Unclear roles lead to unclear results

Annual Report 2018/19
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PREFACE
The past year has been an unusual one for the Evaluation Department. The report from the project group for the reform of the Norwegian aid administration or “the reform of organisational aspects of the grant management administration”, which is its full name, was presented in September 2018. In the report, the project group recommended outsourcing the evaluation function from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Norad.

This recommendation was made after the Minister of International Development clearly stated six months earlier that the evaluation function should be part of a future Norad administrative directorate. One year earlier, the Ølberg committee recommended transferring the evaluation function from Norad to the MFA.

Two years of uncertainty is not a sound foundation for a function that should be characterised by integrity and analytical expertise. Such a function needs to know that it is considered legitimate and needed.

Much of the Evaluation Department’s attention has therefore been on clarifying and explaining the function and role of evaluation in Norwegian aid administration. After all, this is a function that has been in operation since 1977, has its legal basis in specific instructions given by the permanent secretaries of the MFA and the Climate and Environment Ministry and is run in accordance with the financial regulations in the Norwegian central government. In other words, it is not a random or optional activity that a state enterprise can choose not to carry out. The reasoning behind this recommendation is therefore unclear.

Despite the uncertainties, the department has delivered good evaluation work in line with the evaluation programme. The evaluations have contributed to systematise experiences and knowledge from the implementation of development policy and have shed light on aspects of this work that can be improved. It is not unusual for evaluations to show that the results are different than what was intended and expected. One example of this is the impact evaluation of Phase II of the Norway India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (NIPI). The Norwegian authorities have cited it several times as a successful initiative; the evaluation provides a more nuanced view.

The Evaluation Department has also made its mark in international evaluation work this year, both in connection with the work within the evaluation network of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and within selected multilateral organisations. It is worth noting that the OECD/DAC peer review of the Norwegian aid administration commends the evaluation activities: ‘Norway’s approach to strategic evaluations is strong, and the country has become an important leader in development evaluation’.

Within the OECD system, the work of revising the five DAC evaluation criteria has required much of my time and attention in my role as chair of the evaluation network. The criteria were drawn up at the end of the 1990s to strengthen the evaluation of development aid and international development work. The criteria are now in use all over the world, providing a foundation for evaluations in all contexts, far outside the field of development assistance. An extensive consultation has been conducted, and the process of revising the criteria is nearing completion.

The Evaluation Department has entered into partnerships with the evaluation departments of the Global Environment Facility, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Women – the UN organization dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women. The partnerships include exchanging knowledge and performing evaluation work in areas that are relevant to Norwegian development cooperation, for example education, climate and the environment.

The department has also participated in international peer reviews of the evaluation functions of selected organisations in order to strengthen these functions. These include reviews of these functions in the African Development Bank and the UNDP during the past year.

In addition to organised cooperation processes, the Evaluation Department regularly exchanges knowledge and experiences on relevant topics with similar organisations in other OECD countries and multilateral organisations.

The international networks and contacts help ensure the relevance of the approaches used in evaluations
and makes it possible to draw on a broader range of knowledge than that obtained in each evaluation project.

The Evaluation Department is continuing to play an active role in the Norwegian evaluation community through participation in the government’s evaluation forum and through cooperation with the Norwegian Evaluation Society at different evaluation meetings and conferences.

A challenge will be to further improve the dissemination of knowledge produced through the work of the Evaluation Department and the knowledge we can access through the many collaborative relations to other parts of the Norwegian aid administration. This will allow Norwegian development work to maintain a high level of quality.

Oslo, May 2019

Per Øyvind Bastøe
Director, Evaluation Department

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**AID BUDGET AND ALLOCATION TO EVALUATION 2005–2018**

(NUMBERS IN MNOK)

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The Evaluation Department’s activity is regulated by separate instructions issued by the Secretary Generals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. The instructions from 2006 were revised in 2015 and became operative on December 1st 2015.

The following people were employed by the department in May 2019:

- Anette Wilhelmsen
- Anita Haslie
- Balbir Singh
- Ida Lindkvist
- Jan-Petter Holtedahl
- Lillian Prestegard
- Per Øyvind Bastøe
- Ragnhild Pedersen
- Siv J. Lillestøl
THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON
As in previous years, the evaluations that are summarised in the annual report show that much good work is being done in Norwegian aid administration.

At the same time, there are findings in the evaluations that give rise to concern. One of these findings is an unclear understanding and definition of roles and responsibilities within the aid administration.

Several of the evaluations link this lack of clarity to the ongoing changes related to development aid. The changes apply to the size of the aid budget, the direction of development aid, the use of different aid channels and the distribution of tasks and responsibilities among the different parties in the aid administration.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS**

The evaluation of the organisation of the aid administration in Norway and abroad found that the distribution of responsibilities between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Norad and the embassies was viewed differently by the various actors. This was primarily linked to administrative responsibility, technical advice and strategic management. One of the developments highlighted by the evaluation is that an increasing share of aid management is being performed at the MFA and Norad, with less and less being managed by the embassies. The aid statistics confirms this view. In 2018, 45 per cent of development aid was managed by the MFA in Oslo, while 30 per cent was managed by Norad. Only 15 per cent was managed by the embassies.

The evaluation of the protection of human rights associated with assistance for private sector development revealed discrepancies in the execution of due diligence processes. While Norway played an active role in establishing the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the evaluation found that the different aid administration actors followed up the principles in very different ways. The evaluation called for clearer guidelines from the Ministry.

Even though the evaluation of Norway’s work associated with the peace talks between the FARC guerrillas and the Colombian government generally praised Norway’s work, a lack of clarity was also revealed in the distribution of tasks and responsibilities between the different actors on the Norwegian side.

The current evaluation of Norway’s participation in multilateral funds is taking a closer look at the increasing use of funds as an aid channel. The provisional findings show that Norway supports a wide range of funds, especially in the World Bank and in the UNDP. This is confirmed by aid statistics, which show that 32 per cent of the aid budget is being channelled through multilateral organisations as earmarked development aid. In total, 56 per cent of development aid went to multilateral organisations in 2018. Key questions here are what the implications of this situation means for aid administration in Norway and internationally, and the role and responsibilities of the administration in this type of aid. This must be clarified to a greater extent than at present. Provisional findings show that the administrative burden in Norway is considerable, and that responsibility for funding channelled through multilateral is unclear, including responsibility for performance.
The changes in Norwegian development aid are clearly visible in the 2018 aid statistics. They show changes in the size of the aid budget and changes to the channels through which Norway distributes funds. The total budget in 2018 was NOK 34.6 billion. This is an increase of NOK 0.5 billion, compared to the previous year. More than half of the total sum, NOK 19.3 billion, was channelled through multilateral organisations. Civil society partners were the second-largest group of partners, with over NOK 7.5 billion. The public sector in Norway and in other donor countries forms the third-largest partner group, with NOK 5.9 billion in 2018.

Even though the general thematic areas are fixed, changes are constantly being made to the initiatives and tasks to be handled using development aid. New initiatives are often linked to humanitarian crises and disasters, but also to new ideas and approaches among our partners and our political leadership.

This means that the current distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the aid administration is different than before. While aid administration employees used to be directly involved in the planning and execution of projects, their work now consists of negotiating agreements, developing partnerships and managing funds. At the same time, staffing levels are subject to streamlining, and the requirements regarding management are increasingly stringent.

The chances of achieving good results in such complex areas as those targeted by development aid increase if certain conditions are met. Predictability, a long-term perspective, coordination, capacity, competence, contextual understanding and local adaptation are some of these conditions.

Constant changes that result in unclear roles and unclear assignment of responsibilities may be a serious impediment to achieving results. It cannot be a coincidence that these findings recur in the thematic evaluations that have been conducted during the past year.

The evaluations do not provide a clear answer to what is achieved through Norwegian development aid but indicate that the current conditions are not the best for achieving results. The lack of clarity that has been identified in the evaluations makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions regarding the outcomes of development aid. This in itself can be a sign that it is urgent to clarify the roles, responsibilities and organisation of the aid administration.
REPORTS FROM THE EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
Synthesis study of evaluations of Civil Society Organisations’ democratisation and human rights work in Southern and Eastern Africa

BACKGROUND
In 2017, the Evaluation Department commissioned the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) to collate findings from evaluations and other documents regarding the response by south-based civil society actors to the challenges encountered in Southern and Eastern Africa. The study looks at civil society actors in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia, exploring the challenges facing these actors in their work with democratisation and human rights, and the actors’ responses to these challenges.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the synthesis study was to apply knowledge from existing evaluations to inform Norwegian development policy and strategies related to the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) with democratisation and human rights work in the Global South. The study reflected a southern perspective on this work.

FOUNDATIONS
The report focuses on the global tendency towards shrinking space for civil society in recent years, notably CSOs who work with democratisation and improving human rights. The limitations range from more restrictive legislation, through financial restrictions, to violence and threats against civil society actors.

The restrictions on CSOs can be specified as follows:

> Restriction of rights: the right to freedom of association, assembly and expression is limited, either through legislation or as a result of the exercise of authority.

> Exploitation of restrictions in the socio-political and cultural environment, for example in the form of conservative attitudes towards the LGBTI community and members’ rights.

> Limited access to policy dialogue with legislators and political processes, especially for organisations that work with democratisation and human rights.

> Financial restrictions: changes to donors’ priorities and limited opportunities to raise funds themselves cause substantial financial problems for non-governmental organisations that work towards democratisation and human rights.
South-based CSOs respond to these challenges in different ways:

> Responses to restrictions on rights include increasing the organisation’s focus on service delivery, limiting activities to the local level, becoming more cautious with what is said about e.g. the lack of democratisation and compliance with human rights, and how it is said, or to discontinue activities. A more proactive approach means mobilising CSOs and the population at large to fight such restrictions on rights or taking legal action against the authorities.

> CSOs that are exposed to restrictions in the socio-political and cultural setting often enter into local, national or international alliances. Information work is another form of response. A third is to increase transparency and accountability within one’s own organisation.

> When the authorities limit access to policy dialogue to only a few CSOs, those who have not been invited to participate may instead seek to force such access, for example by mobilising the local inhabitants, obtaining research-based findings and/or by collaborating with the media.

> Some south-based CSOs respond to limited funding options by delivering services in exchange for pay or by introducing membership fees. Others work towards changes to the tax regulations in order to alleviate such limitations or seek membership of various funding arrangements.

The report also finds that the response of CSOs is most effective when it is based on a thorough analysis of the local context and local power constellations.

The response options depend on which themes are socio-politically or culturally sensitive, such as LGBTI rights or corruption, and the alliances that are available. The most effective strategies use a whole range of response types and tools.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Evaluation Department recommended that the report be forwarded to relevant units at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including relevant foreign service missions.
Evaluation of Norwegian engagement in the peace process between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2010–2016

BACKGROUND
Norway has been engaged in a number of peace and reconciliation processes since the early 1990s. This has been an important aspect of Norwegian foreign policy. This evaluation looked at Norway’s engagement in the peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from June 2010 to December 2016. The peace negotiations took place in two phases, a secret phase in 2010–2012 and a public phase in 2012–2016.

Trust was an important factor in Norway being invited to participate in the negotiations in 2010. Norway had a good reputation as a peace facilitator. In addition, Norwegian actors had been present in Colombia for a long time, partly as a result of their engagement in previous peace processes in the country, which gave them a good understanding of the context and a large network. This allowed them to navigate a complex political landscape. As a country outside the EU, Norway was also able to negotiate with the FARC without being bound by the ban on negotiating with anyone on the EU’s list of designated terrorist organisations.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation was to obtain knowledge about the Norwegian engagement which can be used to strengthen Norwegian work on future peace and reconciliation processes. The evaluation sought to:

- document and analyse Norway’s role as a facilitator in the peace process.
- assess whether and, if applicable, how contextual analysis and experience from other peace processes in which Norway participated informed Norway’s approach as a facilitator in the Colombian peace process.
- provide recommendations for future Norwegian participation in peace processes.

FINDINGS
- On the general level, the evaluation found that, as a peace facilitator, Norway helped build trust between the parties, and gave the parties access to relevant expertise. The evaluation also found that Norway benefited from its experience with other peace processes in its role as a facilitator of the peace process in Colombia.
- Norway helped build trust between the parties by having a good understanding of the context, and by offering a dedicated team that was present during the entire negotiations in Havana. The team was able to organise informal meeting places where the parties could have an open dialogue, and which allowed a reduction of tensions when different crises arose.
- Another important contribution by Norway was to offer the parties expertise in relevant technical areas. This particularly applied to the gender perspective and women’s participation in peace processes, demining, and transitional justice; i.e. processes and initiatives during the transitional period between armed conflict and peace, that would guarantee accountability for past offences.
The evaluation found that the Norwegian team actively used experiences from previous peace processes Norway had been involved in (Sri Lanka, Guatemala, South Sudan, Nepal, and prior processes in Colombia). These lessons helped the members be aware of issues that they had not focused on earlier, for example keeping a low profile in the media, and including a gender perspective in every aspect of its work. Norway also displayed a considerable understanding of the context. This knowledge was drawn on actively throughout the process.

Even though the findings are mainly positive, the evaluation identified areas for improvement:

Better clarification of roles and responsibilities within the Norwegian team in Havana and between the team and the administration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The Norwegian team needed more administrative support in order to fully focus on its role as a facilitator, for example in connection with travel and logistics, but also help with communication and formulating a clear message to the outside world.

Norway could have been better prepared for an outcome that meant that the peace agreement was rejected in the national referendum. For example, Norway could have spent more time clarifying the content of the peace agreement with the Colombian population.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Evaluation Department recommended that the MFA increase operational readiness for future Norwegian peace engagements.

The following general recommendations were made:

- Ensure sufficient and flexible funding in future peace processes.
- Clarify thematic areas in which Norway can have a role in peace engagements, preferably in areas where Norway has sound expertise and an international position, for example in women’s participation and a gender approach, or transitional justice.
- Systemise knowledge from previous peace processes and use these experiences on new engagements.

The following recommendations were made regarding certain peace engagements:

- To perform systematic risk assessments.
- To build Norwegian engagement on a good understanding of context.
- To formulate a clear mandate for the facilitation team, where roles, responsibilities and access to support from the administration of the MFA are clarified.
BACKGROUND
A key component of development policy has long been to promote, protect and respect human rights. The 2014 White Paper *Opportunities for All* highlighted the importance of human rights as both an objective and an instrument of foreign and development policy. This means that the promotion and protection of human rights is an objective in itself, while also being a means of achieving the other objectives of development policy. This evaluation focuses on how the obligation in the White Paper to promote and protect human rights has been followed up in development cooperation that involves the business sector.

The evaluation is based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), which is the leading international framework for the promotion and protection of human rights involving business. Norway played a key role in the international process that led to the UN’s guiding principles in 2011.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation was to examine the extent to which the UN’s guiding principles to promote and protect human rights have been followed up in development cooperation involving business.

The overarching questions addressed by this evaluation were to what extent the state actors have implemented policy, guidelines and measures to promote and protect human rights, the extent to which the development administration communicates clear expectations towards actors in business, and how state actors check and guarantee that the business sector performs adequate due diligence assessments of human rights. An assessment was also made of the extent to which there is a complaints mechanism and compensation arrangements for human rights violations.

The evaluation team reviewed systems to promote and protect human rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Norad, the Norwegian embassies, Norfund, Innovation Norway and the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credit (GIEK). The six units have different responsibilities and tasks in Norwegian development cooperation. The evaluation team also reviewed selected projects and the role of the embassies in Mozambique and Tanzania.
FINDINGS

> There is strong support for human rights and the UNGP, and these have been communicated widely through white papers and guiding documents for development cooperation. The MFA has played a key role in communicating these expectations to the business sector, professionals and other parties. Despite this, the evaluation shows that implementation of these political guidelines is incomplete.

> There are major differences in how state actors understand their responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights. Furthermore, deficiencies are discovered when it comes to the state actors’ understanding of their responsibility for securing adequate due diligence assessments of human rights among the business actors involved in development aid.

> On the part of the government, it is also unclear where the responsibility lies for ensuring that state actors have a clear understanding of who is responsible for monitoring and following up implementation of the UNGP.

> Apart from GIEK, the evaluation finds that the complaints mechanisms for human rights violations are inadequate at all units.

RECOMMENDATIONS

> The MFA should clarify and communicate more clearly towards its partners in development cooperation the expectation that they must follow official Norwegian policy to promote and protect human rights.

> Administrative responsibility for implementation of the policy to promote and protect human rights should be clarified. This includes clarifying responsibility for tailoring implementation to the UNGP, and performing good due diligence assessments of human rights, including responsibility for quality assurance of due diligence assessments performed by private actors involved in the development cooperation.

> Guidance services aimed at Norwegian business engagement in developing countries should be strengthened, especially at the embassies. The administration should also consider allocating extra funds which can be used by the business partners to perform due diligence assessments and promote and protect human rights.
The Norway-India Partnership Initiative phase II: Impact evaluation of five interventions for maternal and child health

BACKGROUND
The Norway-India Partnership Initiative (NIPI) is one of five partnership initiatives that Norway has entered into to promote maternal and child health, and it is part of the Norwegian commitment to global health. NIPI is divided into three phases: Phase I (2006–2012), Phase II (2013–2017) and Phase III (2018–2021). Approximately NOK 800 million has been budgeted for the programme during this period.

Five interventions from the initiative were selected for an impact assessment of the interventions on the target groups. The five interventions were: home visits to families with children between the age of three and twelve months, follow-up of sick newborns after discharge from the clinic/hospital, family planning measures, strengthening regional resource centres for facility-based newborn care, and strengthening nursing and midwifery education.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation was to give NIPI’s partners, including Norwegian and Indian authorities, information about whether and to which extent the interventions worked. In addition, the Evaluation Department wished to focus on various methods that can be used to assess the impact of development aid interventions.

FINDINGS
Difficult to document the health benefits of home visits to families with children between the age of three and twelve months
Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) would visit families with children below the age of twelve months, four times, with the intention to provide age-adapted information about factors such as appropriate diet and childcare. The evaluation team found that fewer than half the families had received all the visits to which they were entitled. The team found limited evidence of impacts at the population level; for example, there were few differences in diet and childcare between the NIPI districts and the control districts. The team concluded that it was difficult to conclude with respect to the impact of the intervention.

Limited health impact of follow-up of sick newborns after discharge from a clinic/hospital
ASHAs and midwives were intended to make home visits to families with sick newborns or newborns with low birth weight. NIPI provided training and was to pay a small sum of money to both midwives and ASHAs for each visit. However, payment to midwives was not approved by the Indian healthcare authorities, and the midwives therefore had to carry out home visits without extra compensation. The evaluation found that the ASHAs mainly carried out the home visits. Very few infants were followed up by the midwives. However, it found that more mothers used the so-called kangaroo method where the child lies skin-to-skin on the parent’s chest. Research has shown that skin contact has a wide range of positive effects on a child’s health.
The kangaroo method was one of the training interventions the mothers received during these home visits.

**Positive health impacts of postpartum family planning interventions**

The intervention was intended to strengthen the family planning program by providing counseling and information to employees and ASHAs. The evaluation team found that postpartum services staff were satisfied with the training they had received but that their knowledge of family planning still varied. Although there had been an increase in ASHAs’ knowledge, after the training they still had a somewhat limited awareness of family planning methods. Moreover, the evaluation team found that the mothers in the NIPI districts had more knowledge of family planning methods and that more of them used intrauterine devices than in the control districts. The team believed it likely that the intervention had had positive health impacts.

**Regional resource centres for newborn care have enhanced knowledge and practices at the local sick newborn care units**

The intervention focused on establishing regional resource centres to provide follow-up at local sick newborn care units. Based on the interviews, the evaluation team found that these local units received good support from the regional resource centres. For example, the evaluation team found that the staff’s knowledge and practices had improved. However, several of the local units had inadequate technical equipment and infrastructure, which may put sick newborns at risk. Notably, support for infrastructure, equipment etc. was not part of the NIPI intervention. The team was of the opinion that the regional resource centres had made a positive contribution to the enhancement of knowledge and practices at the local sick newborn care units.

**Improvement in nursing and midwifery education**

The intervention was intended to improve nursing and midwifery education at several schools. This included establishing state resource centres, as well as interventions in 133 schools. The evaluation found that the interventions had a positive impact on the schools, including improving student training methods. The evaluation team notes that a lack of a technical infrastructure made it difficult for the schools to comply with Indian standards, but the intervention has probably improved the situation.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Evaluation Department recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should assess whether NIPI Phase III should be adjusted in line with the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, in particular it should facilitate the acquisition of more knowledge about the impact of some of the interventions. Moreover, it was recommended that when development aid is used to fund pilot projects, it is necessary to ensure at the planning stage that it will be possible to measure the impact of the project before deciding whether to scale up the project. In such situations, those responsible for planning the programme/grant administration should have access to guidance on how to develop monitoring and performance frameworks, and what methods can/should be used to evaluate the impact of the programme.
BACKGROUND
The background for the evaluation is a 2004 reform with the aim of simplifying and modernising Norwegian aid administration, making it more effective, as well as improving dialogue and contact with recipient countries. As a result of the reform, responsibility for bilateral assistance was transferred from Norad to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and several tasks and funding were decentralised to the embassies. The aim was to establish closer links between development policy and foreign policy, and Norad was primarily intended to serve as a development aid advisor, in addition to retaining responsibility for some grants. In 2017, the MFA transferred large portions of the health and education portfolio back to Norad.

The evaluation has examined the development in the embassies’ roles and responsibilities and the division of labour between the embassies and the MFA and Norad. The division of labour between the MFA and Norad has not been evaluated.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide input to ongoing efforts to improve Norwegian development cooperation.

FINDINGS
The main finding in the report is that in the period from 2004 to the present, a centralisation of authority in the Norwegian aid administration has occurred. According to the evaluation, the reform was reversed as early as 2009, when the embassies’ share of the total aid budget declined. The centralisation identified in the evaluation is in line with international trends in the field, with a number of countries integrating development aid policy more strongly into foreign policy. The centralisation is also in line with general trends in government administration in this period.

The evaluation finds that bilateral aid became relatively less important during this period. Since 2009, development aid via other channels has strongly increased, particularly in relation to funds and thematic initiatives. The evaluation shows that the embassies lack both information and an overview of total Norwegian funding in partner countries, including aid disbursed through multilateral organisations.

Today, embassies managing aid have a range of different tasks, but have less decision-making authority than before. A number of new goals and sub-goals were included in the embassies’ work, particularly after 2012. Key tasks linked to foreign policy and development aid policy are administration, consular matters, migration and trade promotion. Embassies have less decision-making authority since they have fewer opportunities to enter into agreements with local partners, they have less leeway to reallocate their budget, and their work has a more short-term perspective since one-year plans for
the embassies’ work are now drawn up, in comparison to previous three-year plans.

> However, the number of embassy staff managing aid has increased. In 2017, a total of 41 embassies managed aid. The evaluation shows that the number of employees at these embassies has increased from approximately 165 in 2004 to 301 in 2017. There have been plans to transfer positions from Norad to the embassies, but the evaluation team was unable to determine whether this is in relation to the development aid field or to the many other tasks embassies perform.

> Despite this centralisation of authority in the Norwegian aid administration, the evaluation finds that the MFA has not been adequately reinforced to handle the task. The evaluation raised the question of whether the MFA has adequate development competence. Moreover, the embassies reported that the support provided by the MFA is too weak. In some cases, the embassies find that they must coordinate the work performed by their colleagues at home instead of the MFA coordinating support to the embassies. The embassies also experience duplication of work and overlap between various parts of the administrative system.

> The embassies are most satisfied with the technical support they receive from Norad. However, some of the informants in the evaluation are unsure as to whether country-level and context-specific competence in the agency is in the process of being weakened, which may be due to Norad staff having few foreign postings.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

> Ensure improved strategic management and coordination from the MFA in order to avoid duplication of work and overlap between the MFA’s departments, Norad and the embassies.

> Clarify the role of embassies in relation to Norwegian development aid provided through other channels at the country level, including Norad’s grant schemes, support via multilateral channels and funds and humanitarian assistance.

> Adapt career paths and organisational resources to ensure adequate and stable development aid competence in the MFA, Norad and the embassies.
Evaluation of Norway’s multilateral partnerships portfolio

BACKGROUND
More than half of Norwegian development aid funding is channelled via multilateral partners. There is considerable interest from both Norway and the multilateral partners in improving the management of partnerships that channel earmarked funding using trust fund based mechanisms.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation is to assess how Norway’s trust fund based partnerships with the World Bank and the UNDP promote the priorities of Norwegian development aid; bearing in mind Norway’s rationale for channelling earmarked development aid through partnership funds.

The evaluation identifies lessons that are relevant for the future management of earmarked development aid funding through trust fund based partnerships.

FINDINGS
The analysis of Norway’s portfolio of trust fund agreements with the World Bank and the UNDP shows that:

> Norway is a predictable contributor that permits flexibility in the use of funds.

> Portfolio analysis indicates a high level of thematic and geographic concentration.

> A large proportion of funding is concentrated in a few funds, while the remainder is spread over several smaller funds. This raises the question of whether the composition of the current portfolio could be better adapted to Norway’s priorities in development aid policy.

> The quality of Norway’s funding through trust funds is weak in terms of transparency and accountability for results.

> The distribution of authority and responsibility for managing donor contributions varies according to the type of fund and the partners. Disparities across types of fund and partners constitute a risk that requirements and applicable standards for utilisation of resources in multilateral partnership agreements deviate from those that are applicable to bilateral development aid channels.
Mapping and analysis of humanitarian assistance and support in fragile states

BACKGROUND
Norway spends NOK 4–5 billion annually on humanitarian efforts. In addition, substantial amounts are spent on long-term engagements in fragile states. The increased complexity and duration of humanitarian crises has meant that Norway, like other donor countries, has directed greater attention to the relationship between humanitarian and long-term engagements in recent years.

PURPOSE
The Evaluation Department is planning several evaluations in the field of humanitarian assistance and engagements in fragile states. This mapping report constitutes background material for these evaluations. The first evaluation will examine Norwegian support to South Sudan.

The report covers the period 2008–2017 and maps:

- Norwegian goals and priorities for humanitarian and long-term engagements in fragile contexts
- Norwegian humanitarian assistance
- Norwegian and international development aid to three selected countries (South Sudan, Somalia and Palestine)

FINDINGS
The study shows a substantial degree of continuity in Norwegian goals and priorities for humanitarian assistance and development aid to fragile states. Norwegian support has been based on protecting and helping civilians and vulnerable groups. During this period, there has been increasing focus on a rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance. Norway has given higher priority to the coordination of humanitarian assistance and long-term engagements, in line with international commitments.

The mapping shows a doubling of Norwegian humanitarian assistance in the ten-year period. Norwegian humanitarian assistance is mainly channelled via multilateral organisations and Norwegian NGOs. The share channelled to local organisations is negligible.

Humanitarian assistance to the individual countries reviewed appears to follow the needs that arise as a result of humanitarian crises. Humanitarian assistance as a share of the total Norwegian engagement in the three countries is lower than the share in the total international assistance. The study indicates that this may mean that Norway is more willing than other donor countries to invest in long-term assistance in fragile contexts.
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
Partnership agreements

Most organisations that receive Norwegian development aid, whether they are multinational (multilateral) organisations, non-governmental organisations or institutions in the recipient countries, evaluate their own activities. Since parts of this activity are supported by Norway, this work is also important for acquiring knowledge about Norwegian development aid.

In order to gain insight into this evaluation work, the Evaluation Department cooperates with several evaluation units in UN organisations, development banks and other professional evaluation bodies. Our contractual partners this past year are described below.

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**
In 2015, an agreement was signed with UNDP’s Independent Evaluation Office following the completion of the previous agreement in 2014. Through the agreement, support is given to evaluation measures that improve partner countries’ ability to evaluate the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in the years ahead.

A practical guidance tool has been developed for national authorities to use to assess the current evaluation capacity, including guidelines on how to strengthen capacity in accordance with national needs and priorities. The guide is available online.

**The Global Environment Fund (GEF)**
In 2017, the Evaluation Department entered into a partnership agreement with the Global Environment Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office whereby the Evaluation Department has partly financed several evaluations and studies. The evaluations that have been completed are presented on the following pages.

**The United Nations entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women (UN Women)**
In 2018, the Evaluation Department entered into a partnership agreement with the evaluation office of UN Women. The aim of the cooperation is to develop and share good evaluation approaches and practices that can build greater capacity for evaluation in partners in the South.
BACKGROUND
Since its establishment in 1992, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has created global environmental benefits by supporting local investment. The challenge for the GEF has always been to distinguish between the impacts of its own actions and the actions the GEF’s partners would have undertaken themselves without the GEF’s support. This counter-factual philosophy has driven much of GEF’s approach to determining additionality in its projects.

PURPOSE
This study further develops the GEF’s approach to assessing additionality in its projects. The aim of the study is to strengthen design and implementation, including the monitoring and evaluation of the GEF’s support.

FINDINGS
> Additionality resulting from GEF’s efforts can be divided into six categories:
  • Environmental benefits
  • Improvements in legal/regulatory framework conditions
  • Strengthening of institutional capacity
  • Greater access to funding
  • Improvements in socio-economic effectiveness
  • Benefits resulting from increased innovation

> A review of the GEF’s final project reports shows that the additionality of GEF’s support measured in the form of global environmental benefits was documented in 77 per cent of the projects, while benefits that can be attributed to increased innovation are mentioned in only 11 per cent of the projects assessed.

> Carrying out an assessment of the environment and other types of additionality requires a clear specification of the project’s theory of change, in which the correlation between the GEF’s input and its direct and indirect impacts and sustainability are described, and the assumptions on which the correlations are fully elucidated.

RECOMMENDATIONS
> The GEF’s independent evaluation unit should place emphasis on ensuring that new projects allow for an assessment of GEF’s additionality. An approach to ascertain additionality aspects should be included in the evaluations conducted by the unit.

> The GEF must track results relating to improvements in the legal and regulatory frameworks, strengthening of institutional capacity, improvements in socio-economic effectiveness as well as global environmental benefits.

> The GEF’s partners should outline a theory of change for projects which clearly explains the additionality of the GEF’s support.

FOLLOW-UP
The GEF is in the process of incorporating the proposed approach into its evaluation policy and guidelines applicable to its partners.
Evaluation of the Global Environmental Facility’s support to the mainstreaming of biodiversity

BACKGROUND
Altogether 195 countries and the EU have signed the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that requires member countries to work together to secure global biodiversity. The GEF supports the mainstreaming of biodiversity, defining it as ‘the process of embedding biodiversity considerations into policies, strategies and practices of key public and private actors that impact or rely on biodiversity’.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of GEF’s biodiversity mainstreaming projects in three countries – Colombia, India and South Africa. The study draws on the results of projects amounting to USD 2.34 billion in grants and USD 12.73 billion in co-financing.

FINDINGS
> GEF’s projects that are explicitly designed to address threats to biodiversity have played a significant role in the implementation of the Global Convention for the Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD).

> Most of the GEF projects have successfully introduced biodiversity conservation to targeted sectors, institutions, policies and territories that are of significance for conservation of global biodiversity.

> Successful mainstreaming is influenced by the interaction of economic and environmental interests, institutional monitoring and enforcement capabilities, and communications and outreach capacities.

> The utility of the contribution of GEF projects to the development of policies and practices that promote biodiversity exceeds the costs related to GEF’s input.

> Capturing other additional benefits such as socio-economic and environmental impacts of GEF’s support for biodiversity mainstreaming remains a challenge.

> Despite significant efforts to reinforce the monitoring and evaluation framework, the current framework has an inadequate focus on quantifying the impacts of mainstreaming efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS
> Design mainstreaming interventions that have a long-term perspective and funding.

> Conduct a systematic analysis of benefits and trade-offs in the project design stage.

> Improve and strengthen the design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation efforts.

> GEF should continue to leverage its convening power to improve policy formation and practice, and to promote cross-sector cooperation.
Evaluation of the Global Cleantech Innovation Programme (GCIP)

BACKGROUND
The Global Cleantech Innovation Programme (GCIP) is a cooperation between the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) which is intended to facilitate the establishment of entrepreneurial ecosystems for clean technology. The GCIP has supported programmes in nine countries with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises that develop clean technologies and solutions that offer global environmental benefits.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the evaluation was to help to improve the design, performance and impact of GCIP and similar future projects and programmes.

FINDINGS
> The GCIP projects are consistent with the mandates of the GEF and UNIDO, and national priorities and strategies of the programme countries.

> With relatively limited resources, the GCIP projects have meaningfully contributed to the development of innovative cleantech ecosystems, while improving its project performance over time.

> GCIP has demonstrated additionality in terms of innovation for clean technology, institutional capacity building, and financial and business development support for start-up companies whose products and services offer environmental benefits. Additionality has not been realised to an equally great extent in relation to strengthening the development of policy and regulatory framework conditions promoting innovation.

> GCIP has not readily realized cross-country network building as planned.

> GCIP has successfully mobilised the voluntary support of private sector actors, although the voluntary nature of these contributions makes the programs vulnerable.

> Commitment by a national partner unit, adequate funding, and a planned exit strategy at project completion was seen to enhance prospects for sustainability.

> Monitoring and evaluation was among the GCIP's weakest areas of implementation. Lack of a fully shared understanding of indicators, targets, and definitions have limited the comparability and aggregation of results.
RECOMMENDATIONS

> Program countries should be selected strategically based not only on their willingness, but also factors concerning their current state and readiness to support cleantech innovation as a part of national environmental and development strategy.

> Support national-level coordination and dedicate greater effort to developing national- and regional-level initiatives.

> Involve national coordinators where possible to coordinate, join and communicate with actors in countries engaged in supporting cleantech innovation. In addition, mobilise established private sector networks, such as technology associations, employer organisations, trade unions etc.

> Establish adequate monitoring and evaluation systems, and ensure their implementation using standardised, relevant indicators.
FOLLOW-UP OF EVALUATIONS
Follow-up of evaluations

Follow-up of the Evaluation Department’s reports is institutionalised through the Instructions for Evaluation Activities in Norwegian aid administration (2015). Against the background of a final report and acquired information, the Evaluation Department prepares a cover memo to the leadership (the Secretary General) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Climate and Environment, depending on who is responsible for the aid assistance that has been evaluated. In the memo, the Evaluation Department presents its assessment of the evaluation and proposals for actions to be followed up in Norwegian development policy.

Further follow-up is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. The department or foreign service mission that is responsible for the aid that has been evaluated is required to draw up a follow-up plan within six weeks and report back to the ministry leadership within one year on the measures that have been initiated to follow-up the evaluation. Both these documents are sent to the Evaluation Department for information purposes.

The table that follows shows the status of follow-up on the Evaluation Department’s reports in the period 2009 and up to May 2019. Both the Evaluation Department’s follow-up notes and the ministries’ follow-up plans and reports are published on the Evaluation Department’s website:

https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/evaluationreports/
## Follow-up of Evaluations // Status as of May 2019

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<th>Topic of the Evaluation/Project</th>
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<th>Follow-Up Measures Adopted by the MFA/MCE</th>
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<td>Follow-up Government of Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint donor team in Juba</td>
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<td>09.09.2009</td>
<td>No plan recommended beyond the follow-ups already conducted in the MFA</td>
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<td>NGOs in Uganda</td>
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<td>07.08.2009</td>
<td>No Norwegian follow-up required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral aid for environmental protection</td>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>08.10.2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian programme for development, research and education (NUFU) and Norad’s programme for master’s studies (NOMA)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Norwegian business-related assistance</td>
<td>3/2010 (Case studies 4, 5, 6)</td>
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<td>Norwegian support to the Western Balkans</td>
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<td>Evaluability study – Norwegian support to achieve Millennium Development Goals 4 &amp; 5 (maternal and child health)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace-building activities in South Sudan</td>
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<td>Norway’s culture and sports cooperation with countries in the South</td>
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<td>Study on contextual choices in fighting corruption: lessons learned</td>
<td>4/2011 Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for anti-corruption efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian development cooperation to promote human rights</td>
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<td>Norway’s trade-related assistance through multilateral organizations</td>
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<td>Activity-based financial flows in UN system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian support to the health sector in Botswana</td>
<td>10/2011</td>
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<td>Study of travel compensation (per diem)</td>
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<td>Norwegian development cooperation with Afghanistan</td>
<td>3/2012</td>
<td>13.12.2012</td>
<td>16.05.2013</td>
<td>06.03.2015</td>
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</tbody>
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1 This overview has been prepared by Norad’s Evaluation Department and is based on copies received of follow-up resolutions and reports in accordance with the Instructions for the Evaluation Activity in Norwegian Aid Management.
Since 1 January 2014, responsibility for follow-up and real-time evaluation of Norway’s international climate and forest initiative rests with the Ministry of Climate and Environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>The Norwegian climate and forest initiative – real-time evaluation: Support for measuring, reporting and verifying</td>
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<td>11.02.2014(^1)</td>
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<td>Unintended effects in evaluations of development aid</td>
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\(^2\) Since 1 January 2014, responsibility for follow-up and real-time evaluation of Norway’s international climate and forest initiative rests with the Ministry of Climate and Environment.

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