and visit the places where they live and work.
We had the privilege of meeting over 220 of NPA’s beneficiaries in Lebanon and Somalia, in whose service this evaluation ultimately stands. Many of these people were refugees. Many face uncertain futures and daily questions about their basic needs and rights, including food, water, shelter – even personal safety and security. We were welcomed into their homes, camps, clinics, schools and communities. When violence or threat prevented us from reaching them they came to us, even if it took a whole day driving on difficult terrain to do so.

We thank all the beneficiaries who provided welcome and hospitality, who told us their stories and experiences of how NPA and NPA partners provide humanitarian assistance and other support. In a spirit of solidarity, and with thanks and respect, we hope that this evaluation accurately (though regrettably not fully) reflects your situation and contributes to the positive developments that NPA seeks in its humanitarian assistance work with you.

**BRIEF SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Partnership approaches should be the norm. Develop clear decision rules for exceptions
- Develop more transparent and verifiable mechanisms for partner assessment and selection
- Develop more transparent mechanisms for assessing the fundamental principle ‘Do No Harm’
- Formalise NPA’s humanitarian assistance model in terms of ‘Resilience’
- Make explicit how NPA’s values inform policy, strategy and translate into operational success
- Examine mechanisms for improving NPA’s speed of decision-making in different crises scenarios
- Formalise learning and knowledge management in Humanitarian Assistance, and NPA’s work more broadly, beginning with a review of existing strengths and gaps in how NPA captures, analyses and shares knowledge and learning
- Improve the development and rigorous use of indicators not only for reporting but also for learning.
- Consider possibilities for a specialist ‘home’ for learning and knowledge exchange/management – perhaps like a Learning Hub
- Strengthen cross-partner learning and peer-review
- Consider scope for NPA to contribute to humanitarian assistance research
- Agree NPA’s distinctiveness and niche in humanitarian assistance
- Review and describe how NPA is connected with humanitarian assistance networks and alliances.
- Emphasise the value of the SOLIDAR alliance (and others) in the next International Strategy. In other documents, emphasise agreed NPA/alliance shared strategies, and how these reflect NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief goals
- Formalise decision rules about working with an alliance model
- Introduce a standardised, locally flexible programme and project management system
- Ensure that risk analysis is much more robust, and is routinely used
- Ensure that relevant conflict analysis tools are known and used
- Consider mainstreaming gender and environment analyses
- Develop a corporately branded tool kit of relevant, simple, accessible and engaging tools for analysis
- Develop a partnership assessment tool from partnership criteria in NPA’s Partnership Strategy
- Decouple the phrase ‘humanitarian assistance’ from the word ‘relief’
- Re-frame ‘assistance’ and ‘relief’ within the language and conceptual framework of resilience thinking
- Consider longer funding-cycles in line with a resilience approach to humanitarian assistance
- Consider having a head office (and possibly regional) leader(s) for humanitarian assistance
- Review the pros and cons of NPA’s decentralised approach vis-à-vis humanitarian assistance, and perhaps more broadly
- Invest in an internal and external marketing, communications and outreach strategy specifically for humanitarian assistance that explains clearly what NPA’s humanitarian assistance is actually achieving, and why it is so special
DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AND MAIN POINTS

1. OVERARCHING STRATEGY, RESILIENCE and NPA’S PARTNERSHIP MODEL

Key Recommendations

1.1 Partnership approaches should be the norm in NPA’s Humanitarian Assistance work, just as in NPA’s longer-term development work. To do otherwise would go against a large body of current international thinking about the importance of partnerships in humanitarian assistance.

1.2 Develop more transparent, verifiable mechanisms for partner assessment and selection that link with Partnership Policy, International Strategy and Country Strategy criteria and principles.

1.3 Develop more transparent mechanisms for assessing the fundamental principle ‘do no harm’ and for clarifying the decisions that emanate from those assessments.

1.4 Clarify the decision making process that follows from the International Strategy on crisis response (International Strategy 2012-2015: p10, Section 4.3, bullet 1). This could involve formalising internal decision rules about when not to use local partnerships in humanitarian assistance, or to attach special conditions to partnership work. For example:
   In a humanitarian crisis we will always work alongside and through local partners if:
   a. We have reliable, trusted, competent partners on the ground, who we can confidently expect to deliver humanitarian assistance quickly, or
   b. We can identify ways of reliably building their capacity to do so within the necessary time frame.

   Otherwise we will either:
   a. Work through an alliance or network partner(s) who we are certain has trusted local presence,
   b. Support UN or other large actor responses,
   c. Under exceptional circumstances, if we have the necessary capacity, resource and agility, we become operational ourselves, or ally ourselves with an operational partner, or
   d. Explain to our constituencies why we are unable to act in this particular crisis at this time, and maintain a watching brief regarding our possible future intervention.

1.5 Re-align NPA’s work in humanitarian assistance, relief, and long-term development with the language and conceptual thinking around ‘Resilience.’

NPA has developed a partnership model that ensures effective, relevant humanitarian assistance and which is capable of delivering long-term impact and building sustainable change. The benefits of a partnership model, and the lack of alternatives in some of the situations we saw, strongly indicate that a partnership model is by far the most effective approach to humanitarian assistance for NPA where at all possible. Indeed, NPA’s particular approach to partnership is grounded on three of the most important aspects of current cross-national thinking on humanitarian assistance: resilience, innovation and capacity building.
The evaluation team was able to witness and closely examine humanitarian assistance of the highest quality, delivered in two of the most challenging, protracted crisis situations in the world. In Lebanon and Somalia the value of NPA partnerships goes far beyond the finance involved. The partnerships that NPA has developed in these places are directly contributing to lasting, positive change in circumstances where the world is hungry to see change; they are a tribute to NPA strategy, the country directors, partners and NPA teams involved.

There are compelling reasons, then, why a partnership approach to NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief should be the norm. The evaluation found no evidence to the contrary. While we did find some areas of concern regarding systems, analytical rigour and reporting, the overarching strategy of a partnership model, its underlying philosophy and capacity to deliver are sound.

In fact, in many ways NPA’s humanitarian assistance and political approach are ‘ahead of the game’ in terms of international thinking about partnerships and humanitarian assistance. NPA are already delivering holistic, resilience-based approaches to humanitarian assistance and relief, but just not using the language of resilience to capture and present what they do.

NPA Somalia and NPA Lebanon relate holistically to the political nature of any crisis, keeping political context acutely in mind in considering partner selection and partner abilities in emergencies. The NPA partners we met demonstrated that they could manage transitions between emergency and recovery well, notwithstanding considerations of scale.

Before moving on to this in more detail, though, we note four things that frame this evaluation’s response concerning political context and sustainability (Appendix 1 Terms of Reference: 4.3.1 - Sustainability: Is NPA able to select partners who also have the potential to influence change in society after the emergency phase?).

1. **Evidence for Assessment and Selection Process.** There are strong fits between overarching NPA strategies, country strategies and local partners’ strategies. Partners’ activities and outputs clearly reflect these strategies. The partners we met have the capacity to influence change and are doing so even during crises, let alone after them (e.g. PARD Case Study, Appendix 10). However, it was not easy to find evidence concerning how the Partnership Policy (on “Selection and Assessment of Partner Organisations” – Sec 2.6) translates into decisions to:
   a. Stay with those partners during and after a crisis, building capacity as needed (Partnership Policy p7, last paragraph)
   b. Search for and identify new or additional partners, or
   c. Choose an alternative approach (e.g. consultants, government bodies, alliances, NPA become operational)

So how are assessment and selection decisions taken? While some of the mechanisms for selection and assessment were visible to us (e.g. *Lebanon Country Strategy Document 2012-2015, p11; GECPD/NPA 2002-2013 Partnership Brief*), partner assessment/selection work was not easy to evaluate.

NPA partners are deeply rooted in local communities. Speaking to people at length, it was clear that the skills informing selection and assessment decisions were strong, and intelligently applied. Decisions seemed to be based on hard-won and well-understood experience, effective relationships and trust. However, this appeared to result in decision taking more by intuitive ‘feel’ than objectively verifiable analysis. Given the fundamental importance of partnership work for NPA, it would be helpful to have a more verifiable and transparent process.
2. **Assessing the ‘Do No Harm’ Principle.** It was not clear to us exactly how NPA country offices actually assess the relationship between “…influencing change in society after the emergency phase” and the fundamental principal of “do no harm.” This also speaks to partner selection and assessment, as well as the way that influencing processes are actually applied in practice. Given the risks involved, this needs attention.

3. **Agreed understanding of the terms Emergency Phase, Relief and Humanitarian Assistance.** The demarcation between emergency phase and recovery phase was not easy to capture for some of NPA’s work, especially for informants in the two countries we visited. Both Somalia and Lebanon have decades-long needs for humanitarian assistance, with cycles of demand for relief. Both contexts are characterised by long-term intractable conflict across political, economic, social and cultural domains. One group described Lebanon as one long emergency and crisis situation, punctuated by military invasions and the arrival of new refugees. Somalia was described in similar terms but with cycles of drought added in\(^1\). Under these circumstances, an emergency is well understood, but the idea of a recovery phase was tricky for our informants to pin down. ‘Recovery’ for them, was more like a return to the normal situation of long-term crisis, with all its attendant political ramifications and needs to reduce the likelihood and impact of future emergencies.

4. **Working with Resilience.** NPA works with a Resilience model; it just doesn’t say so. Moreover, the NPA approach to resilience focusses on what one researcher says should be the real driver behind resilience agendas, which is “… to prevent people falling into crisis” (Simon Levine, Overseas Development Institute, quoted in OCHA-IRIN News, 4 March 2013). In general, the partners we met were so deeply familiar with the political realities of ‘preventing people falling into crisis,’ building on local strengths, and influencing change, that they almost automatically tuned in to building resilience during emergency relief. We found no evidence that any approach other than partnership would be able to do this so well. Every informant we asked said that not working through local partners would encourage dependency and short-term thinking, and fail to build long-term resilience during or after the emergency phase.

In Lebanon, there are 300,000+ Palestinian refugees living in 12 camps and gatherings and almost completely detached from government services. Over a million Syrian refugees have arrived in the last two years, some moving into already crowded Palestinian camps, many in geographically dispersed settlements that bring a different set of relief and humanitarian assistance questions (Appendix 9). NPA Lebanon has selected: seven partners between 1995 and 2001; two that grew out of NPA Lebanon in 2008; and five Syrian partners since 2012.

In Somalia there is probably a similar number of people, but NPA now works with just four partners. This is partly because of decisions against some (e.g. because of political or social bias, insufficient capacity, or weak engagement) and partly because of positive decisions about those four in terms of delivery and capacity to influence change. People migrate across, or have moved to Sool, Sanaaq and Cayn (and elsewhere) as part of normal nomadic life, but also due to drought and to violence in the centre and south of Somalia.

Both places are highly complex politically internally and as a result of external factors. The political contexts relating to representation, rights, tensions between state and other authorities, exclusion, and many other things have been well described in NPA Lebanon and NPA Somalia context analyses.

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\(^1\) Although Lebanon is not without serious environmental crises, *The Daily Star Lebanon 2012: June 6,* “Lebanon faces Environment Problems due to Development” Stephen Dockery.
To address these issues in Lebanon, the strategic choices made by NPA place humanitarian assistance and relief within a range of politically directed development actions (*NPA Lebanon Strategy Document 2012-2015: undated*). The actions are to work with “Palestinian and Lebanese strategic actors” and to focus on five areas:

1. **Palestinian rights** – institutional and legal change, and public perceptions
2. **Women’s rights** - improved representation in democratic processes, combating violence against women
3. **Democratisation in Lebanon and Palestinian communities** – better participation, representation, electoral reform, stronger alliances, abolishing the sectarian and confessional system, aiming for fair distribution of power and resources
4. **Emergency preparedness, response and humanitarian aid**, including health and disability
5. **Youth empowerment** – education, employability, enhancing participation in political and public life

A range of local partners (“potential” and “close relationship”) has been identified, along with selection criteria that echo NPA’s Partnership Policy (2009) and aspects of NPA’s niche. Since ceasing operational activity in 2012 (except for Humanitarian Disarmament), NPA Lebanon only works through partners, including NGOs, CSOs and others. Their Strategic Plan broadly reflects NPA policy documents (*International Strategy 2012-2015; Partnership Policy (2009)*).

For NPA’s work in Somalia, we could see little alternative to partnership work, although the power of local partnerships could probably be strengthened through an alliance or coalition model that includes INGOs as well as local NGOs. The potential for working through UN efforts also exists, in the event of a major crisis that existing partners could not handle alone. Even then, the legitimacy and access that NPA’s local partners provide would be invaluable in scaling up.

In Sannaq, Sool and Cayn, interventions are placed even more clearly than for NPA Lebanon under the banner of humanitarian assistance, as seen in a range of documents and on the NPA website. The focus is on livelihoods, recovery from drought, humanitarian aid, recovery and development, with these words sometimes even grouped together: “... NPA intends to provide humanitarian assistance in Sool and Sanaag in order to avert the looming crisis and at the same time strengthen the livelihood recovery gains realized from past interventions.” (NPA website). We found that NPA is holding the political space very well, with ‘chameleon steps’ being taken to engage with all relevant authorities.

In the contested areas of Sannaq, Sool and Cayn, it is critical to analyse and select partners very carefully, to ‘do no harm.’ We felt that this was being achieved but again, our evidence base for making this judgement is thin. NPA partners are explicit in linking ‘humanitarian assistance’ work with strategic planning through, for example, girls’ integrated education, boys’ vocational skills training, and the participation of youth in community peace-building. One project provides a clear example of NPA’s leadership in the international discourse on resilience (See also *Appendix 14, Water, Wells and Tankers*):

"[The] establishment of a borehole [in Sool] ... will provide ... reliable and safe water ... and strengthen the traditional coping mechanism during periods of extended drought, by significantly reducing long distances for water trucking ... lowering the price of water. A permanent water source ... is very important because it is needed by the people for their survival and will address the persistent problem of water scarcity in the area." (NPA website)

Thus, overcoming water crises, and strengthening local authorities’ decision-making and community participation is one of the ways in which NPA partners Social Relief Organisation
and Steadfast Voluntary Organisation can influence change politically through both relief and longer term work, when the 'state' is absent, or fighting for control with others.

Another opportunity for enabling political change has been firmly taken by two NPA Somalia partners, HANAQAAD and GECPD. Their strategic focus on women and youth also links relief and crisis work with long-term development and political empowerment under a framework that implicitly embraces resilience (Appendix 14, Women delivering change). We met young people and women who had migrated to town because conditions in the countryside were so challenging. Both GECPD and HANAQAAD had programmes that enabled these people to participate on the basis of their emergency crisis needs. The women who were beneficiaries have now gone on to volunteer, encourage others and become active in gendered, political discussions. They described how they come together to explore ways of contributing to positive change in the extremely challenging circumstances they face.

NPA partners in Lebanon and Somalia, then, have clearly demonstrated their capacity to work in relief, humanitarian assistance, and long-term development situations. Some are stronger than others and the question of reach (scale of intervention) is important. But collectively in each place, they possess the required competencies, legitimacy and capacity for emergency work coupled with the ability to influence change over the long term. Appendices 4 and 5 go into further detail regarding the things these partners have achieved.

A key recent document on partnerships and humanitarian assistance comes from a consortium of international NGOs.2 ‘Missed Opportunities’ calls for “… a renewed focus on capacity and partnerships as a result of the attention being paid to resilience and innovation” and describes four key benefits of “…partnership work in humanitarian assistance …

1. Conventional aid delivery … (is) often criticised for … lack of relevance and appropriateness, … the evidence shows that well-designed partnerships can militate against these issues.
2. Partnerships can do this by ensuring programme design that is contextually appropriate, culturally sensitive, responsive to needs, and based on communities’ own understanding.
3. Partner-based responses can be fast, responsive, and well prepared for action.
4. Partner-based responses can contribute to accountability and community engagement."

We found strong evidence that NPA’s partnership approach delivered success across a range of partnerships in all four of these areas, with one or two recent exceptions regarding point 3. Appendix 8 indicates other benefits of partnership work, as expressed by partners and beneficiaries themselves in workshops that we facilitated for this evaluation.

These things said, however, we did find scope for improvement and there are circumstances where a more cautious approach to partnership would be advisable. These include situations where:

1. There are no local partners at all, or none with the capacity to contribute meaningfully in a crisis, or no local partners with the potential (through capacity building) to contribute.
2. An Alliance or consortium model offers clear advantages in terms of competence, reach and legitimacy, without undermining local capacity.
3. Overarching risks or security concerns, or an assessment that 'do no harm' cannot be achieved, prevents local partners acting, e.g. because of access issues or threat.

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Therefore while a partnership approach to humanitarian assistance should be the norm, NPA would benefit from clear decision rules (such as those just mentioned) about when a partnership approach might not be advisable, or should be used with certain conditions.

**Resilience – some further thoughts**

The evaluation team met a range of views about what humanitarian assistance means conceptually and operationally within NPA, among NPA partners and among other stakeholders. This partly reflects an old dilemma about where emergency relief ends and longer term development begins. It also reflects differing perspectives on NPA’s distinctive approach to two issues:

- The nature of NPA’s work in protracted crises, and
- NPA's approach to building capacity and resilience.

In fact, approaches to humanitarian assistance and relief are changing and increasingly using the language of resilience.

> “Nowhere is the dividing line of responsibility between humanitarian and development actors more blurred than in the areas of post-disaster reconstruction, rehabilitation and pre-disaster risk reduction. Do these areas fall under the label of humanitarian, or development aid? In short, the answer is both.” *(Building Resilience, Human Coalition: undated)*

Previous approaches indicated that a disaster situation needs both a humanitarian assistance / relief response, and a disaster risk reduction (DRR) approach that aimed to reduce the risk of further disaster through strengthening capacity. Although this is very much in line with the Red Cross code of conduct (reduce vulnerability, increase local capacity) the language of resilience allows a more holistic approach to a humanitarian situation by:

1. Recognising that resilience was already present in the first place; local communities are very resourceful, and it is they who respond in the first instance.
2. Ensuring that NGOs’ humanitarian responses are about further strengthening people’s resilience – (e.g. safer construction techniques, working through community-based organisations, using cash interventions to meet immediate needs but as much as possible building a foundation for strengthening resilience over the long term).
3. Challenging thinking to move from a linear, timeline approach (e.g. immediate relief, recovery, reconstruction, rehabilitation) to building resilience from the very start of the crisis. Although building resilience could be regarded as developmental, this should not threaten the need to deliver direct inputs if the situation requires it.

Formalising resilience thinking and the language of resilience would find accord with the NMFA’s increasing focus on resilience and preparedness (NORAD 2011:28). It would also help overcome some of the confusion around what humanitarian assistance means in practice for NPA, its partners, donors, members and other stakeholders, especially in protracted crises with repeated transitions from humanitarian assistance to long-term development.
2. VALUES AND POLICY ALIGNMENT

Key Recommendations

2.1 Make NPA values explicit for internal and external stakeholders. Clarify how NPA values inform policy and strategy, and how that in turn translates into operational success in NPA’s Humanitarian Assistance work.

2.2 Examine mechanisms for improving NPA’s speed of decision-making given different humanitarian crises scenarios, exploring values as well as structural issues that could inform decisions about:
- Perceived shortfalls in humanitarian assistance expertise and capacity
- Operationality
- Partner engagement, and
- Alliances.

It was clear to us that the NPA partners we met and NPA as a whole, share common values and beliefs that are given life through the work they undertake together. These values are a cornerstone of the trust and confidence that enable the partnerships we saw to flourish.

NPA values and beliefs, as expressed in policies and strategies, appear to translate into operational practice in times of crisis as well as during long-term development work. This speaks to partner assessment and selection discussed under Theme 1. One key value is that partnerships, properly developed and nurtured, are essential to achieving an effective local response in an emergency. NPA’s expectations about the value of relationships, the importance of dignity and respect at the local level, and conduct for partners who work alongside communities in crisis, were reflected in systems and processes in the country offices, interviewee responses, and in partner documentation.

Shared values about equality, dignity, mutual respect, the distinctive contributions that different actors can make, feedback, listening, attention to detail – all were reflected in the way local leaders and beneficiaries talked to us about their own needs and values. In particular, beneficiaries expressed gratitude that they kept their sense of self-respect and dignity when NPA and partners delivered aid, (food, non-food, or even electronic cards).

Beneficiaries told us specifically how they experienced NPA’s and partner’s values, and how they translated into operational practice to assess need and respond with relief. Three examples were:
- Distribution house-to-house, rather than through queueing or distribution lines,
- Using volunteers or partner staff to assess strengths as well as needs on a one-to-one or family basis, rather than in public,
- Working intelligently with local leaders so that where community needs must be collectively understood, it was done so using customary, well-accepted processes.

Such examples demonstrate:
  a. That accountability and transparency were built on NPA’s and partners’ profound understanding of the way people should be viewed in a crisis, and
  b. The operational processes which are necessary to ensure that a partnership approach to humanitarian assistance reflects NPA’s values in times of crisis.

It was mostly clear that NPA partners are involved in designing responses to humanitarian crises and contributing to overarching strategy (see for example the PARD Case Study in
Appendix 10). In Lebanon and Somalia, and in documentation and interviews relating to Myanmar and Sudan, it is evident that these things are done collaboratively, or even led by partners.

What was less clear is that all partners share a vision of what NPA is trying to achieve at a higher level, and how relief operations (as opposed to longer term humanitarian issues or development) link with notions of solidarity, democratization, and political and social rights. Partners working directly with rights (e.g. Palestinian refugees, women’s rights) seemed to make the links more easily than others, for whom some concepts are harder to translate across cultures, organisations and different community stakeholders.

It is worth noting that the values on which NPA’s humanitarian assistance work is based are also reflected elsewhere, for example in other parts of the organisation, NPA’s fundraising in Norwegian local and labour constituencies, other Norway-facing stakeholders, campaigning for government policy change, etc.

This congruence of values and the fact that beneficiaries can describe and relate to NPA’s values, gives coherence and integrity to the organisation that is very powerful. For the partners and beneficiaries we met, NPA was highly regarded not only for providing humanitarian assistance but for the values it holds while doing so. In their eyes, the integrity of NPA and its partners is demonstrated through action not only words. In purely operational terms, then, NPA’s values translate directly into a sense of authenticity and sincerity, giving the kind of deep trust and access that is required to operate in demanding humanitarian contexts.

Just as there is a strong alignment between NPA documented values and NPA partners’ practice on the ground, there is also strong vertical alignment between policy, strategy and practice within NPA, and between NPA and its major funding partner, the NMFA.

Echoes of the MFA’s Humanitarian Assistance Policy may be found throughout NPA’s documentation, including its international strategy and partnership policy (e.g. the search for political solutions to humanitarian crises, strengthening rights, commitments to solidarity, explicitly gendered perspectives, ‘do no harm’ principles, local participation). These policies and strategies are clearly embedded within NPA country goals, and can be identified in Humanitarian Assistance practice on the ground as implemented by NPA partners.

One area where NPA’s unique combination of values may be tested is in making decisions about when not to work through local partners in a crisis (see Recommendation 1.2 and Appendix 8). If the outcome from such decisions is to work through a UN agency, or a network / alliance partner, or even to become operational, then core values will need to be examined and aligned with others in order to achieve the greater good.

Decisions in this regard partly relate to another key value, commitment. This is not made explicit in NPA documentation but is clearly present in practice – a strong commitment to continue supporting trusted partners even in highly complex, often dangerous humanitarian situations. The fact that NPA ‘stays with it’ and does not pass complexity on to others (e.g. through transferring funding to another agency) is strong testament to the courage and skill of country directors and their teams. NPA does not seem to take humanitarian assistance and relief decisions out of convenience, but rather from decisions about impact and where the most value can be gained.

Interestingly, if the organisation’s values provide NPA’s International Programme with some of its greatest strengths and underpin its most powerful competencies, they may also contribute to a weakness in its humanitarian assistance programme, namely the potential for
slow decision-making that several informants in both countries noted. Some of those who noted this concern also expressed surprise since:

- NPA has several historical examples of rapid, accurate decision-making (notably from Lebanon, Myanmar and Somalia) and
- Other parts of the organisation (notably Humanitarian Disarmament, and Rescue Service and First Aid) continue to demonstrate rapid decision-making.

There are of course other internal and external drivers for slow decision-making in humanitarian assistance. Notable among these are:

- The prominence and nature of the Syrian crisis, where many agencies are uncertain and questioning themselves about ‘what is the right response,’
- The dependency on NMFA’s decision making since MFA is NPA’s major humanitarian assistance donor,
- Relevant and sufficient capacity at HQ and perhaps regionally, and
- A lack of an internal focal point for decision making in humanitarian assistance.

These concerns were raised by a number of people and we do not understand all the reasons why this was so. But, it did seem to us that values underpin to some extent decisions about:

- Crisis intervention
- Operationality (to be operational or not)
- The nature of NPA’s wider alliances and networks (who could we ally with or would we be willing to support), and
- The nature of partnership work, especially in areas where there are no clear local partners.

In fact, NPA’s speed of decision-making in some crisis contexts was such a concern among partners, country offices, staff at HQ and even external stakeholders, that it is something of a corporate and reputational risk that needs to be addressed soon. To the extent that values underpin decisions around operationality, partner engagement, alliances, and whether to have a humanitarian assistance focal point / expert, it would be useful to explore this urgently, say, before mid-July 2014. This could begin with a clarification of the language of ‘relief,’ ‘humanitarian assistance’ etc. outlined under Theme 1.
3. LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

**Key Recommendations**

2.1 A step change is needed in how NPA formalises learning and knowledge management in its Humanitarian Assistance work, and NPA’s work more broadly. This should begin with a thorough review of existing strengths and gaps in:
- How NPA captures knowledge and learning from experience,
- How this is reviewed and analysed, and
- How learning is shared and disseminated in ways that are relevant and accessible for a range of internal and external actors, from NPA / partner teams in other areas, to members, partners and donors within Norway.

2.2 There should be a step change in the development and rigorous use of qualitative and quantitative indicators not only for reporting purposes (see Theme 6; Programme and Project Management) but also for learning at a range of levels relating to impact and effectiveness.

2.3 Review possibilities for a specialist ‘home’ for learning and knowledge exchange / management – perhaps like a Learning Hub, to disseminate and share across the organisation and among external stakeholders, and help with scaling up.

2.4 Strengthen cross-partner learning through peer-review and other mechanisms during humanitarian crises.

2.5 Consider what scope exists for NPA to contribute to humanitarian assistance policy through research, case studies and working papers. This might serve as effective information for policy makers and add to NPA’s credibility as a serious humanitarian actor, while also highlighting NPA’s special experience and niche.

There is a significant amount of knowledge about humanitarian assistance in NPA, individual competencies are powerful, and highly experienced personnel clearly produce results. The success of NPA’s partnership and programmes have been partly built on this knowledge, skill and learning. One strong humanitarian assistance example was the creation of an emergency contingency plan for Lebanon using lessons learned by NPA partners from military conflict in 1996. This plan was actually implemented with life-saving results and measurable humanitarian successes in 2006 (Appendix 10). It is a powerful example of how to capture, store and access learning from humanitarian assistance that should be widely disseminated as an example of good practice.

It is not always so clear, though, how learning has taken place in humanitarian crises, and more generally within NPA. We also felt that valuable knowledge and learning is bound up with individual teams and personnel, not accessible to the organisation more generally.

Significant opportunities exist to formalise learning processes and strengthen knowledge management:
- Between communities – partners – country offices – HQ in each country,
- Among partners and country offices regionally and globally,
- Laterally, across departments within NPA, and
- Between NPA and key Norwegian partners and donors, notably NMFA and NORAD
There is strong evidence that NPA country offices involve partners in the process of learning and use feedback from communities. This is founded on NPA’s shared approach to the whole process of project management – developing strategy, designing programmes, monitoring and evaluation, and the emphasis on participation throughout. But there is perhaps an over-reliance on individual memory. Without effective handovers, there could be significant losses in this almost ‘intuitive’ approach if certain skilled individuals with significant experience left the organisation.

Without careful questioning it was sometimes difficult for us to unpack how learning was achieved and what systems are in place for formalising lessons (what works well, what needs to be improved).

An improved use of indicators, stronger reporting systems and strengthening of analyses used for programme design, monitoring and evaluation all would strengthen NPA’s capacity for sharing learning and managing knowledge in humanitarian assistance. In particular, indicators should be clear, consistent and relevant for learning purposes as well as reporting purposes, addressing impact and outcomes, rather than inputs and intentions. These things are covered in more detail under Theme 6.

NPA’s partners are encouraged to develop cross-partner learning, for example through shared training and collaborative responses to conflict or developmental work. This could be extended explicitly into humanitarian assistance through resilience approaches, as partners develop their humanitarian assistance plans and ensure that these are grounded in community preferences. Peer review could be more encouraged and an expectation set among partners that evaluation should take place from day one, while the crisis unfolds, with NPA being part of that rapid sharing of learning.

Different local NPA partners would be involved in those reviews, visiting one another as part of shared learning and ownership, with a practitioner from one partner being part of an evaluation team, spending time with other partners. Key learning could be formalised as partners share each other’s work, bringing challenge and insight from their context and gaining from witnessing others’ responses actually during the crisis.

Facilitating the cross-partner sharing of learning would also contribute to strengthening relationships, transparency and trust as they see each other’s work. The learning would be horizontal at first, enabling cross-fertilisation of ideas locally. But local case studies and experiences could be passed to Oslo head office for review amongst technical specialists. Once information had been analysed and reviewed through corporate processes, it could then be passed across to other country programmes that may have similar issues requiring a response.

If the quality of sharing among partners is as good elsewhere as we generally saw in Somalia and Lebanon, then capturing learning more effectively would be relatively straightforward. A key challenge is how to create a system that enables the sharing of learning after it has been captured, so that it is transferable and accessible across cultures and contexts, and people can make sense of learning from another area. This system may be something like a Learning Hub, perhaps Oslo-based, and would assist with scaling-up approaches and operations that work locally across other contexts that might initially appear unalike.

Cross-country learning has been facilitated through programme manager and country coordinator meetings. Dissappointingly, no one we spoke to could quickly identify the key learning that emerged from these events, or locate reports or summaries of outcomes from them that captured key learning. Annual or regular events to share learning and experiences
are an important vehicle for exchange and development. Future events could perhaps ensure that learning is more systematic, and is brought into one place for sharing and future reference. Similarly, online sharing portals, video conferences, facilitated workshops to explore responses to crises within programme disciplines/areas all might be useful to consider as means for promoting exchange and collaborative learning for humanitarian assistance.

There may be scope for NPA to contribute to change and humanitarian assistance policy through research, case studies and working papers. Time is a pressure for everyone. But if one or two key themes were chosen each year that are special to NPA, this might serve as effective information for policy makers and add to NPA’s credibility as a serious humanitarian actor, while also highlighting NPA’s special experience and niche. One example could be “Long-term humanitarian engagement in protracted crises.”

4. NPA’s NICHE

Key Recommendation

4.1 Agree what makes NPA’s humanitarian assistance work (or international work in general) most distinctive, and ensure that that ‘Core Area’ or ‘Niche’ can be clearly and easily communicated to NPA stakeholders. Ensure that this is strongly branded, coherent, and visually attractive.

The evaluation team heard a range of views about NPA’s core areas of competence and what makes NPA distinctive generally and in humanitarian assistance work. Indeed, NPA demonstrates a striking breadth and depth of competencies in its humanitarian assistance and international work.

The difficulties that many of our informants had in agreeing ‘what humanitarian assistance means’ in NPA terms have already been discussed. It simply cannot be taken for granted that everyone understands the term in the same way. However, taking both relief and humanitarian assistance as broadly understood, we found that the political aspects of NPA’s approach with local partners typically addressed certain key structural issues that may form part of a distinctive niche in humanitarian assistance that resonates with NPA’s political goals.

- **Working explicitly and intelligently with ‘authorities’ at different levels**, strengthening local capacities when state systems are weak or absent (e.g. boreholes in Somalia), explicitly tackling systems that are felt to be unjust (e.g. the confessional system in Lebanon), and moving to support state systems when they are trying to reform (e.g. Myanmar, post-Nargis). Several of the NPA partners we met described how they relate and respond to customary processes and influence their development. This is a particular strength of some local partners that has direct bearing on relief and humanitarian assistance outcomes.

- **Addressing women’s rights and representation**, NPA’s partners are able to describe the importance of how women and men experience and respond differently to conflict and natural calamity; why relief and humanitarian assistance needs are gendered; what activities they do that reflect this; and how this translates into post-crisis development work.
- Addressing the needs of young people especially with regard to education and their ability to engage with and improve their communities. Partners working in this area spoke passionately about how empowering young people and giving them a voice in the community enabled them to be more effective actors in crisis situations.

These are the examples that stood out for us. However, finding a simple, clear description of how a niche in humanitarian assistance fits into ‘the larger NPA’ is not easy. NPA’s own website doesn’t help us much. The Home Page has ‘Democratisation,’ ‘Emergency relief’ and ‘Fair distribution’ under ‘Development.’ But a click on:

- ‘Democratisation’ leads to ‘Democratisation and just distribution;’
- ‘Emergency relief’ leads to ‘Emergency Relief Aid’ but starts with the sentence “Norwegian People’s Aid is not an emergency relief organisation …”,
- ‘Fair distribution’ leads us to a page titled ‘Lobbying.’

While many of these words appear throughout NPA’s strategies, the links between them need to be more coherent and better connected to a niche or core area that can be easily explained.

Not unexpectedly, some NPA partners and beneficiaries hold a clearer but narrower view of NPA’s core areas. For some it is women and youth. Others see NPA as primarily focussed on water and reducing vulnerability to drought. In Palestinian camps, vocational training, gender and disabilities are regarded as NPA specialities, while for others certain absences were relevant: “NPA doesn’t work in the health sector anymore;” “NPA has no operationality in humanitarian assistance.” Some stakeholders with a more outside view of NPA regard political empowerment, conflict transformation and humanitarian disarmament as core.

This range of impressions is interesting. Those who know NPA and its country programmes may regard it as a strength (e.g. NMFA, NORAD, Norwegian partners, some other INGOs). But in a competitive donor environment, where diversifying income streams is a corporate goal, NPA’s humanitarian assistance work may suffer from being seen as all things to all people: “We understand your vision, but what do you actually do…?” This may also apply to other international work. It would be useful to consider therefore, developing a niche or ‘core area’ that clearly captures NPA’s humanitarian assistance and development goals.

It is not for the evaluation team to say what this niche or core area might be. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that ‘solidarity’ would provide one key link with NPA’s humanitarian assistance Alliance partner (SOLIDAR). Additionally, women and youth are existing niche areas that have a powerful voice. They speak clearly to NPA’s funding partners’ policies, Norwegian international policy, and NPA principles and focus.

Refining NPA’s niche in humanitarian assistance does not mean reducing breadth. One way of looking at this niche would be to consider a core idea at the centre of a wheel, with spokes leading from that idea (like a spider diagram). In such a model, Oxfam might put Reducing Poverty and Save the Children might put Children and Families. But both organisations would deliver emergency assistance from this core idea, along with programmes on health, education, sanitation, vocational training – even agriculture or forestry. But the simple idea at the centre becomes the niche that everyone can understand. Whatever is at the centre for NPA, the spokes of the wheel still can capture the things that NPA actually does; Gender, Youth, Disabilities etc. (Note: Resilience and Partnerships are part of the conceptual and operational framework but the centre of the wheel should be clear and simpler to explain).

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) uses a different visualisation but the result is similar (NCA Global Report 2012:11). For NCA, Emergency Response, Long-term Development and Advocacy are at the centre of the wheel, with five themes described from that ‘core.’
An alternative conceptual approach, more like a narrative form of Results Based Management or Logical Frameworks, exists within NPA now. NPA’s Humanitarian Disarmament department faced a dilemma when answering questions about the complexity of what they do. They have addressed this wonderfully, through clear, objectives-focussed language and engaging, visually congruent imagery in the 2014 Humanitarian Disarmament Strategy. This is a high quality, clear document. It makes the issues clear (six threats) and describes “… this is what we do, why we do it, and how we do it ” – (One long-term objective, Three intermediate objectives, Three Pillars, 18 Outputs, our working methods and how we evaluate impact).

This externally facing tool serves also as an internal marketing tool. A similar document could perhaps be designed for International Development, in which humanitarian assistance (reframed as part of resilience building) would sit comfortably across both departments in NPA.

Whichever approach was taken, it would be essential to ensure that it was coherent, congruent with corporate branding, and visually attractive.

5. NETWORKS AND ALLIANCES

Key Recommendations

5.1 Is SOLIDAR NPA’s only alliance for humanitarian assistance? Clarify the ways in which SOLIDAR can or cannot support NPA in its humanitarian assistance and relief goals. If it cannot, develop strong alternative alliance partners for relief / humanitarian assistance work. Formally review other networks and alliances in terms of values, goals, shared strategies, and how these translate into effective humanitarian assistance on the ground.

5.2 Clarify and emphasise the purpose and value of the SOLIDAR alliance (and any others) in the next International Strategy, in general terms and in terms of humanitarian assistance and relief, if it has that role. In other documents (e.g. country strategies; Norway-facing marketing materials) emphasise agreed NPA/alliance shared strategies, and specifically how these reflect NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief goals operationally (e.g. building on local people’s strengths, building resilience, avoiding long-term dependency, developing first responders’ humanitarian response and development capacity, strengthening the influencing hand of local partners).

5.3 Formalise decision rules about when and how to work with an alliance model in humanitarian contexts.

During Oslo interviews, some NPA staff spoke of NPA’s membership of the SOLIDAR alliance. The evaluation team was also introduced to a project in Lebanon run in collaboration with SOLIDAR Suisse, a SOLIDAR partner. In addition, NPA is well networked in the NGO community especially in Norway / Scandinavia; many staff in Norwegian agencies (and beyond) are deeply familiar with each other’s work over many years.
In our formative evaluation, the team felt that these alliances and networks, though strong and rich with potential, were rather weakly referred to, e.g. on the NPA website and in documents. It appears that SOLIDAR is the only alliance of which NPA is a member, and that this may not be the best alliance for humanitarian assistance. If that is the case, then there is an urgent need to identify alternative alliances within which NPA could comfortably accommodate its humanitarian assistance and relief efforts.

Interestingly, NPA’s participation within SOLIDAR is also weakly referenced on SOLIDAR’s various websites. NPA’s humanitarian assistance collaboration with SOLIDAR Suisse is mentioned on their website (despite misspelling ‘Norwegian’). But we could find no reciprocal mention (at least in English) of NPA’s partnership with them on the NPA website, no mention that the NPA secretary general is on the SOLIDAR board, or any real detail on the nature of the SOLIDAR alliance and its significance in NPA’s humanitarian assistance work.

This is worth noting for three reasons:

1. NPA has worked successfully in humanitarian assistance with an Alliance partner (SOLIDAR Suisse) on at least two recent programmes in Lebanon; providing winterisation equipment for almost 1,200 Syrian refugee families, and a pilot electronic card programme that NPA Lebanon arranged for us to review (see Appendix 4).

2. The possibility of working with alliances forms a key part of NPA’s strategic decision making about operational modalities and partnership in humanitarian assistance. Several interviewees said that if a humanitarian crisis emerged where NPA had no long-term partners, a next step might be to contact alliance members and confirm who has commitment to that region with long-term relationships with local partners.

3. In many donor environments, consortia are being actively encouraged. For DfID it is almost a pre-requisite for rapid response funding. Some kind of alliance arrangement is consistent with that.

To a large extent the same logic of partnership working, trust and pre-established relationships would seem to apply to NPA’s decision making about whether (and how) to use the alliance model in a humanitarian crisis. But it was not clear to us what decision rules exist and what are the full humanitarian assistance criteria that inform the NPA’s decisions to be a part of SOLIDAR in general, or in specific humanitarian contexts.

In the formative evaluation we didn’t have the opportunity to examine any agreed strategies, (e.g. issuing grants, report writing, project management approaches, sharing common standards of practice, commitments to quality, impartiality) within the alliance. We also could not find in our documentation any operational criteria that clarify what NPA expects from, or would contribute to, any alliance approach to humanitarian assistance, for example with the critical issue of pre-positioning, or rapid deployment of items, teams, stand-by groups and so forth.

The International Strategy, for example, does mention that “NPA will be an alliance partner” for three areas of work (p6) but it is not clear what that actually means. Under “Response to Crisis” (p10) the mention of SOLIDAR is limited to “…NPA can also fundraise on behalf of a Solidar partner.” But NPA could bring so much more to the SOLIDAR table than just fundraising, if that alliance was relevant for NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief work.

In sum, NPA’s membership of the SOLIDAR alliance is unclear in humanitarian assistance terms, undersold in general terms, and not clearly described in terms of the value that particular alliance and NPA can achieve in humanitarian crises. It would certainly be worth amplifying the purpose and value of this relationship in the next International Strategy. Other documents (e.g. country strategies) could emphasise agreed NPA/alliance shared strategies, and how these reflect NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief goals.
operationally (e.g. building resilience, developing first responders’ response and development capacity, strengthening the political and influencing hand of local partners).

It would also be useful to formalise internally what decision rules exist about when and how to work with an alliance model (SOLIDAR or otherwise) and negotiate with alliance partners and the SOLIDAR board how to profile more powerfully NPA’s humanitarian assistance role within SOLIDAR beyond the fundraising aspect.

It is important that NPA explores other potential alliances and preferred network partners (including relevant UN bodies) and review systematically how NPA is connected with wider networks and alliances for humanitarian assistance and relief. This would help to support NPA’s internal decision-making about whether to regain, retain or remove operationality from NPA directly, enabling either (a) local partners to be operational where they exist or (b) working solely through the operationality of alliances or networks where NPA local partners are not present.
Key Recommendations

6.1 Introduce a single, standardised, locally flexible programme and project management system that can clearly describe programme/project objectives, outcomes activities, risks, and indicators of efficiency and effectiveness that significantly strengthen NPA’s capacity for effective monitoring, evaluation and lesson learning. This could, for example, be based on the 2010 NPA document ‘Observing Change.’

6.2 Ensure that risk analysis is much more robust, is routinely used in project design and management, is accompanied by specific mitigation and management measures in project design and throughout implementation, and is routinely used to inform lesson learning.

6.3 Ensure that relevant conflict analysis tools are known and used/adapted by all country teams and partners during project design and throughout monitoring. Ensure that they are culturally sensitive, gender sensitive, relevant for young people, and cover structural conflicts, process-related issues (e.g. customary vs. statute law), and latent conflicts as well as any conflicts of interest.

6.4 Consider formalising the need for gender and environment analyses as a mainstreamed part of humanitarian assistance project design, with robust gender-related and environment-related indicators forming part of all the International Department’s project management.

6.5 Develop a corporately branded toolkit of relevant, simple, accessible and engaging tools for analysis that can be used by everyone throughout the organisation.

6.6 Develop a simple and useable partnership assessment tool based on the partnership criteria outlined in NPA’s Partnership Strategy.

The performance evaluation showed that NPA country programmes deliver successful, relevant humanitarian assistance and relief through local partners who are demonstrably effective even though they have different capacities and levels of experience. In the examples we were able to examine, the contextual evaluation showed that:

a. They do this in operational circumstances that are among the most challenging in the world,

b. Some partners have a good record of transitioning from long-term development to humanitarian assistance in an emergency (e.g. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar; military conflict in Lebanon, drought in Somalia; various emergencies in South Sudan), and

c. NPA humanitarian assistance methodologies and activities contribute directly to delivering NPA’s strategies and goals – partners grow and strengthen; partner influence and political engagement is enhanced; women, youth and local people in general are empowered.

Clearly, the programme and project management systems in place are robust enough to ensure these outcomes. However, we found varying quality in proposals, reports, and analyses across the organisation; at HQ and in all the country programmes whose documents we had a chance to read, not just Somalia and Lebanon. Indeed, some of the
systems and documentation in place in partner organisations are stronger than those of NPA. Ironically NPA had organised or delivered the project management training that enabled partners to strengthen their proposals, management systems and reporting. This training had been understood and fully integrated into daily business by some partners who explained to us why they found essential the project design, risk assessment and emergency plans, monitoring and reporting tools / documentation that they used – and which NPA had trained them in.

The evaluation team feels that NPA programme and project management documents, proposals, reporting documents and analytical documents are weak by international standards, across the organisation. There is great variation in the quality and depth of these documents. A number of external informants reported similar views. Some used quite strong language to suggest that improvement was necessary. Issues include:

- **Unclear, or weak project design** in a variety of ways, e.g. through confusing use of the terms ‘Aim,’ ‘Objective’ and ‘Outcome.’ These are presented as different in some proposals but in fact an objective and an outcome sometimes contained the same language just slightly reworded, or even used the same sentence to describe both.

- **No measures, or weak measures of impact** in proposals and reports, for example no measure of the outcomes from training (as opposed to the amount of training delivered) or the change that could be specifically attributed to a particular initiative.

- **Using only basic indicators** for monitoring, but with no specific measure of quality, quantity or time, and no clear distinction between indicators of progress (efficiency) and indicators assessing change or impact (effectiveness).

- **Risk assessments not done or poorly done**, or risk management strategies not addressing specifically what will be done to mitigate risk and who will do it. In some cases, meaning may be clear to the proposal’s author(s) but an outside reader has to make assumptions in order for the mitigation measure to make sense.

- **An almost complete absence of conflict analyses** despite this being specifically stated as a requirement by NPA when working on conflict areas (but when is NPA not working in areas where there is or could be conflict?). It isn’t so much that conflicts and the potential for conflict are not analysed and understood. It is more that there seems to be an over-reliance on memory and individual experience, with highly competent, experienced people anticipating well, preparing well, and solving issues as they come up. Conflict analyses are not structured or recorded, and therefore not generally known or knowable.

- **Weak or absent analyses** (beyond risk and conflict analyses) in proposals and project design. For example we saw no structured gender, environment or technical analyses in several proposals that had successfully requested significant sums from NMFA, and some that are seeking funding now.

- **Lack of measurement of key guiding principles** of NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief. It is not clear, for example, how NPA or NPA partners actually know that they ‘Do No Harm’ in humanitarian assistance work (see Recommendation 1.3).

We also feel that the NMFA, or at least their Humanitarian Section, is a comfortable funding partner for NPA because they do not request more robust proposals or reports. The NMFA’s own project templates are in need of revision and at present are insufficiently robust to capture the kind of measurement, risk analysis and conflict analysis that are standard across other international development departments and agencies. Even NPA local partners state that NPA/NMFA do not ask for so much detail, but that they appreciate the rigour that other agencies request. They openly say that if NPA or NMFA do not ask for more detail, analytical rigour, or measures of impact and reporting, then they don’t provide more.

While some changes are thus necessary, they are not overly difficult, expensive or time consuming to introduce. It is also crucial to adopt them without becoming mechanistic or
threatening NPA’s distinctive, enabling culture and ways of working. Because local partners do some of these things already, we believe that the changes we recommend are entirely achievable without disabling the strengths and effectiveness that NPA’s culture and approach brings.

Specifically we feel that four changes are urgent and necessary across NPA’s International Department (maybe wider), not just in humanitarian assistance. Although urgent, the changes would bring significant benefits to NPA as a whole, are relatively straightforward to achieve, and can fairly quickly be agreed and implemented. They are necessary in order to:

a. Meet international (and increasingly, Norwegian) expectations and donor requirements for robust project/programme design and management tools
b. Achieve success with proposals and tenders in efforts to diversify income streams and NPA’s donor network
c. Harmonise and strengthen design and reporting mechanisms between and among NPA offices local partners
d. Improve analytical power, the ability to learn and share lessons, and the capacity to act on lessons learned
e. Assess, explain, reduce and manage risks as fully as possible
f. Ensure that practice on the ground actually reflects existing NPA documentation (NPA does what it says it will do) e.g. in conflict analysis, risk assessment, and partner assessment processes
g. Improve the credibility and capacity of NPA to influence change and provide policy-relevant information locally (in-country), in Norway, and across the international development community
h. Provide a lead for the changes that are also needed within NMFA
i. Enhance NPA’s reputation as a powerful, relevant and fully professional partner

These four changes are:

1. Introduce a standard, locally flexible **Programme and Project Management system** that can clearly describe programme/project objectives, outcomes activities, risks, and indicators of efficiency and effectiveness that yield considerably more monitoring, evaluation and lesson-learning power than many of those now used.

   This would need to be an internationally recognisable and internally acceptable tool along the lines of Results Based Management or Logical Frameworks. Interestingly, several NPA partners use and value a logical framework approach – having been trained in their use by NPA! Ensure that relevant and engaging tools are in place to accompany this system and can be used locally as well as for corporate purposes, external audit or NPA technical evaluation (e.g. risk register, monitoring log, stakeholder engagement plan, lesson-learning records, Issues logs, and records of unexpected concerns or added value). It could, for example, be based on NPA’s 2010 publication, ‘Observing Change,’ a document to which several people referred but that we did not see in use.

2. Ensure that **risk analysis** is much more robust, is routinely used in project design and management, is accompanied by specific mitigation and management measures in project design and throughout implementation, and is used to inform lesson learning. The need for risk analyses in certain contexts is urgent and was specifically requested by two senior diplomats.

3. Ensure that **conflict analysis** is understood, that relevant conflict analysis tools are known and used/adapted by all country teams and partners during project design and throughout monitoring. Ensure that this is culturally sensitive, gender sensitive,
relevant for young people, and covers structural conflicts, process-related issues (e.g. customary vs. statute law), and latent conflicts as well as conflicts of interest.

Restructuring water provision in contested areas of Sool and Sanaag provides a clear example of where conflict analysis would support the outstanding practice that is already going on. A wide variety of water-related conflicts have been well documented worldwide. Interventions to provide water have the ability to solve problems, but also the ability to create problems. NPA is well placed to ensure that people think about this in advance, formalise the way in which local humanitarian assistance partners reach into customary law and local problem solving, and link local partnerships with an ever-changing political landscape and a complex mosaic of authorities (see Appendix 13).

What is being achieved there is incredible and a testament to people’s courage as well as their analytical, social, political and technical skills. But it is risky. Conflict analysis would:
- Reduce risk
- Add potential solutions for beneficiaries and authorities locally
- Support local partners with delivery, risk management and adding value
- Make clear to donors that things don’t just happen, they are based on profound understanding that can be described and shared
- Add rigour in ways that fully respects local culture while integrating across potentially different legal jurisdictions
- Help partners, local people and other stakeholders identify the different ways in which they might address concerns and solve problems, while appreciating the ways in which they already do these things.

4. Develop a simple and useable partnership assessment tool based on the criteria outlined in NPA’s Partnership Strategy.
7. NPA’S CRISIS WORK, PREDICTABILITY AND MULTI-YEAR AGREEMENTS

Key Recommendations

7.1 Decouple the phrase ‘humanitarian assistance’ from the word ‘relief.’ Since the term ‘humanitarian’ has currency, it would help to separate that word conceptually and operationally from the word ‘relief.’ For example “NPA provides relief in emergencies and is a humanitarian actor in protracted crises and long-term development.”

7.2 Reframe ‘assistance’ and ‘relief’ within the language and conceptual framework of resilience thinking, as discussed in Theme 1.

7.3 Consider longer funding-cycles in line with a resilience approach to humanitarian assistance, to support planning and to improve predictability.

The nature of the humanitarian crises with which NPA works was a significant part of our discussions about “what is humanitarian assistance and relief.” NPA’s long-term work in South Sudan, for example, contributed greatly to political change and independence. Long-term commitment to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have not only supported people in emergencies, the work has essentially been one long humanitarian mission with people who have been refugees for decades. Cycles of drought and conflict in Somalia have also meant that humanitarian assistance has been needed for decades.

For all three places it was difficult for our informants to clearly distinguish humanitarian assistance and relief on the one hand, and long-term development on the other. The two blend into one, or are done in parallel. NPA has become something of an expert in protracted crises, demonstrating long-term commitment, and in the views of many local partners and beneficiaries is – like a family member, or a friend – always there, always reliable. Even if they are not providing funds, many people felt that NPA was personal to them, not just an agency that comes and goes. This ongoing presence and commitment is a key aspect of NPA’s success with partnership work and humanitarian assistance.

For donors and the public, in contrast, NPA’s long-term work is part of a different narrative – “Again? Will it ever end?” Many informants, including external stakeholders, Norwegian volunteers and NPA’s local partners, spoke of donor fatigue and what to do when crises just don’t seem to go away. Is it worth funding NPA for long-term work? Is NPA able to bring change, or do anything useful with this money beyond rescue and relief?

Three responses to this dilemma may help.

1. The first and easiest is to decouple the phrase ‘humanitarian assistance’ from the word ‘relief.’ Since the term ‘humanitarian’ has significant currency within and beyond NPA, it would help to separate that word conceptually and operationally from the word ‘relief.’ An example would be “NPA provides relief in emergencies and is a humanitarian actor in protracted crises and long-term development.”

We feel that this is more than a linguistic nicety and more accurately reflects what NPA does, reduces confusion between two different things, and helps people understand the true meaning and operational implications of each word. Relief is the crisis response word; assistance is the longer-term word. Both can be humanitarian.
2. A second response also addresses language but goes much further, a reframing of ‘assistance’ and ‘relief’ within the language and conceptual framework of resilience thinking. This has already been discussed (Theme 1) and is also discussed in Marketing, Communication and Fund Raising Capacity (Theme 9).

3. A third response is to consider longer funding-cycles in line with a resilience approach to humanitarian assistance, to support planning and to improve predictability. Many agencies work on a one-year funding cycle for humanitarian assistance. Some even use six-month cycles. For some of the work that NPA does, however, a one-year funding cycle is not helpful in enabling local partners and country offices plan and manage long-term humanitarian issues in resilience terms.

There is considerable interest in multi-year framework agreements in terms of the predictability and professionalisation that they enable. Between 2009 and 2011 NPA’s Humanitarian Disarmament department benefitted from the largest NMFA multi-year agreement (Mid-term review of Norway’s Humanitarian Policy, NORAD: 2011:12). But it is not clear that a multi-year agreement will appear from MFA any time soon, and NPA in any case perhaps has an over-reliance on MFA funding with little alternative currently on offer.

Successful diversification of funders would help broaden the dialogue and perhaps secure the longer-term funding that many informants said was key for their ability to deliver humanitarian assistance and other work successfully. But achieving that diversification will partly depend on professionalising NPA’s humanitarian assistance offer, through some of the changes outlined in this evaluation report.

8. LEADERSHIP, SUPERVISION AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES

Key Recommendations

8.1 Consider having a head office (and possibly regional) leader(s) for humanitarian assistance.

8.2 Review the pros and cons of NPA’s decentralised approach vis-à-vis humanitarian assistance, and perhaps more broadly.

It is not clear who ‘owns’ humanitarian assistance at head office and it could be useful to consider having a head office (and possibly regional) leader(s) to help develop humanitarian assistance strategy. Clearer humanitarian assistance leadership might also help address the gap between the Humanitarian Disarmament Department and International Department that is felt at different levels in NPA and even by some external stakeholders who raised questions about direction, accountability and corporate identity.

Clearer leadership in humanitarian assistance would perhaps enable opportunities for staff development that some people felt were lacking and unclear at present. An organisation-wide skills audit might be a useful next step in order to identify and consolidate NPA’s strengths in humanitarian assistance, and also identify training and professional development needs.
For example, cash based programming is now much more the norm for short-term assistance. This brings significant advantages but also disadvantages as NPA Lebanon and others working cross-border are experiencing. Testing e-card approaches is another recent development that is enabling useful questions about choice and market stability, rather than a traditional food and non-food item distribution approach. Such innovations require strong leadership and wide discussion.

One or two other issues concerning support also were raised, with a certain distance between head office, country offices and the field being described. While this is a common concern for many (maybe all) organisations with head offices and dispersed country and local teams, it would be worth investigating the positive aspects of this ‘distance’ (freedom, autonomy, local decision-making, trust, ...) and aspects that negatively affect performance or team working (the nature of support or lack thereof, accountability, identification of professional development needs, guidance, mentoring, ...).

The nature of NPA’s decentralised approach has significant strengths that other organisations do not have. Local partners refer, for example, to the trust and confidence they have in their country offices, while country offices feel that they are treated differently and with more trust than other agencies, in which country decisions are more often referred to head office for scrutiny and approval. That said, there is also a feeling of distance when close support and backing are needed. Perhaps some reflection and clarification about the pros and cons of NPA’s decentralised approach vis-à-vis humanitarian assistance (maybe more broadly) might help. An action plan that could follow this would clarify and consolidate these strengths, not simply address shortcomings.

9. MARKETING, COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH

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**Key Recommendation**

9.1 *Invest in strategic internal and external marketing, communications and outreach strategy specifically for humanitarian assistance that explains clearly what NPA’s humanitarian assistance is actually achieving, and why it is so special.*

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There are powerful drivers for NPA to continue doing humanitarian assistance, and to offer emergency relief in a crisis. As a membership organisation, with strong engagement from the labour movement and significant goodwill among the Norwegian public, NPA’s stakeholders want to see an NPA response when they hear about people suffering. They want to know “where is my NPA at this time.” It is almost like NPA represents a proxy for what they would like to do themselves.

Yet there is something of a distance, even a ‘disconnect’ between what NPA actually achieves in its humanitarian assistance work, and what some NPA stakeholders believe it achieves. At its simplest, this might be viewed as a marketing exercise where NPA takes the opportunity to creatively inform NPA fundraisers, volunteers, ministry colleagues and labour organisations, what it does in humanitarian assistance and how NPA takes decisions about the way it will respond in different crises.
Still, the education and communication needs regarding humanitarian assistance are actually more complex, as well as more urgent, than at first we thought in this evaluation. Most of the external people we met and many of the documents we read, regard humanitarian disarmament as NPA’s major contribution to humanitarian assistance. “Mines” was the frequently used shorthand. The people behind this complex and courageous work deserve huge credit for all that they do and the corporate contribution they make. But in terms of marketing and publicity, theirs is an easier task than other aspects of humanitarian assistance; “A mine cleared is a life saved;” a theoretically finite number of mines and a theoretical end to clearing a school or hospital from ordnance; internationally recognised contributions to cluster and other munitions conventions; clear, positive stories about raw courage and skill in the field. And, as one informant noted, “cute, clever dogs that like having their pictures taken.”

Humanitarian disarmament is tough, honourable and essential work. Its work in NPA is clearly explained, reaching into human emotions and fully engaging a world that wants peace and recovery.

A challenge for other aspects of humanitarian assistance is to achieve the kind of clarity and profile that humanitarian disarmament can more easily gain. Indeed, there are many lessons to be learned from the ways in which that division presents itself, and the sincerity, simplicity and skill behind its writing and strategic profile.

It became clear over the evaluation that the achievements from NPA’s humanitarian assistance work are significantly under-publicised and not sufficiently well understood by many stakeholders. Even those who actually deliver the work seem to take it almost for granted. Yet much of what is being achieved is astonishing. In Lebanese refugee contexts and across the Syrian border people are sometimes at great risk. Simply maintaining an active presence in parts of Somalia is hugely valued by partners and beneficiaries. But it is dangerous and requires great courage as well as skill. These are among the most complex and demanding conditions in the world. It is a story about heroes. No one else is doing this. It needs to be publicised and it surely could be, without losing the humility and gentleness that are part of NPA culture.

NPA’s humanitarian assistance stories are compelling. But presenting that story to donors and the Norwegian public is not just about addressing donor fatigue or securing market presence, although these are important. It relates deeply to political change within Norway, Europe and globally, and people’s needs for clear explanations about how humanitarian action must respond to global changes, where crises are getting more frequent, more complex and more far reaching. New opportunities and concerns are emerging in Norway as a result of increased refugee populations and Norway’s generosity. These and many other issues become part of an inter-related narrative with humanitarian assistance in the mix. All of this speaks profoundly to the underlying values and mission of Norwegian People’s Aid.

And if the evaluators were to allow themselves a little indulgence, and write a sincere reflection of NPA’s humanitarian assistance in marketing and outreach terms more than in the language of evaluation, they might write something like this.

NPA works with humanitarian crises across the world. Our local partners face cycles of desperate need and long-term conflict. It is not easy to keep going in a long-term crisis. Many agencies don’t. We do. We provide relief when needed. And we stay with people over the long haul. We strengthen their hand, support their efforts to change conditions that trap them, help them build resilience, reduce vulnerability and gain independence. We empower girls and boys, men and women to overcome the odds and build successful lives. It takes time. But it works. And working with our local partners, we take that time, and we make it work.
Appendix 1. Terms of Reference

1. Background
   This ToR outlines specifications for an evaluation of NPA’s approach in humanitarian assistance and relief based on cooperation with local partners.

   NPA aims to uphold a capacity to respond to crisis situations, and will always do so in cooperation with local partners. While the main focus of NPA over the last decade has been long-term cooperation, humanitarian assistance constitutes approximately 14% of NPAs total international turnover. NPA’s involvement in humanitarian assistance and relief has had less focus than our long-term cooperation, and is in need of a process of more systematic organizational learning based on existing experience.

   We wish that this evaluation shall contribute to such organizational learning and to systematizing the NPA experience in humanitarian assistance.

2. NPA strategies for Humanitarian assistance
   The below listed strategies should frame the evaluation:
   - NPA will primarily respond to an emergency in countries where we have relevant partners. In most cases, local response is more rapid, flexible, and able to ascertain what the urgent needs of affected populations are.
   - NPA will primarily support local response, with an objective to build local civil society’s capacity for emergency response.
   - NPA will advocate for local participation, in planning, coordination, implementation and evaluation of the response. Any humanitarian response should involve both men and women, and take into account their differentiated needs.
   - When choosing partners for any emergency response, we will focus on partners who have the potential to become actors who can influence change also after the emergency phase.
   - NPA will lobby donors to fund local partners in emergency responses.

   In our humanitarian response the Do No Harm principle and the IASC (Inter- Agency Standing Committee) Handbook on Gender Equality will provide the basis for our response. In situations of conflict, the response should be based on a conflict analysis. NPA will participate in relevant coordination mechanisms related to the response.

3. Evaluation Purpose
   - The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of NPA and partners to provide HA and relief.
   - The evaluation will distinguish between the results and changes which can be directly attributed to the program, and those to which it can be seen to have contributed
   - The evaluation will also assess the methodologies applied in the cooperation between NPA and partners to strengthen the internal capacities of partner organisations in these countries
   - The evaluation is to look at lessons learned from the working methods used, in order to inform future development of NPA methodology for humanitarian assistance in partnership with local organisations. The lessons learned should in particular focus on ways to improve the abilities of NPA and partners to influence on political processes.
   - Another purpose is to bring together documentation of the various activities/ methods/ means of doing humanitarian assistance in the countries to be evaluated.

   The evaluation should include frank recommendations, and will provide input for in house learning and development of the NPA approach in humanitarian assistance and relief. The ToR will be discussed and adjusted as soon as the team leader has been appointed.

4. Evaluation scope and key questions:
   The areas of results to be explored are the project outcomes at immediate level (progress) towards achieving results. The evaluation should describe the main activities that have been carried out. It should analyse and assess, but not necessarily be restricted to, the following:

4.1 Effectiveness
   4.1.1 How effective is NPA in providing HA and relief in cooperation with local partners
   4.1.2 To what extent and how is NPA able to contribute to strengthening local partner org’s capacity to deliver in humanitarian crisis?
   4.1.3 To what extent are the different aspects of the NPA methodology adapted to the country specific setting?
   4.1.4 What are the strengths and weakness in working with local partners in HA and relief in the different countries to be visited?
   4.1.5 What activities/ methods have been agreed and what are the strengths and weaknesses in NPA’s support to improve partner’s internal capacities?
4.2 Relevance
4.2.1 Is NPA with its partners providing assistance that is relevant to the people in need?
4.2.2 Are criteria for prioritization well substantiated?

4.3 Sustainability
4.3.1 Is NPA able to select partners who also have the potential to influence change in society after the emergency phase?

4.4 Impact/long term results
4.4.1 What intended and unintended affects can be attributed to the programme?

Other Questions
- What are the main activities/methods carried out by partner?
- What are the main strengths and weaknesses with regards to performance and results achieved?
- Added value: to what extent has NPA contributed to the development of the activities/methods (political dialogue, networking, funding, etc)? What are the main strengths and weaknesses of this support?
- To what extent does the work methods and approach used in the intervention reflect NPA’s international strategy and policies?
- How is the M&E function, including documentation, organised?

4. Methodology
The evaluation will start with a desk study of relevant plans, reports and evaluations. The document review will include NPA policies, proposals, applications and reports to donors, reports from partners, and project evaluations.

The evaluation will also include field studies to the selected countries (Somalia and Lebanon) and a review of relevant program documents, field visits and interviews with NPA staff, partners and their constituencies/authorities in selected countries, interviews with staff at NPA HO, and possibly representatives from donors. The evaluation team will also receive supporting information from South Sudan, Myanmar and Iraq/Syria.

The evaluation will not necessarily include all partners in the particular country programmes. A selection of partners and processes will be made to ensure time for in-depth analysis. The evaluation should have a strong learning aspect and should therefore apply participatory methods that will include various stakeholders. The main findings should be presented at HO before the final version of the report.

5. Evaluation Team
The evaluation team will be composed of two external consultants, one of whom shall be the team leader and will be responsible for the whole evaluation. This will include data collection, field studies and the writing of the evaluation report.

One program staff members from the International Program Department and/or EO will take part in field studies and data collection in the selected countries. The staff member will also be part of the project group.

NPA have identified a project group to which the team leader will report. Throughout the process, the project group will consult with a reference group which will be established for this evaluation.

6. Reporting
A detailed work plan, and a revised TOR, shall have the approval from the NPA before initiating the evaluation. A draft report is to be submitted to NPA for comments. The final report is to be submitted to NPA within two weeks after receiving comments to the draft report. The final report should not exceed 40 pages, including an executive summary. The report shall be written in English.

7. Implementation, time schedule and reporting: January – June 2014
The time frame for the evaluation is suggested to be as follows: Totally 1 week for interviews at Head office and external office level plus some limited desk study. 2 weeks field level visits in Las Anod, Garowe and Hargeisa. The reasons for Garowe and Hargeisa is that there is a need in this context to also include the Ministry levels in both Somaliland and Puntland. 1 week field visit in Lebanon covering NPAs humanitarian work towards Syrian and Palestinian refugees in the current crisis and interviews to get an overview of the 2006 humanitarian assistance organized by the NPA program in Lebanon. 2 weeks will cover the write up of the report.
Appendix 2. Methodology

The overall evaluation structure consisted of formative, performance and contextual evaluations.

The **Formative Evaluation** explored the extent to which the objectives and intentions of NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief programmes, and NPA’s approach, were captured in an accessible form for different stakeholders by the materials and communication processes that NPA uses. These included policy and strategy papers, project documents and objectives statements, documents relating to local partnerships, capacity-building, training or the development of relationships (especially cross-sector), proposals/reports to donors, training documents, agendas, publicity leaflets and newsletters, and significant emails / electronic documents.

The **Performance Evaluation** addressed the impact and performance of the humanitarian assistance and relief programme: how the intentions, principles, procedures and actions, identified above, were actually experienced by beneficiaries, partners and other stakeholders, especially NMFA staff and diplomats. It explored what was actually delivered in terms of products, processes and additional value; what things were achieved and what were not. The Performance Evaluation explored attribution – what were the clear, direct outcomes from a particular initiative, process or project, and the extent to which outcomes were due to shared contributions.

The **Contextual Evaluation** considered the social, political, cultural, economic and environmental circumstances within which NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief programme operates, in order to draw wider lessons. For example, we asked about external events that occurred over the past 15 or so years, any impact that these may have had on programme performance, and any ways in which the programme was able to positively respond to external (outside NPA) or internal (within NPA) change.

Underpinning our evaluation was an explicit focus on gender, environment, age, and the influence of local context. This was especially true of semi-structured interviews, focus groups and participatory aspects of the evaluation, including workshops, outlined below. The evaluation instruments were:

1. **Document Review.** A review of documents noted in the ‘formative evaluation’ as well as background documents or other documents with (a) other relevant Norwegian agencies / NPA partners and (b) partner organisations elsewhere.

2. **Stakeholder analysis** conducted at the start of the evaluation alongside the document review to identify which stakeholder groups have an interest in, or have been involved with or affected by NPA’s humanitarian assistance and relief programme, its conduct and outputs. The stakeholder analysis and document review (both part of the formative evaluation) guided the detail of the evaluation instruments, mainly the interviews and focus groups.

3. **Semi-structured interviews and focus groups.** Semi-structured interviews explored performance and context, for example – what worked well and why; what has still to be achieved; any concerns or issues that could support learning; any key successes that merit celebration (and how local NPA partners celebrate achievements); any plausible links to inform longer term indicators of success; and context, e.g. the external and possibly internal change(s) mentioned above.

   Our hosts were able to arrange several small focus groups in the field with different groups. These helped to provide methodological robustness as well as an opportunity for us to speak to many more people than individual interviews would have allowed; over 220 beneficiaries were interviewed, sometimes 1:1, mostly in groups of 2-12.

4. **Participatory Workshops.** We use a small number of PA tools that were appropriate to cross-cultural, sensitive field circumstances.

5. **Short questionnaire.** Based on outcomes from the activities above, we designed a short follow-up questionnaire for 5 country offices. One of these was returned and helped to guide a follow-up interview with staff in that office.
## Appendix 3. People interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and interview/meeting with</th>
<th>Job/role title and organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mrs Wafa el-Yassir</td>
<td>NPA Country Director, NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Haifa Jammal</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator Human Rights and Advocacy, NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Safia Darwiche</td>
<td>Programme Officer, NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Khaled Yamout</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator, NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Taj Al-Dein Al-Keis</td>
<td>Relief Project Coordinator, NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ms Soukeina Salemeh</td>
<td>Director, National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services (NAVSSS), Bourj el-Barajneh Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>16 female students, NAVTSS, Bourj el-Barajneh Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mr Nasser Abou Lteif</td>
<td>President, Vision Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Nassim Abed el-Khaleq</td>
<td>Programs Coordinator, Vision Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Syrian refugees in gatherings/camps</td>
<td>3 families benefitting from e-card relief programme at dispersed camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Syrian refugees in gatherings/camps</td>
<td>9 men, 6 women, 2 children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. HE Mr Svein Aass, Ms Stine Horne, Mr Martin Yttervik</td>
<td>Norwegian Ambassador to Lebanon, Norwegian Embassy in Beirut, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy in Beirut, Charge d'Affaires, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mr Kassem Aina</td>
<td>Director, National Institute for Skills and Vocational Training (NISCVT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mrs Rita Hamdan (two meetings)</td>
<td>General Director, Popular Aid for Relief &amp; Development (PARD) Relief Program Coordinator, PARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Rashid El-Mansi</td>
<td>13 women, 2 young men, PARD, Shatilla Refugee Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Families from Syria homed in Nahr el-Bared Camp, including 8 women and 6 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>6 from Young Men's Group, NISCVT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>2 Syrian refugee families in camp (in home visits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Programme Manager, NISCVT, Nahr el-Bared Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mrs Hana el-Enein</td>
<td>Beddawi Camp Manager, Najdeh Association Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>7 women, 6 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ms Leila el-Ali</td>
<td>Director, Najdeh Association, Beddawi Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Mr Kassem Sabbah</td>
<td>Executive Director, Mousawat, Mar Elias Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Day patients and other beneficiaries</td>
<td>2 families, including 2 men with physical disabilities due to shrapnel, 2 children with spina bifida or alike, 1 young woman quadraplegic, 3 limb amputees and 2 stroke victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Mr Mohammed Kaseem</td>
<td>Director, Youth for Development, Mar Elias Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Ali Hamdoun</td>
<td>Vice President, Youth for Development, Mar Elias Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mr Raja Dib</td>
<td>Aidoun Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Wissam Sabaneh</td>
<td>Jafra Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Oussama</td>
<td>Jafra Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Khawla Dunia</td>
<td>Najda Now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Mohannad Mawad</td>
<td>Charitable Association for Palestinian Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Mr Abed Hajeer</td>
<td>Principal of Youth for Development School, Mieh w Mieh Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Hanan Ghali</td>
<td>Teacher at Youth for Development School, Mieh w Mieh Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>22 young people in class 1 (Syrian Palestinian refugees), 20 young people in class 2 (Palestinian refugees), Mieh w Mieh camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Ms Amneh Jibril</td>
<td>Director, General Union of Palestinian Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Amal Shehabi</td>
<td>Senior Social Worker, General Union of Palestinian Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Beneficiaries and social workers</td>
<td>5 Syrian Palestinian women and 6 social workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Salem Dib</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Field Education Programme &amp; School Education Officer, UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Bahija Mayassi</td>
<td>Director, Health Care Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Jean Nicolas Beuze</td>
<td>UNHCR, Assistant Representative for Coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Somalia**

| Mr Farouk Majani | Programs Manager, GECPD |
| Ms Hawa Yussuf Ahmed | Education Programs Officer, GECPD |
| Ms Fathiya Mahamud Dirie | Programs Assistant, GECPD |
| 30. GECPD beneficiaries | 5, including beneficiaries of Education & Sports, Skills Training, and Education programmes |
| Mr Khadar Hassan | Vice Chairman, HADMA |
| HE Abdihakim Abdullahi Omar | Vice President, Puntland State |
| Mr Mohamed Farah Aden | Governor of Sool Region |
| Mr Abdikadir Jama Salah | Mayor of Las Anod City |
| Eng Ahmed Mohamed Hirsi | Director, Ministry of Water Resources, Sool Region |
| HE Mr Osman Garad Sofe | Vice Minister of Interior |
| Mr Mohamed Abdullahi Farah | Executive Director, SVO |
| Mr Abdimajid Ali Mohamed | Project Manager, SVO |
| 34. SVO beneficiaries | 7 people, including water issues, village committee, youth leader, conflict resolution member, environment issues member |
| Mr Abdirashid Jama Bihi | Vice Chairman, SRO |
| Mr Ali Abdinooor Dhaqani | Project Manager, SRO |
| Shululuh Village Community | 7 people, including Shululuh Village Water Committee, Village Committee, Education Committee & Women Committee members |
| Dr Mahamud Abdullahi Jirde | Regional Medical Officer, Las Anod Hospital |
| Dr Bile H. Mohamud | Assistant Regional Medical Officer, Las Anod Hospital |
| Ms Fima Kosafare | Director, Las Anod Hospital |
| Mr Abdiqani Aw Dahir | Health Committee member |
| Ms Halimo Hasan | Regional Polio Officer |
| Ms Halimo Hasan Salah | Vice Chairlady, HANAQAAD |
| Mr Mohamed Hasan | Project Manager, HANAQAAD |
| 39. HANAQAAD beneficiaries | 10 Market Women Training, 2 Skills Training & 6 IDP Beneficiaries |
| HE Mr Osman Garad Sofe | Somaliland Vice Minister of Interior |
| HE Mr Hussein Ahmed Abule | Somaliland Minister of Water Resources |
| Mr Mohamed Hussein Elmi | Las Anod NPA Project Officer |
| Ms Hilde Solbakken | Chargé d’Affaires, Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi |
| Ms Beate Bull | First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi |
| 44. Mr Gary P Jones | UNAIDS programme (former Country Director, NPA Somalia) |
Appendix 4. Lebanon meetings

Evaluation Team:
Scott Jones, Kelly Simcock, Ahmed Farah Mohamed, Haifa Jammal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NPA Office Team</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> 5 Lebanon team, 4 evaluation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaugural meeting of the evaluators with the lead agency for NPA in Lebanon. Presentation of key NPA Lebanon activities then moved into discussions around the programme put together for evaluators. A brief insight provided into why partners had been selected and rationale behind the programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key points:</strong> None of the structural constraints on Palestinians have changed, in fact the needs of the Palestinian communities remain very high and are perhaps increasing with the recent arrival of thousands more Palestinian-Syrians fleeing the Syrian conflict. The team raised concerns about how humanitarian assistance ad relief funding is now being channelled towards the Syrian diaspora and the pressure this is putting and has the ability to impact even further on NPA resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong> 3 hours, including introductory session on evaluation objectives and intended process.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiaries: National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services – NAVTSS, Bourj el-Barajneh Camp</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> 16 women, 3 NAVTSS Staff team, 5 evaluation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion with the women about the services being provided for them. The women benefit from training programmes aimed at enhancing employability skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key points:</strong> Beneficiaries reported that training is highly beneficial, noting the additional value this service brings to their lives by providing them an outlet and a social space as well as education. In terms of service, they said they are treated with dignity and respect by the delivery partner. NPA was described as &quot;on the ground; flexible; participatory; listening; takes the long-term view.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong> 45 minutes</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner: National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services (NAVTSS), Bourj el-Barajneh Camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> Ms Soukeina Salemeh, Director, Mr Afil Abu Hassan, Senior Tutor, 5 evaluation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion on the activities undertaken by this organisation and its partnership with NPA. The organisation spoke of its transition from being reliant on NPA to having its capacity built with NPA’s support – NAVTSS “…has grown and strengthened because of NPA.” Now reaching 350 beneficiaries across 5 different sites per year. This is providing an important lifeline for the Palestinians who are unable to obtain training elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key points:</strong> NPA’s move to annual review of grants means lack of stability and they feel unable to plan beyond an annual plan. Suggestion for NPA to look more closely at how it can support staff within partner organisations. They too are often refugees and are suffering as well as the beneficiaries. More training is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong> 90 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<th>Partner: Vision Association, Bekaa Valley</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> Mr Nasser Abou Lteif, President, Mr Nassim Abed el-Khaleq, Program Coordinator, 5 evaluation team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus was the e-card project that saw refugees receiving cards with credit in order to buy goods from registered shops. The project was undertaken in partnership between NPA and Solidar (Suisse) through Vision Association. A separate report gives key statistics and project outcomes. Key highlights include: error rate for the project never exceeded 5%; managed to reach some refugees who had never been reached. VA works with a large volunteer base that can be called on and deployed when need arises. The organisation was an important partner for NPA in 2006 when Israeli attacks took place, particularly impacting the North of Lebanon. These led to arterial routes to Bekaa being destroyed, hindering provision of HA and relief. The existing relationship between NPA and this local partner, and the capacity of the local partner (through its extensive, trained volunteer base) meant that aid was able to be provided to those who most needed it in this remote area of the country. By way of telephone communication, needs were identified and a proposal for action negotiated between NPA and its partner. This was provided through the provision of ‘fast cash’ into the account of Vision Association.</td>
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<td>34</td>
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</table>
**Key points:** This partnership is an example of how strong relationships with trusted local partners can lead to ‘real impact’ when most needed in a humanitarian crisis as in the events of 2006. The e-card partnership provided some excellent results statistically though challenges in delivery were acknowledged. Vision Association and partner Solidar experienced challenges in administering the project at the outset. NPA was instrumental in providing relevant local support, to ensure that project outcomes were met. Vision is one of very few potential local partners that NPA has in this part of Lebanon.

**Duration:** 180 minutes

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**Beneficiaries:** Vision Association, E-card Project, Bekaa Valley  
**Attendees:** 3 Syrian families met separately, 5 evaluation team (divided into 2 teams) + 3 NPA staff

The team met with the local Vision Association coordinator at two of the new IDP camps in Bekka Valley inhabited by Syrian diaspora fleeing conflict. The team met with 3 families who had been beneficiaries of the e-card, who reported that NPA provided an excellent service. 2 of the 3 families had been unable to gain support from UNHCR and were without any form of relief or aid from any other organisation when Vision had ‘found them’ by knocking at their doors and identified them, amongst others, as being some of the most needy.

**Key points:** The card had ‘been a lifeline’ for these families. They reported feeling that dignity and respect were shown to them as well as essential cash for things they needed most. The service was further enhanced by swift delivery of the cards following registration- delivered from the Mosque as a point of easy access. Promises were kept by NPA/Vision and meant that people were dealt with swiftly and efficiently. Our final visit was interrupted by verbal confrontation outside of the shelter as other members of the diaspora were challenging NPA staff. Our team was mistaken for the UN and people wanted to plead their case. The situation highlighted one of the challenges facing NPA’s staff and partners in reaching the most needy in what is a very challenging environment, due in part to the dispersed nature of the IDP’s.

**Duration:** 20-30 minutes per family

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**Beneficiaries:** Vision Association, E-card Project, Bekaa Valley  
**Attendees:** Vision Coordinator, 9 men, 6 women, 2 children and 5 evaluation team + 3 NPA staff

The team held a large group meeting with another local Vision Association coordinator at the coordinator’s home on the edge of the valley. The group were members of the Syrian diaspora who had been approached by Vision or who had approached the coordinator upon hearing of the initiative. Needs of the group were high once again with limited support for many form existing UN support and no support from other NGO’s other than water. Beneficiaries said that the NPA support was through the personal connection provided by the local coordinator, who assessed and responded to people who were most needy fairly and justly. It was clear that the local contact understood the needs of the people and the environment well. The group highlighted the need for more of the e-cards as the initiative has now stopped and families are desperate. Also highlighted was the need for cash to pay rent in the camps as families are still expected to do so even when cash is not available.

**Key points:** The beneficiaries described other NGO’s as ‘faceless’ yet they felt a sense of ‘solidarity’ with NPA as this connection was made clear by the partner. The group also expressed the importance of forums with local partners (like our exercise) that allowed people to have a voice. The event highlighted how NPA is well placed, through partners, to respond to crises effectively – and to build lasting relations and a capacity that can lead to longer-term development. It also highlighted the way in which strategy connects to front line delivery. A point made later in debrief was that NPA’s risk threshold is different to other organisations. NPA is willing to enter into areas and contexts that other NGO’s may not be willing to enter.

**Duration:** 1 hour

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**Officials:** Royal Norwegian Embassy  
**Attendees:** Ambassador Svein Aass, Ms Stine Horn, First Secretary, Mr Martin Yttervik, Charge d’Affaires  
**Evaluators Scott Jones and Kelly Simcocks**

Discussion included Norway’s general position in relation to humanitarian assistance and political conflicts; not to promote its own national interests, but to promote the development of local partners. Challenges around doing so exist with the Syrian conflict context discussed given the fragility of the political situation in and out of the country.

Conversation linked to challenges for local actors and NGO’s in ensuring safe practice in what is an incredibly complex situation. Need for conflict and risk analysis and assessment and clear and transparent processes for such contexts flagged as critical for any NGO engaged in such places.
**Key points:** NPA is uniquely placed, and recognised as important actor delivering high quality work with “striking resolve.” Embassy not always clear on how stated target groups are being impacted due to reporting methods used (which need strengthening). NPA needs to improve how to consider risk and security in relation to Syria.

**Duration:** 1 hour

**Partners:** NISCVT (National Institute for Vocational Skills and Training)

**Attendees:** Mr Kassem Aina, Director, 5 evaluation team

Organisation has impressive profile of projects ranging from social work to mental health and education programmes. Operating as only secular Palestinian organisation in Lebanon for some years. NPA currently supports the programme educating 30 young people per annum. Reported that NPA is the only INGO supporting the Pal forum and is respected for doing so. “It matters that they are here and know the situation – they know the people and what is needed.”

**Key points:** NPA DNA and ‘special ingredients’ included openness and transparency in working partnerships, clear priorities including women’s participation, genuine engagement with partners to understand needs.

**Duration:** 90 mins

**Partners:** PARD (Popular Aid for Relief and Development)

**Attendees:** Ms Rita Hamdan, General Director, Mr Rashid El Mansi – Relief Program Coordinator, 5 evaluation team

PARD connected to NPA for almost 30 years. Organisation undertakes rapid needs assessment in crisis situations and “aims to cover the cracks where UNRWA are unable to deliver”. High degree of success in working with most needy through effective deployment of a coordinated team of volunteers trained by PARD as and when appropriate. This project clear example of NPA ‘added value’ in terms of mobilising local partner organisations in times of emergency and crisis. Subject of a case study in report.

**Key points:** Follow up meeting to deepen understanding and build case study, Appendix 10

**Duration:** 90 mins

**Beneficiaries:** PARD (Popular Aid for Relief and Development) Shatilla Refugee Camp

**Attendees:** 13 women, 2 young men, 3 young children + 5 evaluation team

Participants and recipients of PARD support. Group of Palestinian Syrians and Palestinian community members and 8 social workers from PARD. Support includes vouchers issued to refugees for essential items and social work for women, children and families. NPA support provided through initiatives such as ‘Women Can Do It!’ project. Volunteers include young female community members ‘giving back’ and mentoring other children.

**Key points:** High impact of social work provision for women and children. Spaces to play for children and places for women to receive moral and social support. Increasing need of refugees in relation to direct support – cash for rent, essential items and job opportunities.

**Duration:** 90 mins

**NPA Office Lebanon**

**Attendees:** Ms Wafa el-Naser, Country Director, Scott Jones and Kelly Simcock

Extended interview with CD. Discussion around changes to approach over time and move from emergency relief to a HA approach that still continues. Highlighted work with disabilities and young people as key successes in HA work. Challenges in moving from front line delivery to partnership approach. Difficult changes managed effectively, leading to creation of 2 new organisations – Mousawat and Youth for Development. Belief that effective HA lays in building resilience and capacity for partners to manage and respond to crises. Arrangements with current partners including commissioning, reporting and review.

**Key points:** Need for clarity around overarching NPA strategy on HA with clear strategic leadership and structures in place to support delivery at a country level. Retention of unique NPA qualities of long term partnership approaches critical to success on the ground. Cautionary note about a system that seeks to systematise too strongly. Critical to retain sound local knowledge and cultural understanding of countries with teams equipped to that standard.

**Duration:** 180 mins
**Beneficiaries: NISCVT, Nahr el-Bahred Camp**  
**Attendees: 8 women, 5 men + 5 evaluation team**

Recipients of food vouchers and emergency relief kits funded by NPA. Group consisted of Palestinian Syrians community members forced to flee violence in Syria and join families. Organisation providing additional support through kindergarten provision and social support for women. Workshops for pregnant women and training programmes for men amongst the offering. High levels of need in the camp and social work support critical.  
**Key points:** Beneficiaries reported excellent service from staff. Treated with respect and dignity. 'I was able to take a shower' was the quote of one refugee who indicated how simple and important needs are responded to. Praised openness and transparency of this local actor and compared NPA favourably to other larger NGO's without local knowledge whose provision is less than acceptable.  
**Duration:** 60 mins

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**Beneficiaries: NISCVT, Nahr el-Bahred Camp**  
**Attendees: 6 young men, Kelly Simcock and Ahmed Farah Mohamed**

Group included three who are now part time youth leaders and one full time project coordinator of ‘Youth Can Do It!’ project. Camp suffered serious upheaval 8 years ago. Issues with ‘extremism’ saw military action in the camp by Lebanese army to put down potential insurgency. Increased and sustained high security measures mean restricted passage in and out of camp. ‘This place is like a prison’. High levels of unemployment and idleness and increasing disaffection amongst youth mean increasing mental and general health issues. ‘Youth Can Do It!’ project has provided lifeline. Young people given training and support through formal trainings and informal activities. Projects enabling peer to peer education to take place. Development of skills, confidence and capacity to improve life skills and preparedness for work.  
**Key points:** Project is a ‘beacon of hope’ within camp bringing different age groups together in a safe space. ‘Youth Can Do It!’ provides a sense of connection to ‘outside world’ that is otherwise non-existent: ‘It has broadened my horizons well beyond this camp’. Support mainly provided now through training and policy support e.g. Women’s Rights.  
**Duration:** 60 mins

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**Beneficiaries: 2 families, Nahr el-Bared camp**  
**Attendees: Scott Jones, Haifa Jammal**

Home visits to 2 families. Woman who was pregnant (newly arrived refugee) and one woman with 23 people in her home as a result of the Syrian conflict.  
**Key points:** People are frightened and confused, homesick and distressed at the level of dependency they face having been able to manage their affairs as normal families all their lives. The fact that NPA and its partners do their work from values that prioritise people’s dignity enables people to feel respected and human. They feel that NPA crosses the cultures and gives a human face to assistance in situations where people feel distressed.  
**Duration:** 60 mins

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**Partner: NISCVT, Nahr el-Bahred Camp**  
**Attendees: Mr Abdullah, Centre Manager + 5 evaluation team**

Discussion of centre provision. Extension of discussion with Dr Kaseem Haina. Extensive services ranging from paediatric clinic for 0-18yrs to gynaecological services for women. A ‘one stop shop’ for services with high trust and confidence amongst community. Partner is well placed for distribution of relief as it did for Syrian refugees in recent times.’Youth Can Do It!’ project facilitated and supported by NPA hugely impactful. ‘It threw a stone into the water.....we can see something has changed in them’. Project has built resilience and reduced vulnerability.  
**Key points:** NPA placing trust and confidence in partners. ‘Doing with’ rather than ‘doing to’. Strategic way of working – ‘Youth Can Do It!’ connecting young people across communities to increase confidence and mobilise. A change in NPA’s approach has been detected and funding has been reduced. Funds provide a lifeline in an area of HA that other organisations do/have not funded so far.  
**Duration:** 60 mins
Partner: Najdeh Women’s Association, Beddawi Camp
Attendees: Ms Hana el-Enein, Beddawi Camp Manager and Ms Fatmeh Said, Women’s Vocational Centre Group Co-ordinator, Kelly Simcock and Ahmed Farah Mohamed

Violence against women project manager and coordinator told of activities supported by NPA. These include the women’s rights programmes and direct psychological support provided through counsellors and psychologists. Financial support given for programmes as well as structural support with strategic direction, training for staff and policy support through the ‘Women Can Do It!’ Programme. High levels of individuality in project with victim support (violence against women) and ‘forum theatre’ work facilitated to raise awareness of abuse across community. Men also participants and beneficiaries of this strand.

Key points: Notable reduction of violence against women in camp and increased participation in political and social activities. ‘These women now have a voice, to go back would be terrible, so much progress has been made’.

Duration: 70 mins

Beneficiaries: Women’s Group
Attendees: 9 women, Scott Jones and Haifa Jammal

Legthy discussion about male violence developed into more of a workshop approach and ideas around women’s violence against children. During heated discussions there was also some distress as women told their stories and comforted each other. We considered outcomes that the women wanted from the contact with the Najdeh regarding ‘Violence’ and ‘Women can Do It!’ projects. We finished on a values-rich and practical discussion about the positive benefits of peace and women’s empowerment.

Key points: The situation is changing but the needs remain great. Women are well-placed to take forward political change and improve life in the communities. Given the positive results through true empowerment, continued support for these programmes would ensure that this momentum to continue

Duration: 70 mins

NPA Office Lebanon
Attendees: Ms Safia Darwiche, Programme Coordinator and Kelly Simcock

Extended interview regarding ‘Youth Can Do It!’ education programme and views on wider country programme. NPA Lebanon supporting most disadvantaged group in Lebanon through work with Palestinian refugees. Youth programmes in particular reducing vulnerability and building capacity. Support for partners should go beyond service provision and simply finance. Strategy is building culture of democracy, communication and self help through training. Has moved four times in four years whilst with NPA and appreciated opportunities for development. Would welcome further support and direction from Oslo for country teams.

Key points: NPA Lebanon lacks the type of experts other organisations have such as IRC. Increased diversity would bring greater knowledge and expertise to the organisation.

Duration: 75 mins

Partners: Najdeh Women’s Association
Attendees: Ms Leila el-Ali, Director of Najdeh Women’s Association, Kelly Simcock and Haifa Jammal

Brief reflections on work carried out in partnership with NPA. Psychosocial support for women and girls (65% beneficiaries), rights and empowerment, and education programme. ‘Dignity kits’ amongst the relief delivered with NPA to women fleeing conflict in Syria. ‘HA is not just about relief-there are gaps and communities must be consulted’, NPA consulted with this organisation regarding Combating Violence Against Women. Approach made different to other NGO’s. Direct consultation took place at local level with partners to identify and discuss capacity and needs. In addition NPA bring analysis, challenge and strategic direction to the organisation.

Key points: Project work held as example of best practice across Lebanon and has been approached by Lebanese organisations dealing with similar and same issues. ‘For the first time, we can tackle the issue of sexual harrassment in a conservative community without fear of backlash’. Notes NPA’s recent focus on ‘relief’. ‘Relief needs to be closer to development to build resilience and capacity’.

Duration: 75 mins
### Key points:

- The nature of the Syrian crisis and cross-border migration means NPA Lebanon partners are dealing with emergency relief and humanitarian issues almost daily. While it is normal to think of humanitarian crises in terms of groups, often large, it is equally important to remember that individuals in conflict zones can also face humanitarian crises and that these translate into needs far away from where the violence initially took place.
- The nature of the Syrian crisis and cross-border migration means NPA Lebanon partners are dealing with emergency relief and humanitarian issues almost daily. While it is normal to think of humanitarian crises in terms of groups, often large, it is equally important to remember that individuals in conflict zones can also face humanitarian crises and that these translate into needs far away from where the violence initially took place.

**Duration:** 45 mins

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### Partner: Mousawat, *Mar Elias Camp*

**Attendees:** Mr Kassem Sabbah, Executive Director + 5 evaluation team

- Organisation grew from NPA in move from operational to partnership approach. Successes include growth from 18-42 staff members in 18 months with increase from 1 to 6 projects funded by other large INGO’s. Unique and filling the gap where other NGO’s do not in terms of disability work. No other providers. UNRWA dedicate only $20k to work with disabilities. Syrian crisis is increasing pressure with rising numbers needing assistance. Local, versatile and agile; able to respond quickly and effectively to need. Relationship with NPA strong. ‘A telephone call to discuss means results within 24-48 hours - no other NGO provides this’. Crisis of 2006 (Israeli aggression) saw fast response on front line. ‘We were everywhere’. Reduced funds mean capacity now diminished with need to focus resources.

**Key points:** Considered to be ‘true humanitarian assistance by reducing human suffering’. Basic needs being met through rehab, provision of artificial limbs and mobility equipment. Organisation delivering wheelchairs to Syria. Mixed strategy messages from Oslo: ‘only 3 lines in strategy refer to HA’. Leading to lack of clarity and frustration that this issue may be missed. ‘This issue should not be a fashion – it is humanitarian assistance’. NPA only organisation supporting the salary of Executive Director where others providing project costs but no core funds.

**Duration:** 60 mins

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### Partner: Youth for Development, *Mar Elias Camp*

**Attendees:** Mr Mohammed Kassem, Director, Dr Ali Hamdoun, Vice President + 3 evaluation team

- Second organisation borne of NPA in move from operational to partnership approach. Now has two vocational centres in 2 different camps. Over 300 beneficiaries aged 18-25yrs per year training on business administration based courses. Recent influx of Syrain young people raised demand for places. Courses providing development for young people at risk of disaffection through lack of employment and development opportunities. ‘Kids were turning to drink and drugs in these camps without this type of provision in place’. Capacity built through support of NPA. Standards have increased to a level whereby YfD now applying for licence from Lebanese government to be able to deliver accredited programmes recognised in Lebanon and more widely.

**Key points:** NPA providing critical support to organisation - funding salaries not supported elsewhere. Long history of association with NPA as local partner. Strong trust and commitment form NPA where other donors do not consult on real need. Cautionary note struck on the competition for funds for Palestinians and Syrians. This is leading to tensions between communities.

**Duration:** 60 mins

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### Partner: Potential partners for HA and Relief for Syria

**Attendees:** Mr Raja Dib, Aidoun Syria. Mr Wissam Sabaneh and Mr Oussama, Jafra Foundation. Ms Khawla Dunia, Najda Now. Mr Mohannad Mawad, Charitable Association for Palestinian Refugees, + 5 evaluation team

- Discussion around existing cooperation with NPA and how partnerships could look in relation to further work in Syria, and with diaspora in Lebanon. ‘We need more than donors right now,’ NGO’s need to understand what is happening on the ground. NPA’s existing relationships and approach well placed to do that. Robust partnerships cited as important to tackle increasingly protracted conflict. Long term sustainable funding and understanding of challenges partners facing. Situation changing daily with different demands and risks. Initiatives such as
supporting a bakery are providing the tools and capacity on the ground in Syria to feed people. Key ingredients to successful HA in this crisis include flexible thinking and support from donors and partners to provide fast cash, with flexibility built in to respond to unexpected expenditure including inflation and bribes where appropriate (sic). In addition, realistic expectations on reporting. Continuing a partner-centric approach.

**Key points:** Recognising that HA and relief has to go beyond simply providing food and water; needs are wider. The separation of relief in terms of HA and long-term development is artificial. HA is also about dignity and respect for local people. Local partners able to provide understanding and community reach that INGO’s are not able to do. NPA has provided and must continue to provide genuine HA without putting constraints on beneficiary groups according to political affiliation e.g. for anti-regime areas only. HA is HA and must be for all the people.

**Duration:** 180 mins

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**NPA Office Lebanon**

**Attendees:** Mr Taj Al-Dein Al-Keis, Relief Project Coordinator, Scott Jones and Kelly Simcock

Explored NPA’s HA work in context of Syria and wider discussion around HA and NPA Lebanon. ‘HA is not just about what you give – it’s about how you give it’. Discussion around e-card project with partners in Bekaa. ‘We were able to reach those who most needed it – the people had nothing’. Vision Association capacity was however low, needing high level of NPA support. Sense this was not just teething problems but partner needed support.

**Key points:** Recommendation to strengthen procedures around partner assessment and professionalise approaches to partnership working more broadly.

**Duration:** 90 mins

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**Partner: Youth for Development, Mieh w Mieh Camp**

**Attendees:** Mr Abed Hajeer, Principal of school, Ms Hanan Ghali, Teacher at school + 5 evaluation team

Mixed school including Lebanese and Palestinian students with 45% from outside and 55% inside the camp. 75-80 graduates per year. Recent intake includes Syrian students. Discussion focussed on risk and security and the school’s policies in the event of crisis or extreme events. Security plan developed after ‘crisis’ of 2006 for extreme events. School has standard risk assessment in place.

**Key points:** Strongly tuned in to young people in their own context and able to manage risk skilfully and with profound knowledge of risks in the camp and how to manage young people’s safety. Deep beliefs about the benefits of training young people and strong evidence base of outcomes from these efforts. Some distance perhaps now from NPA Oslo – would welcome that relationship being refreshed and revitalised.

**Duration:** 90 mins

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**Beneficiaries: Youth for Development, Mieh w Mieh Camp**

**Attendees:** 2 classes of students of 22 and 20 – one group Syrian and mixed group of Lebanese and Palestinian, + 4 evaluation team

Brief visits to classes of Syrian pupils reported that the provision has enabled them to continue with education.

**Key points:** Preparing them for professional life as well as providing sense of normality within their lives as refugees. Palestinian students likewise reporting high standards of teaching and learning in an environment that is safe and professional.

**Duration:** 20 mins

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**Partner: General Union of Palestinian Women, Ein el-Helweh Camp**

**Attendees:** Ms Amneh Jibril, Director, Ms Amal Shehabi + 5 evaluation team

‘Women Can Do It!’ project one of the critical programmes supported by NPA. Have seen changes throughout the camp with examples including women who were once beneficiaries becoming peer mentors, trainers and eventually project coordinators. Beneficiaries of this project include women forced to marry by families in order to raise much needed cash to pay rent – ‘programmes like ours are not threatening and allow these women to heal’. GUPW also distributed food kits provided by NPA.

**Key points:** HA defined as critical for the ‘immunisation of communities’ in order to reduce vulnerabilities. As with other organisations, food kits able to be delivered swiftly and efficiently through local partners. Not enough available however and projects criticised as being ‘one off’. Capacity and relationships exist but more products needed. Social worker spoke of the needs of the staff team members.

**Duration:** 60 mins
### Beneficiaries/Partners: General Union of Palestinian Women, *Ein el-Helweh Camp*

**Attendees:** 5 female beneficiaries, 6 social workers + 3 evaluation team

Syrian women reported how GUPW ‘knocked on our door’. Women from their community who understand their issues, equipped to support them and their needs through provision of psycho-social support. ‘Just to see their smiling faces can make our day better’. Relief also provided through childcare and kindergarten facilities. Social workers reported challenges they face: ‘We too carry a lot of pain of these people, yet we are also refugees’.  
**Key Points:** Supervision structures lacking formally within the organisation. Potential for additional support in relation to capacity building on this more broadly.  
**Duration:** 60 mins

### Officials: UNRWA

**Attendees:** Mr Salem Dib – Deputy chief field education programme & school education officer

Strong relationship with NPA acknowledged for almost 30 years. NPA seen as professional organisation with effective, qualified staff able to support other organisations in building their capacity. Considered that it could be a critical partner in supporting UNRWA in meeting its targets. Strong interest in strengthening and developing relations with NPA if possible. Limitations identified that NPA supporting schools only in Sida and Beirut areas.  
**Key Points:** NPA Lebanon has unique role in supporting work with children and young people with disabilities. Currently, no provision with UNRWA for children with special needs and/or disabilities. UNRWA are developing this as new priority and interested in further cooperation with NPA to develop capacity, strengthen provision and give credibility and legitimacy to both organisations.  
**Duration:** 70 mins

### Officials: UNHCR

**Attendees:** Mr Jean Nicolas Beuze, Assistant Representative for Coordination, Scott Jones and Kelly Simcock

Recognised reputation of NPA as solid NGO with impact in Lebanon. Reflected on challenges for UN and other NGO’s in managing the increasing numbers of refugees fleeing Syria. Clear that term ‘Humanitarian assistance’ = emergency supplies provided in aftermath of crisis. Building resilience within communities critical but not the role of UNHCR. Feels that Lebanon struggling as people try to use HA funds to address structural inadequacies.  
**Key Points:** Clear opportunities for collaboration/coordination. Inter-community and inter-ethnic tensions present additional threats to an already fragile situation. NPA’s extensive knowledge, understanding and existing relationships with local NGO’s considered highly beneficial as UN attempts to map communities and potential conflict. Additionally, UNHCR clear that its response is ‘purely humanitarian’ and building resilience is critical. Sees NGO’s such as NPA as crucial to that provision.  
**Duration:** 45 mins

### NPA Office Lebanon

**Attendees:** Mr Khaled Yamout, Program Coordinator, Scott Jones and Kelly Simcock

One to one meeting to deepen understanding of Bekaa Valley e-card project in conjunction with Solidar Suisse. Also covered standard questions put to NPA employees. NPA enjoys ability to respond rapidly in crisis situation through partners, yet complacency around partners may creep in due to long term relationships. ‘Institutional memory’ is very strong in NPA Lebanon but may be vulnerable due to lack of systems, structures and processes to safeguard organisation. ‘Beauty of partnership is the networks created, however, downside is that it’s so difficult to capture that’. Sarah Al-Amry (NPA Syria) only met NPA Lebanon during evaluation. 3 months in post in a country program focussed on same country as NPA Lebanon demonstrates lack of connectivity at head office level.  
**Key points:** Recommendation to strengthen procedures around partner assessment and professionalise approaches to partnership working more broadly. More detail needed in the strategy – doesn’t translate into business plan.  
**Duration:** 90 mins
### Appendix 5. Somalia meetings

**Evaluation Team:**
Scott Jones, Kelly Simcock, Ahmed Farah Mohamed, Haifa Jammal, Mohamed Hussein Elmi

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<th>NPA Office Team</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> Mr Khamis Chome Abdi, Mr Ahmed Farah Mohamed + 3 evaluation team</td>
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<td>Introduction to NPA Somalia Programme. NPA initially operational here, then transitioned to working with partners. Challenging time due to low capacity in ‘so called’ NGO’s and the reception of communities operating within clan structures. Discussed existing partners and reasons for selection and continued support.</td>
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<td><strong>Key points:</strong> Challenges in the past 7 years. Past strategic changes from Oslo have caused uncertainty &amp; reduced planning ability. Year-to-year rather than longer-term funding has created instability for programme and partners.</td>
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<th>Partners: GECPD (Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development), Galkayo</th>
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<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> Mr Farouk Majani, Ms Hawa Yussuf Ahmed, Ms Fathiya Mahamud Dirie + 5 evaluation team</td>
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<td>GECPD presented their vision, mission, aims and objectives, activities and outputs. Targets are women, girls and vulnerable boys. HA and Relief provided to IDP’s. NPA’s financial support ceased in 2006, but structural support has continued via capacity building and strategic development. Held workshop-based activities on conditions for effective HA and Relief in partnership work, exploring ‘Building resilience and reducing vulnerability’ as parts of this. ‘The burden of society fell on the shoulders of women in post war settings’ – GECPD is building resilience and equipping future generations to respond to humanitarian crises.</td>
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<td><strong>Key points:</strong> Field visits to this volatile area to monitor activity and support development described as ‘different’ and ‘special’ aspects of NPA’s support. Evidence of clear preparation and planning within partnership, including use of log frames. ‘No one wants to fund Galkayo – it’s too volatile’, said staff team member. NPA supports where others would not, increasing confidence and providing references for other partners to build GECPD credibility.</td>
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<th>Beneficiaries: GECPD, Galkayo</th>
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<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> D, N and M (2 young women and 1 young man) + 2 evaluation team</td>
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<td>Workshop with young beneficiaries on what they have learnt through GECPD involvement. All IDP’s working with GECPD. Discussed support, learning and skills development. Vocational training for one young man: ‘I now have the tools to help me make a living’. Young women spoke of opportunities for integration, confidence building and participation in the girls’ boarding school. ‘After 8 years together in our school, we learn sisterhood and friendship. That relationship is as strong as that you have in any family’. GECPD staff described as inspirational role models.</td>
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<td><strong>Key points:</strong> GECPD and NPA partnership is meeting objectives and transforming the lives of young people. Some people describe this as development, others as humanitarian assistance, as more young people arrive in the town from a nomadic lifestyle that doesn’t meet their needs or cannot be sustained. The concept of resilience helps to unify these two differing views.</td>
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<th>Beneficiaries: GECPD</th>
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<td><strong>Attendees:</strong> Two female beneficiaries, Scott Jones and Haifa Jammal</td>
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<td>Meeting with two GECPD beneficiaries. The women explained how they became engaged with GECPD. Both faced barriers to participation from attitudes and values of their families/wider community. Have gained new skills and developed confidence, one through Second Chance Programme, and employment and income. One is 37, with 11 children, husband is unemployed and she is the only one in family earning income. Participated in sewing training then got a job. After some time she became the sewing trainer. Also has her own business in Galkayo and employs other women. She can now send 7 of her children to school and is proud of this. The other woman is 23, married, a student in a GECPD school in Galkayo. Is now a teacher in a GECPD school and coaches the basketball team. Initially, the community criticized her and blamed her family for allowing her to coach. But because she is confident of herself she convinced them she was doing nothing wrong. After marriage her husband supported and encouraged her. Both women thank GECPD and NPA because they supported and empowered them and other women. They asked NPA to continue their support for GECPD to support Somali...</td>
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people, especially women.  
**Key points:** GECPD deeply relate to how people should be contacted and mobilised in safe and empowering ways. They create a safe space and a way of working that enables people to achieve. The links with NPA values and objectives are strong.  
**Duration:** 90 minutes

| Partners: HADMA (Humanitarian and Disaster Management Agency)  
| **Attendees:** Mr Khadar Hasan + 5 evaluation team  
| Brief discussion with head of organisation to understand partnership with NPA. ‘NPA are the only INGO in the SOOL region and we make it our priority to share our intelligence with them’. Work through local partners has been critical and has both built capacity and mitigated potential conflicts between groups.  
| **Key points:** Work through local partners felt to have been successful where INGO’s may not have been.  
| **Duration:** 25 minutes

| Officials: Office of the Vice President of Puntland  
| **Attendees:** Vice President Mr Abdihakim Abdullahi Omar + 4 evaluation team  
| Courtesy visit to introduce evaluation team and mission. VP highly complimentary of NPA’s work and welcomed more support. ‘2-3 wells are not enough; we need even more to cope with approaching crises’. Administration of Puntland very pleased to work with NPA to identify new development sites/areas if NPA wish to continue support.  
| **Key points:** NPA recognised as different to other INGO’s because it ‘goes to those places others won’t go’.  
| **Duration:** 25 minutes

| Partners: Steadfast Voluntary Organisation  
| **Attendees:** Mr Mohamed Abdullahi Farah, Director, Mr Abdimajid Ali Mohamed, Program Manager + 5 evaluation team  
| Presentation of organisation’s vision and mission and associated aims and objectives. Organisation has grown since 2003 and start of relationship with NPA. Evidence of sustained growth and development through NPA’s financial, structural and capacity building support. Details shared on how relationship works through proposal, monitoring, support, reporting and evaluatory phases.  
| **Key points:** Sustained growth of organisation since start of relationship with NPA. NPA’s support seen as critical to development via funding, capacity building, strategic support and references to improve legitimacy.  
| **Duration:** 180 minutes

| Beneficiaries: Steadfast Voluntary Organisation  
| **Attendees:** 4 male beneficiaries from Higlo village, Mr Abdimajid Ali Mohamed, Program Manager + 2 evaluation team  
| Meeting at SVO offices. Beneficiaries travelled to meet team due to heightened security issues near their village identified 24 hours before. A town of 3,500 represented by 4 members of community committee. Youth, conflict resolution, leader and environment reps in attendance. Discussion focussed on benefits of SRO project. Provision of well and related structures. A significant benefit has been increased soil fertility directly around the well. Need for community cooperation has brought further layers of development, but SVO ‘tapped into’ an existing active community committee. New projects include active youth group raising awareness on health and sanitation and engaging over 40 young people (+1% of population). Community representatives reported other benefits of SVO intervention and support, including: higher participation in education, lower mortality rates, and more security for women (who no longer have to seek water and so have less risk of rape). A new SVO-supported initiative is the cash for work scheme to develop land and crops using local labour.  
| **Key points:** SVO’s intervention has been transformational. Significant changes to attitudes and behaviour across community: ‘Our young people are taking the lead in safeguarding their own futures through ownership of the water health projects’. Also increased participation of women in community leadership, income generation and employment. Representatives reported, ‘this has genuinely changed our lives and way of thinking – even if drought hit now, we could hold our heads up with confidence. We could not go back to how it was before’.  
| **Duration:** 60 minutes
Meeting with male community members and leaders discussed the positive impact of the borehole on the community and nomadic peoples who pass through. ‘Most of our suffering is due to water. If there is one thing to do to help the people here, it is providing water so we can be self-reliant. Now we are even thinking of farming. Before, we never had such hope.’ SRO analysed the problems, took proposal to NPA.

**Key points:** So far, water crises have been managed peacefully with the borehole, even though many come for water. SRO and partnership with NPA are key to moving forward with micro-finance and other ideas. High levels of trust and cultural awareness – they are from the community and can cross between the community and INGO.

**Duration:** 50 minutes

**Benefits:** Steadfast Voluntary Organisation

**Attendees:** 5 male beneficiaries + 1 woman from Aroley village + 2 Evaluation team

Village women including 4 reps of 5 different committees: education, health, water and wellbeing. Reported that women are already on village committees and this has been empowering, but would welcome further chances for women since women’s participation is increasingly important for them. ‘As women, our greatest priority is our children and their health – we need trained health care staff’. Ideas for further development include training local women in health care, maternity care and microfinance training. ‘Education for our children is important – but it’s also important for us to develop our community’.

**Key points:** Relationship with SRO is considered strong and effective. SRO doesn’t have a top-down approach – genuinely try to find out what people need and want. Besides water, other tangible benefits include the fight against FGM and raising awareness of sanitation and latrine use.

**Duration:** 50 minutes

**Benefits:** Social Relief Organisation

**Attendees:** Canab, Farduse, Hawo, Hinda + 2 more (total of 7 female) beneficiaries from Shuluhluh village, Mr Ali Abdinoor Dhaqani, Program Manager + 2 Evaluation team

**Partners:** Social Relief Organisation

**Attendees:** Mr Abdirashid Jama Bihi, Director, Mr Ali Abdinoor Dhaqani, Programme Manager + 5 Evaluation team

**Partners:** HANAQAAD

**Attendees:** Ms Halimo Hasan Salah, Vice Chair, Mr Mohamed Hasan, Project Manager + 5 Evaluation team

**Beneficiaries:** HANAQAAD

**Attendees:** Rhoda, Najah, Sahra (3 women) + 2 Evaluation team

Women told their stories of becoming engaged with HANAQAAD, the only provision in the area with a particular focus on young women. One now has her own business, another is now studying at degree level and the last told
of her increased literacy and role as teacher and trainer for other women in project. Were first participants but through provided training and support have become empowered and skilled to develop their futures. 2 are HANAAQAAD volunteers, one employed. 'I am here because I see what HANAAQAAD can do for women and girls – I want to give something back'. ‘Before this place, it was like being in a dark room – I wasn’t able to think for myself’. Have increased confidence as well as communication skills, integration, literacy and socialisation.

**Key points:** Centre described as a second home and safe space for all, staff as role models and HANAAQAAD as special because engages with most needy, a place of trust and safety, and really understands community needs.

**Duration:** 50 minutes

### Beneficiaries: HANAAQAAD

**Attendees:** 5 women + 1 Evaluation team

Group of 5 IDP women displaced from Southern Somalia, aged 25-36yrs. Gave benefitted from non-food items from HANAAQAAD and their children attend the school there. FGM awareness-raising highlighted as a key learning for them that had challenged and changed their attitudes to this practice.

**Key points:** HANAAQAAD reflect NPA values and objectives not only by highlighting issues facing women, but also by empowering women to change their situation.

**Duration:** 45 minutes

### Beneficiaries: HANAAQAAD

**Attendees:** 2 women + 1 Evaluation team

HANAAQAAD did a survey in the market and house-to-house – the two women knew HANAAQAAD by reputation. ‘We were living in the belief that women were weak but now we know differently’. HANAAQAAD has created a place that is 100% safe for us to grow and learn. Now as trainers and volunteers we pout something back in. ‘Our sons support us but generally not many men do – men consider themselves superior and fear that women will control them – for men to change frightens them.’ They explained that women are safely and slowly changing through HANAAQAAD by (1) education, (2) economic empowerment, (3) trying to help male counterparts understand how important the female gender is. ‘When we empower ourselves economically, then we can sit down with the men and men are gradually accepting that change’.

**Key points:** see Case Study Appendix 15. Women delivering change

**Duration:** 45 minutes

### Partners: Las Anod Hospital

**Attendees:** Dr Mahamud Abdullahi Jirde, Regional Medical Officer, Dr Bile H Mohamud, Asst Regional Medical Officer, Ms Fima Kosofare, Director of Las Anod Hospital, Mr Abdiqani Aw Dahir, Health Committee Member, Ms Halimo Hasan, Regional Polio Officer

Visit to Las Anod hospital – financially supported by NPA between 1994-2008. Team met the regional medical officer and staff members who told of challenges the hospital faces: a community who refuse to use the facilities from lack of confidence in provision. Would-be patients would rather travel long distances and risk death than be treated at Las Anod. NPA has continued to advocate for and attempted to work through some of the difficulties. Hospital has no basic facilities; TB and other specific interventions are funded separately. Project needs funding.

**Key points:** Patients no longer have faith in the hospital and this faith needs to be restored by incrementally building skilled, effective services there. Would NPA be able to assist or recommend to other potential funders that the hospital is an essential service with insufficient support and is at present unable to meet the need of a big town like Las Anod.

**Duration:** 60 minutes

### Partners: Las Anod based partners – debrief session

**Attendees:** SRO, SVO, HANAAQAAD staff (6), 3 NPA office team + 5 Evaluation team

Final meeting with partners to provide feedback on findings and opportunities for further partner exploration. Workshop-style exploration of partnership pros and cons. Robust, in-depth discussion on topic of HA context.

**Key points:** NPA working in areas of highest levels of need, in difficult circumstances – and setting the example for local NGO’s in doing so. Sustainable change is achieved through partnership approach. Main points recorded and incorporated into Appendix 8 on reasons for and against working with local partners.

**Duration:** 60 minutes
| Officials: Vice Minister for the Interior, Hargeisa  
Attendees: Vice Minister of Interior HE Osman Garaad Soofe Duraan, his advisor + 4 evaluation team |
|---|
| Welcome dinner and introduction to ministry's work, security and aspirations for Somaliland.  
**Key points**: NPA working in areas of highest levels of need, in difficult circumstances – and setting the example for local NGO’s in doing so. Sustainable change is achieved through partnership approach. Stands ready to assist and support NPA and would welcome a strengthened relationship with them.  
**Duration**: 90 minutes |

| Officials: Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources, Hargeisa  
Attendees: Mr Hussein Ahmed Abdule + 4 evaluation team |
|---|
| Recognised the importance of the work of NPA in some of the most remote and needy areas of SOOL, CAYN and SANAAG regions.  
**Key points**: NPA working in areas of highest levels of need, in difficult circumstances – and setting the example for local NGO’s in doing so. Sustainable change is achieved through partnership approach. Respect and appreciate all that NPA does, is ready to support NPA and strengthen the relationship. Would appreciate the chance to visit NPA field sites.  
**Duration**: 60 minutes |

| Officials: UN AIDS Programme  
Attendees: Mr Gary P Jones, (Former NPA Somalia Country Director) Senior Aids Security and Humanitarian Advisor + Scott Jones and Kelly Simcock |
|---|
| Explored informant’s view and experiences of HA in context of NPA and in his wider work. Big challenges in defining HA, and important to consider the term in the context of work in protracted crises. Reflected on the ‘special’ qualities of NPA’s approach to HA and commitment to organic development, focussed on genuine community engagement and partnership. ‘Development under the acacia tree.’ NPA has long avoided dogmatic, top-down approach of other NGO’s, leading to successes in areas no others can succeed or dare work. Challenge is to remain relevant where other organisations have developed sophisticated approaches and/or marketing.  
**Key points**: Partnerships are necessary to successful delivery of HA. NPA needs to revisit its vision and mission and coalesce around key themes or specialisms to find clarity of direction and focus. Discussed various opportunities for NPA given its unique, developmental approach to working with communities in HA. Research, thematic leadership in the field (e.g. women’s participation) and potential to play convening role as secretariat hosting NGO’s working towards specific themes or areas of best practice.  
**Duration**: 75 minutes |

| Officials: Norwegian Embassy  
Attendees: Ms Hilde Solbakken, Chargé d'affaires; Ms Beate Bull, First Secretary, + Scott Jones (initially included also Haifa Jammal, Ahmed Farah Mohamed, Khomis Chome Abdi) |
|---|
| Considerable respect and admiration for all the work that is being done in Sool and Sanaag but need to know more about impact and follow-up, how impact is measured and how analytical tools are used. It would be useful to know how NPA leverage other organisations to come in and work in alliance and consortia. Efforts are fragmented and all agencies come to the embassy.  
**Key points**: NPA is admired but needs to improve analysis (especially risk, needs, stakeholders and potential consortia), impact measurement and documentation.  
**Duration**: 75 minutes |
Appendix 6. Conditions for Success in Humanitarian Assistance

All partners, NPA officials and external stakeholders were asked about the ‘ideal’ conditions that need to exist in order to make humanitarian assistance successful generally, and for NPA’s work specifically. There was considerable agreement among them. The list below draws together their responses and the evaluator’s ideas:

“… A generosity of understanding”

- **Pre-established relationships** that are proven and trusted, and have legitimacy – primarily among partners, partner networks, alliances. These relationships should have a strong reputation and in-country ‘standing,’ good donor connections, good donor understanding about NPA and how NPA works, and the ability to quickly connect and mitigate locally.

- **Clear systems, procedures, supply chains and logistics** shared by NPA, local partners, and alliance, so that everyone knows the system to follow regarding assessments, proposal formats, reporting, etc. Several people felt that NPA needed to ‘professionalise,’ have stronger systems, dedicated humanitarian assistance staff at head office and either having dedicated staff in-country, or the ability to hire dedicated staff.

- **Effective coordination** with no overlapping, with a strong connection to head office, and communications that are as direct as possible between the field and head office.

- **A rapid needs assessment** that can translate into realistic, high quality proposal writing and the capacity to fundraise.

- **Accountability, transparency**, and keeping everyone informed, especially in the media covering the emergency.

- **A strong, organised civil society**. Some informants said that one of NPA’s strengths is that it strengthens civil society. Others said that an NPA weakness is that it is more dependent than other agencies on a strong civil society. The language of Resilience helps make these views more coherent.

- **Good local knowledge and ability to critically assess context** (political context, key power players, political leadership [not necessarily local authorities], geography, people, …).

- **Strong, effective local partners** that have the capacity to respond quickly (including no conflicts of interest), manage transitions from long-term development to humanitarian assistance work, the ability to influence, are sensitive to cooperation mechanisms with local authorities (community authorities, government and/or non-government), have staff that can easily ‘blend in,’ and at least some that can play a part in later phases.

- **A clear, transparent decision-making process** that is agile, so that NPA can decide within hours what it is doing, as free from bureaucracy and constraints as possible. This is especially with regard to working with local partners and actors as much as possible, but also **knowing how to scale up** with others where local capacity or civil society cannot do so. A ‘top-to-bottom’ consensus on the approach.
- **Strong analytical capacity and improvisation skills** so that problem identification and response is based on sound, accessible, agreed and shared understanding, with good triangulation.

- **Situate NPA’s humanitarian assistance explicitly in evolving peace processes** where this is possible. Demonstrate a willingness to take informed risks and deploy staff and resource flexibly.

- **Resource flow that is flexible and fast** (either pre-positioning or rapid deployment is critical), so that resource can be released quickly, whether it is funding, 'in-kind' means, personnel, stand-by teams, technical inputs, logistical support and so forth. Pre-positioning of funds and materials is still the ideal. NPA could probably not always achieve this, although through alliance(s) pre-positioning may be achievable in certain locations. If pre-positioning isn’t achievable, rapid release of resource is a priority. Being able to maintain a good pace.

- **Coherent conceptual thinking and approach across NPA**, for example within the International Department and between it and other departments. This includes a conceptual understanding and agreement on the importance of local action, resilience building, downward accountability to communities, the importance of national partners (including local government and local authorities), and an intelligent approach to decision-making regarding any NPA operationality where operationality could add value – to complement local partnerships and actions rather than displace them.

- **Clear thinking on what NPA could do to support local and national government bodies** who are acting on the crisis – not driven by political / ideological issues but committed to local support.

- **Stable international and Norwegian policy** to enable planning for >1 year.

- **Strong, coherent administrative routines**.

- **Knowing how the UN sees the situation**.
Appendix 7. Beneficiary and partner discussion on differences and similarities between Humanitarian Assistance, Long-term Development and Resilience in NPA programmes in Somalia

Humanitarian Assistance & Relief

- Life-saving
- Medicine
- Shelter
- Refugees
- Reduction of human suffering
- Loss of family
- Loss of animals
- Drought
- Famine
- Crisis
- Disaster
- Violence against women
- Food trucks
- Water tanker
- Food distribution
- Food for training
- Child labour
- Lack of opportunity
- Ignorance – not knowing what to do
- Insecurity
- Violence
- Conflict
- Water
- Hygiene
- Animal protection
- Soil erosion control
- Restoration
- Environmental protection
- Improvement of judicial system
- Good governance
- Rights-based approaches
- Institution building
- Infrastructure
- Health & social infrastructure

Long-term Development

- Participation
- Education
- Capacity building
- Job creation – entrepreneurship & self-employment
- Empowerment – “realise the potential within”
- Advocacy
- Equal power and resource
- Peace building
- Youth development
- Gender balance

Resilience & Reducing Vulnerability

- People needing each other
- Diversity in society
- Diversifying economy
- Equal access to resources
- Mechanisms for recovery in place
- Early warning
- Encouragement
  - Feeling
  - Confidence
  - Space to be
- Local capacity to act locally
- Having alternatives
- Equal opportunity
  - Minorities
  - Men and women
  - Special needs
  - Regional
  - Status – can all access the wealth of the country?
- Programmes that promote the true aspects of diversity
- Rights-based approaches
- Health & social infrastructure
- Gender
- Balance
- Life-saving
- Child labour
- Poverty
- Violence against women
- Violence
- Conflict
- Food
- Water
- Hygiene
- Animal protection
- Soil erosion control
- Restoration
- Environmental protection
- Infrastructure
- Institution building
- Rights-based approaches
- Good governance
- Improvement of judicial system

Humanitarian Assistance & Relief

- Reduction of human suffering
- Life-saving
- Medical supplies
- Shelter
- Refugees
- Food distribution
- Food for training
- Child labour
- Lack of opportunity
- Ignorance – not knowing what to do
- Insecurity
- Violence
- Conflict
- Water
- Hygiene
- Animal protection
- Soil erosion control
- Restoration
- Environmental protection
- Improvement of judicial system
- Good governance
- Rights-based approaches
- Institution building
- Infrastructure
- Health & social infrastructure
Appendix 8. NPA Humanitarian Assistance and Relief – reasons for / against working with local partners; points from partners, beneficiaries and evaluation team in mini-workshops

**The case for working with local partners in HA and R**

- Partners add their contributions – new partners; volunteers; members' contributions
- Ownership of intervention – the more beneficiaries feel “this is ours,” the more sustainable it is.
- Running costs lower – e.g. local partner salaries, allowances
- Operational reasons* – local knowledge; access (*see opposite)
- In depth cultural understanding / sensitivity
- No other actor, e.g. state, Can’t act without a local partner
- Better able to intervene in conflict (can go direct to village authority)
- Accuracy of information & the right local contacts
- Committed to the long-term and more accountable to the community
- Local partners often lead in a crisis – First Responders
- A strong local NGO can attract other INGOs – releasing NPA.
- Can continue beyond the emergency, after NPA exit; e.g. with conflict resolution
- Opportunity to influence political change; e.g. rights of women
- Able to manage transitions; swift action from development to crisis response
- Where is ‘my NPA’ – stakeholder funding for NPA (labour unions; residents)
- Policy alignment: with - MFA, MEID - UN and international actors

*Added Value of working with and through partners – operational and practical considerations

- Better able than outsiders to manage local expectations
- Share values of NPA – can do more together, working toward common vision
- Security of NPA staff
- Speed and accuracy of response
- Better able to assess, take and manage risks
- Local partners more accessible to the local community than INGO. Can visit the field more often
- Trust and acceptance by local people; authenticity of perceptions
- Easier facilitation of access, including distant vulnerable groups
- People can be mobilized quickly (partner is knowledgeable and trusted by INGO and by the community)
- Knowing specific of how a community responds in a crisis

**The case for not working with local partners in HA and R**

- Less value for money – more individuals reached in arms-length programs
- Capacity gaps – unable to scale up in a crisis
- Others may do it better – NRC, Red Cross
- Not all partners can respond competently in a crisis
- Marketing challenges (fatigue)
- Local partners can be biased; e.g. political bias – don’t treat all equally in a crisis
- Others have more reach (e.g. > area coverage)
- Excessive negative empowerment of a partner in a crisis
- Others have more expertise
- Local balance may be disturbed if one partner empowered more than others
- Partner does not follow govt. rules or goes against the govt.
- If there are many local NGOs in a crisis, selection can be a problem
- If assessment is weak, partner selection can be poor
- No time – perhaps there are no clear local partners but NPA still feels it must respond

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Appendix 9. Case Study: Working in geographically dispersed locations

NPA’s partnership approach brings a host of different benefits and values to the interventions it provides, particularly when it comes to working in locations where the target populations are in geographically dispersed locations.

Lebanon presented three different types of settlement patterns for refugee populations:

1. Overcrowded settlements: Initially Palestinians settlements, now with additional Syrian Palestinians
2. Relatively transient groups in small to medium sized tented settlements.
3. Relatively stable (more secure) concreted prefabs.

The first type of settlement allows for access to many people and for putting in place sustainable arrangements to provide longer-term support. Challenges include the tensions this can create between the communities in need and the host communities.

The other types of less permanent settlement have the advantage of reducing the risk of political conflict and tension with host communities. However, they present disadvantages regarding NGO’s ability to coordinate and provide direct relief that reaches these widely spread communities – and in particular when adverse conditions such as rain or snow hit.

The value of local partnership approaches in overcoming these disadvantages was evident when it came to serving those dispersed populations of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Settlements were widely spread across the landscape, with smaller groupings pitched around the valley in relatively small clusters. Through its ‘on the ground’ presence and delivery through local partners, NPA have been able to identify needs and respond quickly and efficiently to a dynamic and changing population.

A specific example is the e-card project, delivered with local partner Vision Association. Vision, through its local volunteers, was able to quickly build a picture of the areas in need – including assessing individual families and groups. Service delivery included visiting individual families’ houses to inform them of the initiative and to signpost people to other services and support where appropriate. Use of venues such as local mosques as places to register and distribute cards evidenced how local partners innovated to meet the needs of the population. This approach also built confidence and trust in the refugee communities by giving the organisation a ‘face’.

During the evaluation team’s visit, however, it became apparent that the challenges facing NPA and its partners go beyond distribution and identifying populations. These situations present unique challenges in terms of risk and conflict for the staff working with these communities. The desperation of some families and individuals means that the teams can be faced with hostility and threats in relatively remote and isolated encampments. This was evident when the evaluation team and its facilitators were met by a desperate group of refuges angry at the perceived injustice of allegedly being abandoned and excluded by the UN.

On the one hand, the partnership approach clearly added value through a flexible and agile delivery model. On the other, it also highlighted some of the challenges facing NPA and its partners in terms of identifying, mitigating and managing risk and conflict.
Appendix 10. Case Study: PARD

The relationship between Popular Aid for Relief and Development (PARD) and NPA dates back to 1985, when PARD worked closely with NPA Country Director Wafa Yasir through a time of great crisis in Lebanon during the ‘War on the Camps’. This saw Palestinian civilians fleeing the camps into displacement centres and gatherings, and PARD’s activists provided essential emergency relief for affected communities.

PARD works to improve the social, health and environmental conditions of marginalised and vulnerable groups. It aims to achieve this mainly within Palestinian camps and gatherings and mainly through water and sanitation programmes, mother and child services, and by empowering the youth and local communities. It does so by delivering training and support that may be considered ‘long term development’ activities with the aim of reducing vulnerability and building resilience and capacity in communities, thus increasing their ability to cope in emergency situations. It continues to provide direct support and relief to people in times of emergency and disaster. ‘We cover the gaps where UNRWA is unable to – their support does not extend to the illegal settlement and gatherings, and this is where we step in. Someone has to do it’, explains Rita Hamdan, General Director.

As an organisation that began as grassroots and activist-based, with many members from Palestinian diaspora communities in Lebanon, PARD has received ongoing support from NPA. This is not only financial, but also in its development, capacity building of staff, and strategy development support.

Given the unique nature of PARD and the vulnerable communities it targets (including those on ‘illegal’ settlements and gatherings), it has extensive experience working with communities at the front line in times of crisis. The 1996 war with Israel saw communities in Lebanon hit hard, and lessons from this led to PARD developing a Contingency [emergency] Plan.

A decade later, in 2006, violent conflict took place between Israel and Lebanon, and the already impoverished Palestinian communities were badly affected. PARD mobilised immediately, using the Contingency Plan. The organisation worked with a wider committee of NGO’s to coordinate the emergency response. It drew on a list of existing, trained volunteers (e.g. WASH, Sphere) and ‘contingency’ staff to mobilise. The sophistication of PARD’s plan, the networks developed, the level of contact between and within communities, and its extensive knowledge of those communities led to PARD and the emergency committee being asked by the Lebanese government, and the local governor, to coordinate crisis response efforts. Through the Contingency Plan, details ranging from the names of key individuals to log frames detailing action plans and pathways were already in place. From organising ‘welcome committees’ for refugees to help identify and register need, to providing hot meals by the end of day two, PARD’s efforts were a huge success meeting the needs and providing relief for desperate communities.

NPA continued to provide ‘on the ground’ support during this crisis through its role on the coordination committees and by drafting funding proposals to ensure that emergency items and resources could go where they were most needed – to its partner organisations delivering on the frontline.

PARD’s ability to transition from ‘business as usual’ to an ‘emergency response’ model is evident, with a track record to prove that this is not only possible, but it also has impressive results. As the custodian and leader of the Contingency Plan it manages quickly to reach affected communities and respond at a pace that other local and international NGO’s would struggle to do. PARD’s on the ground presence and profile within communities that are affected by protracted crises and conflict mean that it is able to gain trust and confidence, and establish itself and its partners quickly in areas and within communities that other NGO’s might spend weeks trying to map.

Since its inception, PARD has been supported and funded by NPA. Whilst the funding has not been continuous and has been subject to annual review, NPA’s support has enabled PARD to develop its structures, systems and capacity through the provision of sustained and ongoing support.
Appendix 11. Case Study: Mousawat

Mousawat is a unique organisation that aims to promote equality and equitable opportunity for people with disabilities, including refugees, in Lebanon. It promotes a rights based development approach in social policy empowering and mobilising people with disabilities, enhancing their participation, accessibility and inclusion. It targets the most deprived, poorest and underprivileged in society and as such, works primarily with Palestinian refugees within Lebanon who have very little access to services and provision outside of this organisation.

Mousawat was born of the shift by NPA from being operational to working through partners. The organisation was established in 2008 and the ‘legal separation’ from NPA took place some 18 months hence. The organisation has a multi-purpose rehabilitation centre in Mar Elias camp, Beirut. Outreach and rehabilitation provision is provided in camps in the North and South of Lebanon and in 3 other camps. An organisation that started with one financed project now boasts six different projects with funders including the EU, World Vision and UNICEF. Mousawat has developed a strategy and set of objectives that it hopes will enable it to maintain its position as the leading provider of services for Palestinian and other minority groups in Lebanon.

The conflict in Syria has presented new challenges for Mousawat as the influx of Palestinian Syrians into Lebanese refugee camps has further increased demands on its services. In addition, many of the prospective beneficiaries arrive at Mousawat with injuries and disabilities caused as a result of the violence of war, ranging from paralysis to severe mental trauma. The demands on Mousawat are increasing and whilst it has the capability to respond to this, it struggles to raise the capital required to fund key salaries such as those of core staff: ‘Funders are willing to fund project outcomes – but not the salaries of our staff’. Mousawat’s geographic reach as a ‘local’ partner operating on the Syrian border means that it is well placed to continue its unique provision of humanitarian support for those facing a life without the most basic of freedoms. It has established a network of partners in Damascus and has a key base in Aleppo: ‘We have transported 30 wheelchairs across the border into Syria under very challenging circumstances – but this type of work requires significant resources’.

Mousawat’s experience, professionalism, presence and extensive networks demonstrate how a local partner can provide humanitarian assistance and relief to the most vulnerable. It is clearly an example of how NPA has worked strategically with a partner to establish and support a unique and much needed provision. Given that UNRWA’s annual budget for people with disabilities sits at $20,000 per year, NPA and its partner are significantly contributing to filling the gaps where others cannot or are not.
Appendix 12. Case Study: Youth Can Do It!

‘Humanitarian assistance should avoid charity. Think first and see the humanity of the person. If that relief does not respect the dignity of that individual and see that education and other things matter as much – they miss the point.’ Kassem Aina, Executive Director of NISCVT, Lebanon

Youth Can Do It! (YCDI) is an NPA campaign inspired by its sister initiative Women Can Do It! YCDI initially saw NPA operating with 5 different strategic partners in 5 camps across Lebanon. Its aims are to ‘empower, motivate and encourage young people to become active in their political and civic life.’

Working with 180 young people as direct beneficiaries per year, the project draws $100,000 from an annual $800,000 NPA budget for young people and education. It equips young people with skills, confidence and capacity to deliver projects, advocate for solutions to the issues affecting them and their communities, and train their peers within the camps to increase participation and empowerment. It has established clear results to date, with hundreds of young people trained to sustain delivery.

YCDI seeks to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience and capacity in young people by equipping them to take control of their own lives and destinies. The project has led to young people campaigning to improve the electrical networks, increase environmental health and garbage management, and reduce violence against children. All campaigns aim to alleviate suffering and tackle root causes that could lead to further humanitarian crises. This demonstrates their strong connection to NPA Lebanon’s humanitarian assistance and relief aims.

The evaluation team met with several different partner organisations and their beneficiaries to hear about the challenges facing young people in refugee camps and the successes of their interventions. The story of YCDI in Nahr El Bared camp is one example of positive impact. Extremist activity increased in this camp after the 2006 ‘war on the camps’, and the risks facing young people increased dramatically as extremism became seen as a ‘quick and easy’ solution to grievances. This threatened to prolong the existing conflict if youth without a cause or purpose continued to join extremist groups.

‘We had real problems following 2006, it is worrying to see just how many young people had been drawn in and affected by this. The programme has thrown a stone into the water – we can see things have changed… we have to find a way to continue to support the work with the youth.’ Abdullah, Programme Manager, NISCVT, Nahr El Bahred

Developing a network of young actors who had benefitted from YCDI and were committed to its aims profoundly impacted on other young people who had been less able to see ‘life beyond the camp’. Young beneficiaries, activists and volunteers from Nahr el-Bared stated that YCDI has raised participation, aspiration, and enabled them to see positive roles within the camp and futures outside it.

A second example of YCDI’s direct connection to the HA agenda was the ‘Refugee to Refugee’ project by a group of young people in Ein El Helweh camp. This trained group of young activists led a consultation with a newly arrived group of Syrian refugees living in tented accommodation. Struck by the deprivation and challenges these people faced, the group published a report on their needs that attracted attention to their plight, leading to partners and donors providing relief and further support.

‘NPA is working with the most marginalised, vulnerable communities in the whole of Lebanon in a protracted humanitarian crisis – you cannot say that this is not humanitarian assistance.’ Sophia Darwiche, NPA Programme coordinator

The traditional distinction between HA and longer term development might class YCDI as LTD. Whilst it may be argued that the divide between these two areas is to some degree artificial because of how systemically NPA works, there remain clear and compelling arguments for NPA to continue supporting this work within Lebanon. YCDI continues to deliver to NPA’s political agenda by furthering advocacy and campaigns on the right of return, amongst others. Furthermore, it equips young people with the skills, understanding, confidence and competence to reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience to further humanitarian crises.

There are also wider considerations for NPA and the Norwegian government funding partners. The fight against violent extremism is something that Norway is grappling with as it works to recover from the horrific events of July 22nd 2011. By working to provide alternative paths to Palestinian youths in desperate communities where the seeds of extremism could easily be propagated, NPA really could be addressing some of the root causes of extremism.
Appendix 13. Case Study: Water, wells and tankers

“Most of our suffering is due to water. If there is one thing to do to help the people here, it is provide water so we can be self-reliant. Now we are even thinking of farming. Before, we never had such hope.” (Male farmer, Sool)

It is not easy in a protracted crisis to distinguish between emergency relief and long-term development. The case of water in Somalia helps us to frame the question.

Emergency water provision involves trucking. When there is serious drought, NPA has trucked water for distances of over 200km. This is an emergency response that no one would think of as a long-term, sustainable solution – it is much more in the style of NPA and external assistance, than it is about local partners and internal capacity building.

The next short-term step often includes basic, low cost approaches such as small dams and pits, while long-term change involves digging boreholes. Boreholes enable water trucking in an emergency to be undertaken over shorter distances, maybe 30km. This saves time, money and environmental costs, and delivers assistance more effectively and efficiently. Digging boreholes across a drought-prone area thus reduces vulnerability in future drought-related crises.

Another outcome is the increased sense of stability and potential that comes from having a more reliable water supply. Pastoralists, for example, talked to us about how they might diversify into farming. This speaks to their increased confidence and capacity to build resilience from within.

In this case, the overarching NPA philosophy of local empowerment and working through local partners seems to provide a perfect fit between emergency relief, on the one hand, and, on the other, working with traditional leadership and knowledge to reduce vulnerability and enhance prospects for stability and development. This is an incredible achievement anywhere. In a place where two, possibly three administrations are fighting for territory and where no other INGO maintains on-the-ground presence, it is truly fantastic.

As a caveat, however, the mechanism for maintaining the boreholes no longer works well. Although community capacity to raise funds is still in place and well supported by local partners and NPA country teams, the communities cannot easily secure the purchase of repair and maintenance work because the relevant ‘state’ agency no longer exists. This issue of sustainability is uppermost in NPA and country partners’ thoughts as future plans are laid out.

But the real point is that local authorities and local people are, for now, the point of influence and change by partners. The door is very much open for NPA country managers on the possibility of enhanced relationship building among competing ‘state’ authorities.

As the macro-level political context is in a state of flux and not easily resolved, NPA and partners are building resilience on the ground in one of the most dangerous places in the world. Not only that, local people are confident, excited and interested in exploring farming to strengthen livelihoods.
Appendix 14. Case Study: Women delivering change

The work of NPA and their partners with women in Lebanon and Somalia has the potential to be a real flagship for NPA in terms of strategic, political change. NPA supported programmes with local partners clearly demonstrate:

a. Gendered aspects of humanitarian assistance being addressed during and after crisis, linking crisis intervention / relief work and long-term development
b. People feeling safe and strengthening after personal and collective crises
c. Strategic aims and objectives being achieved at a grassroots level,
d. Women engaged in family and community politics,
e. Strong momentum toward participation in democratic processes,
f. People taking delight in their achievements and those of others around them.

The ‘Women Can Do It!’ and the ‘Violence Against Women’ programmes in Lebanon are not just about empowering women with the confidence and skills to participate. They are about creating the conditions in which women can participate, individually and collectively. At the time of crisis the programmes provide support, reduce vulnerability and build resilience. The confidence and capacity building, for example in influencing and ‘leading,’ comes afterwards.

NPA Lebanon recognises these connections between immediate relief and longer-term development and as such, is funding those projects that enable women to help create the conditions for political change. Speaking with partners and beneficiaries it is clear that this is not ‘done to’ them with a top-down approach but is rather a process of careful negotiation and dialogue to understand needs, identify gaps and ensure that the impact of the work is understood and reflected in programme developments.

A Najhdeh Association worker said - 'We prefer to call it partnership, not relationship... they [NPA] come in and work with us to identify the gaps and the correct project'. She added that Najdeh invited NPA to join a strategy group to support the development of the organisation. The situation is similar in PARD. Although NPA are not their largest donor, the value added by having NPA involved is recognised and sought.

Examples of innovation and impact through partnerships in humanitarian assistance include:

- Women supporting other women in the projects, e.g. one Syrian women said ‘Just the fact that she comes and knocks on my door makes such a difference ... she might not have food or anything else to offer, but she helps me keep my strength.'

- Dignity Kits were described as examples of how to look at the human being and understand what they really need. One woman said “… people need more than just food and water. Dignity and respect are critical to maintain human spirit."

- Workshops in camps being delivered are also attracting the men to the conversation. The ‘forum theatre’ being run in Beddawi goes beyond immediate ‘relief’ (of violence against women) through counseling and is building longer term sustainability by challenging complex, male dominated politics in society.

- There is no sense of the programmes being imposed – they are owned by the women. An external evaluator can see this through the way they name their projects and through the way women now lead and innovate. Women know they are a part of ‘Women Can Do It!’ – NPA’s name is known and associated with the programme, but they are in the background and partners are leading successfully.

- The network element and sense of connectedness among is clearly adding great
value. Participants know and feel they're part of something bigger. This in itself provides a confidence in an identity and a profile that supports political influence.

The journey toward democratic participation for women in Lebanon is by no means easy. But the years of experience, strong networks and the critical mass of women who are involved, means that those programmes are perhaps a little further down the road than in Sool, Sanaaq and Cayn.

The structural barriers in Somalia are indeed great. Conditions are harsh. The forces hindering change can be dangerous. NPA staff and partners have been imprisoned for disturbing the status quo. People have had to leave the country in fear for their lives; al-Shabab has said, "If you work for a western agency we will kill you." And they have carried out this threat. It is not without reason that all INGOs bar NPA have pulled out of Sool and Sanaaq, and that local NGOs are few and far between.

Yet in these areas, GECPD and HANAQAAD are at the forefront of some of the most challenging, innovative and inspiring work that the evaluators have seen. These organisations meet people on their own terms, in their own places, and ensure that relief and humanitarian assistance are provided sensitively and accurately. While there is no evidence of a larger women-focussed entity in Somalia (yet), the potential for political change through women is very great and surely has to be a top priority and overarching goal. This is a critical ground for development that springs directly from crisis intervention as well as strategic initiatives in education and employment.

In Somalia, like Lebanon, there is a sense of connection into something bigger.

'I felt like I was in a dark room before I came to this place - it opened my eyes to the fact that we can do something. We can think. We can have a voice.'
(HANAQAAD beneficiary)

Difficult though it is, networks to share practice and connect women are growing. Further NPA support for this could add even greater value. These forums can go beyond sharing practice and strengthening identity and ensure that women can properly prepare for political opportunities. We had the strongest sense that the humanitarian assistance work with women in Somalia contains untapped additional value for NPA that is worthy of even closer and deeper evaluation than has been possible to date.
Appendix 15. Documents Read (Not all documents have authors or dates)

Africa Development Torch, Final Evaluation of the Emergency food crisis response project in Panyikang County, (upper Nile) and Leer Country (Unity State), March 2013.
Healthcare Association Lebanon, Outcomes 2012-2013.
KPMG, Audit of NPA North Somali emergency project, August 2003-2005.
Myanmar Political Work, Perspectives of a practitioner, PowerPoint.
Middle East and North Africa Application, Democratisation in Middle East and North Africa, Egypt and Tunisia, 2014-2016.
Ministry of Social Development, Gender and Religious Affairs, Gender Strategic plan for Central Equatoria state, 2009-2014.
NISCVT, Prospectus.
NMFA, Grant approval letter for NPA Somalia Post drought livelihoods recovery in SOOL and SANAAG region, April 2010.
NMFA, Letter approving humanitarian assistance and livelihood support project in SOOL region Somalia, November 2009.
NMFA, Template for final report to NMFA on use of grants, budget chapter 163 item & 164.7
NPA, Concept note: Response to the crisis in Syria NPA’s analysis, approach and capacity, September 2012.
NPA, Closure of NPA’s Programmes and Representation in Sri Lanka, March 2011.
NPA, Learning from Change.
NPA, Letter to NMFA regarding Project estimates for 2010, SOOL and SANAAG.
NPA, Letter to USAID requesting Somalia Programme project extension, March 2006.
NPA, Mapping Norwegian NGOs’ in Lebanon for the Syria crisis.
NPA, Memo to NPA Management team from Svein Olsen re. advance for Somalia programme, February 2011.
NPA, Observing Change and PMR, October 2010.
NPA, Partnership Policy, February 2009.
NPA, PowerPoint Sudan En Risiskovurdering, March 2011.
NPA, Principles and Value basis 2011-2015.
NPA, Solidarity and Practice, undated.
NPA, Final report (to MAFA) association Najdeh, Women’s Rights – Combating Violence Against Women, June 2012.
NPA Honduras, Selection of partners and analysis of stakeholders, 2013.
NPA Iraq, Proposal for immediate relief to Syria, December 2012.
NPA Iraq, Syria Risk review diagnostic, 2013.


NPA Lebanon, *Proposal to MFA for Annual Budget*.


NPA Lebanon, various summary sheets on camps visited and associated projects.


NPA Mines and Arms Department, *Portfolio 2012*.


NPA, *Observing Change, Results Based Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, 2010*


NPA Somalia, *Humanitarian assistance and livelihood support project, Project Status and Revised Budget*, October 2009.


NPA South Sudan, *Peacebuilding and recovery project, NMFA project proposal*, Feb. 2014.


PARD, *Summary of Services*.

PARD, *Emergency plan and Strategic plan*.


Solidar Suisse, *Relief aid assistance to Syrian refugees Bekaa Valley, Lebanon*.


Agreement (and amendment) between UN OCHA and NPA, on SOOL/SANAAG Drought Emergency Response Project, July 2009.

Empowering Palestinian Women in Lebanon for Active Participation.

Example of a proposal to the Norwegian embassy in Lebanon by an NPA partner.


Youth Can Do It! Report 2010-2013.

NPA Somalia documents – various internal documents relating to post drought livelihoods recovery in SOOL and SANAAG region, 2011 and beyond.
Appendix 16. Extracts from ‘Missed Opportunities’


Partnerships with national and local actors have long been identified as a source of problems in international humanitarian aid. Major evaluations of numerous high profile humanitarian crises … have identified insufficient investment in, and commitment to, such partnerships as the biggest hinderance to effective performance. The reality is that efforts to work with national and local actors do not play a central role in the majority of international humanitarian work. This … longstanding systemic issue for the sector as a whole … has persisted despite … efforts made by individual agencies to invest time and effort in this area.

A number of the INGO organisations have used partnerships – partly or exclusively – as the means by which they respond to new and emerging humanitarian crises. … However, the approach taken to partnerships in the majority of humanitarian responses tends to be reactive, driven by emergency, and shaped by ad-hoc interactions that take place at the point of crisis. The sector is not yet systematic about partnerships: how they are thought about, designed, implemented or assessed.

Key messages
- Conventional aid delivery approaches often criticised for … lack of relevance and appropriateness, … evidence shows that well-designed partnerships can militate against these issues.
- Partnerships can do this by ensuring programme design that is contextually appropriate, culturally sensitive, responsive to needs, and based on communities’ own understanding.
- Partner-based responses can be fast, responsive, and well prepared for action.
- Partner-based responses can contribute to accountability and community engagement.
- Issues of coordination, learning and human resources are as much an issue for partners as they are for the wider system.
- Efficiency should not be reduced to a simplistic assessment of how cheap a response can be, but should be based on an understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of partnership work in different settings.
- Cost savings of partnerships can be considerable, in terms of staff costs, but most other aspects of financing a humanitarian response are at parity with international efforts.
- Costs of partnerships that need to be considered in any efficiency assessment include setting up, maintaining and ongoing capacity support.
- Coverage is a major limiting factor for partnerships, as seen by partnership-focused agencies and direct delivery organisations alike.
- Partners themselves suggest that the issue is less about delivering effective programmes at scale, and more about spending.
- There is a need for the humanitarian sector to engage more closely with large NNGOs and governmental ancillaries and bodies on issues of scale and coverage.
- National partners can clearly help to smooth the links between resilience, preparedness, response, recovery and development.
- They cannot do this unless funding NGOs and donors put their house in order – otherwise the institutional divides simply get transferred down the system.
- The resilience agenda has potential to address this issue, but more needs to be done to position it as a means of bridging the humanitarian development divide if it is going to tap this potential.

Summative Key Messages

1. Factors beyond the sector are pushing for a greater localization of aid – these include the range and complexity of disasters, growing numbers of middle-income countries, and the perceived performance of the international community.
2. Within the sector, while there has been some rhetorical attention to partnerships, funding and organisational structures still largely give preference to international actors over national ones.
3. There is scope and space for a renewed focus on capacity and partnerships as a result of the attention being paid to resilience and innovation.
## Appendix 17. Itinerary for Lebanon


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saturday 29 March 2014</strong></td>
<td>09:30 – 12:30</td>
<td>Meeting with NPA Staff: Wafa el-Yassir, Haifa Jammal, Safia Darwiche, Khaled Yamout, Taj el-Kaissi Presentation about NPA Lebanon Work in Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Bourj el-Barajneh Camp: Meeting with Partners and Beneficiaries National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services – NAVTSS, Mrs. Soukeina Salemeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunday 30 March 2014</strong></td>
<td>8:00</td>
<td>Bekaa visit - Meeting with Partners and Beneficiaries. Vision Association: Mr. Nasser Abou Lteif – President, Mr. Nassim Abed el-Khaleq – Programs Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monday 31 March 2014</strong></td>
<td>9:30 – 10:30</td>
<td>Meeting with the Norwegian Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Meeting with NISCVT Director, Mr. Kassem Aina</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:30 – 15:30</td>
<td>Shatilla &amp; Surrounding Gatherings: Meeting with Partners and Beneficiaries Popular Aid for Relief and Development – PARD: Mrs. Rita Hamdan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Meeting with NPA Country Director – Mrs. Wafa el-Yassir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tuesday 1 April 2014</strong></td>
<td>8:00</td>
<td>Beddawi and Nahr el Bared Camps in North Lebanon: Meeting with Partners and Beneficiaries (Najdeh Association and National Institution for Social Care and Vocational Training – NISCVT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday 2 April 2014</strong></td>
<td>9:00 – 10:00</td>
<td>Meeting with Safia Darwiche – NPA Program Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:30 – 11:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Najdeh Association Director, Mrs. Leila el-Ali</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11:30 – 14:15</td>
<td>Visiting Mar Elias Camp: Meeting with Partners and Beneficiaries (Moussawat), Mr. Kassem Sabbah, and Visiting Youth for Development – YFD (previous operational vocational training program of NPA), Mr. Mohammad Kassem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Syrian Partners: Meeting with Previous partnerships and potential partners: Aidoun Syria, Mr. Raja Dib, Jafra Foundation, Mr. Wissam Sabaneh, Mr. Oussama, Najda Now, Mrs. Khawla Dunia, Charitable Association for Palestinian Refugees, Mr. Mohammad Mawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday 3 April 2014</strong></td>
<td>9:00 – 10:00</td>
<td>Visiting YFD School – Mieh w Mieh Camp (Near Ein el-Helweh Camp), Mr. Abed Hajeer, Mrs. Hanan Ghali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:00 – 12:30</td>
<td>Saida – Ein el-Helweh &amp; Gatherings: Meeting with Partners and Beneficiaries General Union of Palestinian Women: Mrs. Amneh Jibril, Director, Mrs. Amal Shehabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:00 – 15:00</td>
<td>Meeting with Rita Hamdan (PARD Director for follow up)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friday 4 April 2014</strong></td>
<td>9:00 – 10:00</td>
<td>Meeting with UNRWA – Mr. Salem Dib</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10:30 – 11:30</td>
<td>Meeting with Health Care Society Director – Mrs. Bahija Mayassi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12:00 – 13:00</td>
<td>Meeting with UNHCR - Jean Nicolas Reuze</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13:30 – 17:00</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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### Appendix 18. Itinerary for Somalia

#### EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY NORWEGIAN PEOPLE’S AID IN SOMALIA

**Itinerary for Evaluation Team’s Visit to Somalia in April 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Planned Activity</th>
<th>Responsible NPA Office / Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Thursday 10.04.2014 | Nairobi                   | ▪ Arrival in Nairobi (Scott / Kelly / Haifa)  
▪ Overnight in Nairobi - Hill Park Hotel | NPA Nairobi                       |
| Friday 11.04.2014  | Nairobi                   | ▪ Meeting with NPA Staff in Nairobi Office  
▪ Skype Meeting with International Director of UK NGO  
▪ Overnight in Nairobi - Hill Park Hotel | NPA Nairobi  
Scott Jones |
| Saturday 12.04.2014 | Nairobi                   | ▪ Open meetings by Consultants  
▪ Overnight in Nairobi - Hill Park Hotel | Scott Jones |
| Sunday 13.04.2014  | Nairobi  
Garowe | ▪ Air travel from Nairobi to Garowe - UNHAS  
▪ Consultants’ briefing with NPA and GECPD  
▪ Overnight in Garowe - New Rays Hotel | NPA Nairobi  
NPA Las Anod  
GECPD |
| Monday 14.04.2014  | Garowe                    | ▪ Meeting with GECPD and beneficiaries  
▪ Meeting with HADMA  
▪ Meeting with authorities of Puntland State of Somalia  
▪ Overnight in Garowe - New Rays Hotel | GECPD  
HADMA  
NPA Las Anod |
| Tuesday 15.04.2014 | Garowe  
Las Anod | ▪ Road travel from Garowe to Las Anod  
▪ Meeting with Somaliland Authorities in Sool Region  
▪ Consultants’ briefing with NPA, SVO, SRO and HANAQAAD  
▪ Overnight in Las Anod - NPA Compound | Governor  
Mayor of Las Anod  
SVO / SRO / HANAQAAD  
NPA Las Anod |
| Wednesday 16.04.2014 | Las Anod                 | ▪ Visit to Meeting with SVO in Las Anod  
▪ Discussions in Las Anod with beneficiaries of projects supported by NPA Somalia and implemented by SVO  
▪ Overnight in Las Anod - NPA Compound | SVO  
NPA Las Anod |
| Thursday 17.04.2014 | Las Anod                 | ▪ Visit to Meeting with SRO in Las Anod  
▪ Discussions in Shululuh with beneficiaries of projects supported by NPA Somalia and implemented by SRO  
▪ Overnight in Las Anod - NPA Compound | SRO  
NPA Las Anod |
| Friday 18.04.2014  | Las Anod                 | ▪ Visit to Las Anod Regional Referral Hospital  
▪ Discussions with some patients (where possible)  
▪ Overnight in Las Anod - NPA Compound | RMO  
NPA Las Anod |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Planned Activity</th>
<th>Responsible NPA Office / Partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Saturday   | Las Anod | Visit to Sool Women’s Resource Centre (HANAQAAD Office)  
Discussions with beneficiaries of projects supported by NPA Somalia and implemented by HANAQAAD  
Consultants’ debrief with NPA, SVO, SRO and HANAQAAD  
Overnight in Las Anod - NPA Compound | HANAQAAD  
SVO / SRO  
NPA Las Anod |
| Sunday     | Las Anod | Road travel from Las Anod to Hargeisa  
Meeting with Somaliland Vice Minister of Interior  
Overnight in Hargeisa - Maan Soor Hotel | NPA Las Anod |
| Monday     | Las Anod | Meeting with Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources  
Meeting with Ministry of Health and Labour  
Dinner with Chair of Somaliland Nurses’ Association  
Overnight in Hargeisa - Maan Soor Hotel | NPA Las Anod  
Scott Jones |
| Tuesday    | Hargeisa | OPEN                                                                                                 | Consultants |
| Wednesday  | Hargeisa | Air travel from Hargeisa to Nairobi  
Overnight in Nairobi - Hill Park Hotel | NPA Nairobi |
| Thursday   | Nairobi  | Meeting with Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi  
Consultants debrief with NPA staff based in Nairobi  
Meeting with Gary P. Jones (Former CD NPA Somalia) | NPA Nairobi  
Scott Jones |
| Friday     | Nairobi  | Departure from Nairobi (Scott / Kelly)                                                               | NPA Nairobi  
Scott / Kelly |
| Sunday     | Nairobi  | Departure from Nairobi (Haifa)                                                                       | NPA Nairobi  
Haifa |

**KEY**

a) GECPD - Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development  
b) HADMA - Humanitarian and Disaster management Agency  
c) HANAQAAD - Hanaqaad Umbrella Women’s Organization  
d) NPA - Norwegian People’s Aid  
e) RMO - Regional Medical Officer  
f) RWE - Regional Water Engineer  
g) SRO - Social Relief Organization  
h) SVO - Steadfast Voluntary Organization  
i) UNHAS - United Nations Humanitarian Air Services
Appendix 19. Itinerary for Oslo

**Monday March 3**
0900 – 0930 Kathrine Raadim/Jane Filseth Andersen, NPA Oslo office
0930 – 1100 Svein Olsen, venue NPA Oslo office
1400 – 1500 Beate Thoresen, venue NPA Oslo Office.

**Tuesday March 4**
0900 – 1000 Rannveig Lade/Martin Holter, venue NPA Oslo office
1000 – 1130 Ingeborg Moa, venue NPA Oslo Office
1200 – 1300 Per Nergård, venue NPA Oslo office
1500 – Sveinung Torgersen, venue Gullhaug 4a

**Wednesday March 5**
14-1500 - Steinar Essen venue NPA office

**Thursday March 6**
0900 – Orrvar Dalby, venue railway station Drammen
1300 – Mads Almaas – NRC, venue NRC Prinsensgate 2
1500 – Ketil Eik – MFA, venue MFA

**Friday March 7**
1000 Arne Folleraas – MFA, venue MFA
1100 Trude Falch, venue NPA office

**Monday March 10**
1130 – 1230 Final meeting Kathrine Raadim/Jane Filseth Andersen venue NPA office